

**THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE**  
**NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE**



**SYLLABUS**  
**STRATEGY AND POLICY**  
**MARCH 2009 – JUNE 2009**

# **N A V A L   W A R   C O L L E G E**

## **COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE**

\*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*

### **STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT**

#### **FOREWORD**

This pamphlet contains the syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, March 2009-June 2009. This syllabus provides both an overview and lesson-by-lesson, detailed description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

JOHN H. MAURER  
Chair  
Department of Strategy and Policy

APPROVED

WILLIAM R. SPAIN  
Dean of Academics  
(Acting)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD .....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT .....	1
STUDENT OUTCOMES .....	2
COURSE THEMES.....	4
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY — THE PROCESS .....	5
1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy and Operations.....	5
2. The Decision for War .....	5
3. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans .....	7
4. The Instruments of National Power .....	8
5. Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment .....	9
6. War Termination.....	10
7. Winning the Peace and Preparing for War .....	11
MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY — THE ENVIRONMENT .....	12
8. The International Dimension of Strategy.....	12
9. The Material Dimension of Strategy.....	13
10. The Institutional Dimension of Strategy.....	14
11. The Cultural and Social Dimensions of Strategy .....	15
COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS.....	16
1. Methodology .....	16
2. Seminar Assignments .....	16
3. Presentations .....	16
4. Readings.....	16
5. Course Requirement .....	16
6. Seminar Essays .....	16
7. Pretutorials and Tutorials.....	18
8. Seminar Preparation and Contribution.....	18
9. Final Examination.....	20
10. Grade Appeals.....	20
11. Academic Honor Code.....	20
12. Course Critique .....	21
13. Web Page .....	22
ANNEX A - STRATEGY & POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY, 2008.....	A-1
ANNEX B - CASE STUDIES .....	B-1
CASE STUDIES	
I. Masters of War: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and the Development of Contemporary Strategic Thought.....	B-1
II. Democracy, Leadership, and Strategy in a Long War: Peloponnesian War .....	B-9
III. Commanding the Maritime Commons: Great Britain's Grand Strategy and Rise to Naval Mastery .....	B-19

IV.	At the Strategic Crossroads: The Rise and Fall of a Peer Competitor—Imperial Germany from the Wars of Unification to the First World War .....	B-27
V.	Losing Global Leadership: Confronting Conventional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and Disruptive Security Challenges—Great Britain Between the World Wars .....	B-37
VI.	The Challenge of Global War: The United States and its Allies in World War II and the Early Cold War .....	B-45
VII.	The Rise of China: The Transformation from Non-State Actor to Regional Power during the Chinese Civil War, Korean War, and the Taiwan Strait Crises .....	B-58
VIII.	Lessons Learned? Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Great Power Interventions: The Vietnam War in the Southeast Asian Cultural and Geostategic Environment.....	B-68
IX.	Limited War, Coercive Containment, and Regime Change: Gulf Wars 1990-2009.....	B-78
X.	Stopping the Unthinkable: Strategy and Policy of Preventing Proliferation of WMD .....	B-87
XI.	The Long War: The United States Against Al Qaeda.....	B-98
XII.	Retrospect and Prospect: Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Century.....	B-110
ANNEX C - COURSE CRITIQUE .....		C-1
ANNEX D - ACADEMIC CALENDAR .....		D-1
ANNEX E - PRESENTATION SCHEDULE.....		E-1

## **STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE DESCRIPTION**

### **Course Objectives and Content**

The Strategy and Policy Course is designed to teach students to think strategically and to prepare for positions of strategic leadership. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, and means. The aim of the course is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative strategic courses of action best serve to achieve overall national objectives. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, about a range of potential strategies, and about the strategic effects of joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

For policy makers, strategists, and operational planners, the task of translating operational outcomes into enduring political results is never easy or straightforward. The Strategy and Policy Course examines how the overall international strategic environment shapes strategies and outcomes. In turn, the course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. It is often the case that the forces fielded at the beginning of a conflict prove inadequate to deliver the desired strategic goals in wartime. The ability to adapt rapidly when confronted by wartime realities, developing new capabilities, is essential to achieve the strategic initiative. In addition, this course shows the critical importance of non-military instruments of national power for setting the conditions for success in war and sustaining the resulting settlement.

Of course, adversaries always seek to frustrate the best-laid plans in war and overturn the peace imposed upon them. A good strategic leader must anticipate and master the dynamics of interaction in a contest against determined adversaries. A skillful enemy that employs asymmetric strategies or an adversary from a different culture may prove especially daunting to defeat. The skilled strategist and war planner thus understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome.

The case studies examined in the syllabus are distinctive in three respects. First, the course examines the strategic dynamics of long wars, marked by protracted periods of intense fighting, producing truces and peace settlements, as well as interwar, and prewar eras, cold wars and crises leading to war. This perspective provides an opportunity to consider the effectiveness of all instruments of national power. Second, the leading strategic thinkers and case studies examine diverse types of wars, featuring a variety of operations and different keys to success. This course shows how success in one type of war may be followed by failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the ability to adapt to different types of wars. Third, this course analyzes the strategic success and failure of leading great powers and non-state actors over long periods of time. The course gives special attention to liberal maritime powers and their strategic leaders, as well as to the strategic resiliency of different types of political systems.

The Strategy and Policy Course adopts an interdisciplinary approach to strategy, drawing on the disciplines of history, political science, international relations, and economics. It integrates with those academic perspectives critical military factors from the profession of arms—such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics. The result is a coherent frame of reference to analyze complex strategic problems and formulate strategies to address them.

The curriculum consists of two core components: an examination of leading strategic theorists on war and analysis of major case studies. The works of major strategic thinkers—such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett—provide a foundation on which the course builds an analytical framework that students can use to understand the interrelationship of the realms of policy, strategy, and operations. The case studies provide an opportunity to evaluate and discuss the ways in which political leaders and strategic planners in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the challenges associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. This course, then, is concerned with strategic leadership that can effectively deal not only with current problems in policy and strategy but also those that might emerge in the future.

The Strategy and Policy Course addresses Senior Level Learning Areas for professional military education established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College for the development of an elite senior-level course, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The views of policy practitioners and leading teachers of strategy, as well as feedback from War College graduates, shape the course's content. The Strategy and Policy Course also reflects the collective experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded strategic analysis and clear policy guidance is of the utmost importance. The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, one of the country's leading authorities on professional military education, has put it well: "*This Nation does not have enough strategists.*"<sup>1</sup> The goal of the Strategy and Policy Course is to educate joint warfighters who are strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis.

## **Student Outcomes**

The Naval War College Senior-level Professional Military Education Outcomes applicable to this course are listed below. These outcomes, developed in synchronization with JPME Objectives, represent the Naval War College's expectations for those who successfully complete the Strategy and Policy Course.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3. Emphasis in the original.

### **Skilled in Strategic Decision Making involving Maritime, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Warfighting**

- Aware of maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations and their strategic effects
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a wide range of conflicts
- Capable of integrating naval/military capabilities with other national instruments power
- Understand challenges in accomplishing interagency and multinational coordination

### **Prepared for Positions of Strategic Leadership**

- Able to think strategically about all types of wars and strategic actors
- Skilled in evaluating alternative strategic courses of action
- Enhanced cultural awareness of key regions to include an understanding of the dynamics of the international strategic environment and geostrategic relationships
- Skilled in persuasive leadership by practicing the craft of writing clearly and speaking articulately about operations, grand strategy, and policy
- Understand the importance of strategic communication and reaching multiple audiences

### **Capable of Critical Thought**

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support policy and strategy decision making
- Master the meaning of a wide range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts
- Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real world, strategic leaders
- Competent in strategic-level problem solving, creative thinking, and risk management

### **Effective Maritime Spokespersons**

- Understand classic works on sea power and maritime strategy
- Steeped in the maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in full range of naval capabilities
- Skilled in applying naval perspective through use of analytical frameworks
- Aware of naval operations and their strategic effects

## **Course Themes**

The Strategy Department has developed eleven interrelated themes for use in the Strategy and Policy Course. These themes are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of “school solutions,” for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula. Rather, they are sets of questions designed to provoke thought, discussion, and evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. They will be used throughout the course because they can contribute to understanding the reasons for strategic effectiveness in contemporary war. The themes cannot provide the answers. Nonetheless, they are of critical importance as points of departure for analysis of and deliberation on key choices in strategy and policy decision-making. These themes thus provide a starting point for undertaking a critical analysis, assessing the match between alternative policy objectives and strategic courses of action.

We have divided these themes for the Strategy and Policy Course into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of formulating and executing strategies that support national policies; and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

### **STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE THEMES**

#### **MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS**

- 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**
- 2. THE DECISION FOR WAR**
- 3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**
- 4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**
- 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**
- 6. WAR TERMINATION**
- 7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR**

#### **MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT**

- 8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 9. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**

## **MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS**

### **1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**

What were the most important political interests and objectives of the antagonists? Did these interests and objectives emerge from a sound understanding of geopolitics and geostrategy? To what extent were objectives driven by a threat to the homeland? Were these interests shaped by culture, ideology and/or religion? If so, how? Were these interests and objectives clearly articulated and understood? If a country or a belligerent possessed coherent long-term political objectives, as well as medium-term and short-term ones, were these sets of objectives compatible or in conflict? If the objectives were pursued by peaceful means, what instruments of national power did the country choose to employ? Were the correct instruments selected? If not, how might a country have performed better?

Were the problems that gave rise to the war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of their political objectives, did they also plan to use instruments of power other than military ones in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? If war was chosen, did the military component of strategy tend to “crowd out” non-military components or considerations? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were the costs and risks of the war anticipated? How did political and military leaders propose to manage these risks? Were the risks commensurate with the benefits and rewards to be achieved?

What strategic guidance did the political leadership provide to the military? What was the quality of that guidance? Did the strategic guidance place restraints on how force could be used? Were those restraints so stringent as to reduce the chance of operational success? Was the policy so amorphous that it was difficult to match a strategy to it? What military strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did the strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did these strategies support their respective policies? At any point in the war did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the linkage between the achievement of military objectives and the achievement of political objectives? Did the political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically? What was the quality of the strategic leadership of the belligerents in the transition from peace to war, in the waging of war, and in the transition from war back to peace? Was the outcome of the war more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or more the result of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

### **2. THE DECISION FOR WAR**

What were the causes of the war? Can a distinction be usefully drawn between the underlying causes of the conflict and the proximate cause of the opening of

hostilities? Did war develop because of the long-term rise of a major new power? Could the outbreak of the war have been averted by more skillful diplomacy? Was any attempt made to appease or engage a potential enemy, and if so, were the results productive or counterproductive? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence the outbreak of war? If the war broke out despite an effort by one side to deter the other, why did deterrence fail? Were superior deterrent strategies available? In an effort to promote deterrence, did one side forward deploy some of its forces? If so, did the deterrent forces become vulnerable to preemptive attack? Was there something about the politics, culture, religion, or society of a belligerent that made him impossible to deter?

Given the political objectives sought, was the choice to go war a rational one? Was it based on an accurate appreciation of a state's (or non-state actor's) own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of its enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they attempt to push the political leaders into the war? Did they attempt to restrain the political leaders from going to war? Or did they offer the political leadership a balanced analysis of the available strategic options? How did the nature of the political objectives shape the decision to go to war? What role, if any, did a vision of an ideal international order play in the decision to go to war? Did cultural, social, or religious considerations influence the decision to go to war? Did geopolitical concepts or geostrategic calculations influence the decision? Was the war conducted in self-defense? Was control over a disputed territory central to the decision for war? Was it undertaken to protect an ally or coalition partner? Was it waged to uphold a preexisting balance of power? Was it waged to overturn a preexisting balance of power? Was the war preemptive? If so, how accurate was the information about imminent enemy military action? Was the war preventive? If so, were the forecasts made about the growth in enemy capabilities reasonable and justifiable? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerent that initiated it? To what extent did careful predictions about the likely behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision to go to war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If another party intervened in an ongoing conflict, why did it do so? Was that intervention decisive in determining the war's outcome?

If the choice to go to war was in some measure irrational, then why? Did ideology skew decision-making? Religious beliefs? Unrealistic ambition? Status anxiety? False perceptions of threats? Erroneous historical analogies? Misconceptions about geopolitics or geostrategy? Did cultural arrogance promote either overconfidence or an underestimation of the enemy? Were there peaceful strategies that were potentially as promising or more promising than military ones that were nonetheless dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party or parties "drag" major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another power would respond to an aggressive or threatening action? Did the war start "by accident"?

### 3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was the intelligence collected concerning the interests, intentions, capabilities and will of a country's rivals and potential enemies? What was the relative contribution of human sources and technology to the process of intelligence collection? Did superiority in intelligence collection technology actually produce superior intelligence? Were there features of a belligerent's own political system, culture, or society that facilitated or inhibited the collection of intelligence against it, and if so how? Were there characteristics of a belligerent's political system, bureaucracy, society, or culture that made it more difficult accurately to interpret or use the intelligence it collected? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was he taken by surprise?

Once war broke out, how successful were each belligerent's efforts to deny the enemy information about his own capabilities and intentions? As the war unfolded, how well in the event did each belligerent know both himself and his enemy? Were plans for the war based on an objective net assessment of friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, society, values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in the plans for the war? Was account taken of non-rational or unpredictable behavior on the part of the enemy? Was account taken of the possibility of the enemy's employment of asymmetric warfare or, if they existed, weapons of mass destruction? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly predict the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? Did they anticipate that the nature of the war might change over time? Did any leader stand out for his mastery of the art of assessment?

Did a country have a formal planning process designed to translate national policy into executable military strategies? If so, how effective was it? How responsive was it to changes in the international or domestic political environments? To what extent did the planners think about larger strategic issues, not just about operational concerns? Did the planners have to take account of two or more fronts or theaters? If so, how did they establish geostrategic priorities among those fronts or theaters? Were theater plans consistent with national strategies and geostrategic priorities? If the realization of national policy required the application of non-military instruments of power in addition to military force, was there any interagency mechanism for coordinating that application with the use of military power? What was the impact of interagency coordination on the development of strategic plans? Did coordination require fundamental changes in the quality and/or quantity of the planned use of military force? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify the war plans? Was a serious effort made to study the "lessons" of previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning for war at the levels of both grand strategy and theater strategy? To what extent did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines and/or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans correctly identify the enemy's strategic center or centers of gravity? His critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationships among political ends and military and non-military means? If weapons of mass

destruction existed, how did their existence influence the plans of those belligerents who had them and those who did not? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations and/or psychological operations? To what extent were plans for information operations well integrated with plans for other military operations? What were the principal strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning make adequate allowances for the inevitable fog, friction, chance and uncertainty of war? Did planners envision the possibility of a quick decisive victory? If so, was their vision realistic? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate the different stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated, and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be? Did any strategic leader distinguish himself for his brilliance, intuition, and/or imagination as a planner?

#### **4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**

How robust and well balanced were the diplomatic, informational, military and economic components of a belligerent's power? Did a belligerent's political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects and limitations of the different forms of national power at their disposal? Did the leaders take into account the political, financial, social and logistical constraints on the employment of the available instruments of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives and information operations coordinated, synchronized and deconflicted with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? What contribution did diplomats make to the understanding of other cultures, societies, and political systems? Did diplomats demonstrate an ability to think strategically? Did a country's diplomatic service develop an institutional point of view? If so, did that point of view help or hinder the state's attempt to match its grand strategy to its policy? Did diplomats act effectively to prevent the escalation of a war? To negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement to a war? To what extent did a country's diplomatic success depend on its actual relative power? To what extent did that success depend on the perception of its power?

How well did a belligerent utilize its economic resources in support of its political aims? Did it seek to influence other parties by means of subventions, foreign aid, loans, direct investment, or trade treaties? Did it attempt to deter or coerce its enemies by means of denial of aid, selective embargoes, partial or total suspension in trade relations, or blockades? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare against another, how accurate were the assumptions he made about the effects of his economic campaign on the public health, standard of living, and/or will power of his enemy? What roles did the naval and/or air instruments play in the execution of such economic warfare?

Did a belligerent have an information strategy? Did leaders develop a plan of strategic communication to reach multiple audiences? Was it developed through an

interagency process? How flexible, imaginative and comprehensive was it? If a belligerent tried to improve its image abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what success? Were the informational and/or propaganda campaigns of a belligerent aimed at the correct audiences? Were those campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture, society, religion(s), values, traditions and language(s) of the targeted audience? If a belligerent was interested in promoting its own ideology abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what results? If a belligerent was interested in countering what it deemed to be a noxious ideology abroad, what means did it employ? To what extent did it succeed? How well did political and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audience? How persuasive were the justifications they offered for the war? To what extent did political and military leaders manage to convince the domestic audience that their strategies would produce the desired results?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of military power for maximal national strategic and theater strategic effectiveness? Were plans that called for the use of different forms of military power informed by a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the achievement of the political objectives? If one side in a conflict was conspicuously more “joint” than the other, how important was this superior “jointness” to the outcome of the war? What limitations prevented a belligerent from attaining an optimal integration of its land, naval, and air operations during the war? Did any leaders stand out for their success in transcending those limitations? If army officers played a dominant role in the formulation of strategy, did they understand how the naval and air instruments could be used most effectively? Did naval commanders understand the circumstances under which it made strategic sense for them to risk their fleets? Was there a new domain of warfare in which a belligerent was able to operate to good strategic effect? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did any belligerent successfully translate asymmetries of technology into a strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and if so, did its operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional forms of military power and/or engage in irregular warfare?

## **5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**

How accurately were the consequences of interaction with the opponent predicted and anticipated by the parties to a peacetime conflict or by the belligerents in an open war? What effects did interaction with the opponent or enemy have on the nature (and the perception of the nature) of the conflict or war? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? At the outset of war, was the initial strategy implemented as planned, or were the prewar strategic plans disrupted by unexpected enemy action? Was the interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? How skillfully did a belligerent accommodate himself to the fog, friction and uncertainty of war? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful

were the belligerents in devising ways and means for intensifying the effects of attrition upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive? Did any strategic leader stand out as an adaptive improviser?

If a belligerent chose to open or contest a new theater of war, did this signify the adoption of a new policy objective or a new strategy, or was it merely an extension of a preexisting strategy? Was it a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater? Or was it an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created by the evolution of the war? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? If the latter, what were the strategic consequences of fighting an additional enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Was the new theater opened at the correct time? Did the social, cultural, religious, political, geostrategic and topographical environment of the theater promote military success, and if so, did that success have strategic “spillover” effects in the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening or contesting the theater and supporting operations there? If opening or contesting a new theater involved risking the fleet, how well did naval commanders manage that risk?

If the initial strategy proved to be successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or ill advised, in the political objectives? Alternatively, if the initial strategy proved to be unsuccessful or too costly, was there an opportune reassessment of either or both political objectives and strategy? If an additional state or other parties intervened on behalf of one side in the conflict, did this force the opposing side to rethink its policy and/or strategy and, if so, how? If there were any changes or adjustments in policy and/or strategy during the war, were these based on a rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available, both military and non-military?

## **6. WAR TERMINATION**

How and why did the war come to an end? Did the war end due to the collapse of one of the belligerents? As a result of the capitulation of one of the sides? By means of negotiated settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side’s military operations support its diplomacy? Did the war end because of the unambiguous material or psychological destruction or defeat of one belligerent by the other? To what extent was the end of the war due to the exhaustion of the belligerents? Did one of the belligerents sue for peace after rationally concluding that the costs of continuing to fight outweighed the value of any political object that might be gained? Did that rational calculation occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had the losing side earlier squandered realistic opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to overthrowing its enemy’s political regime, did that commitment translate into a longer war and heavier casualties? Did the end of the war come as a surprise? If so, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage the process of war termination to his best advantage?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary, did it overstep the culminating point of victory? Or did the winning side stop too short to give the political settlement of the war a good chance to endure? Did the winning side carefully consider what specific demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of its general political objectives? If the winning side chose to go further militarily in pursuit of greater political demands, what actual leverage did it acquire over the enemy? Did the long-term benefits of going further outweigh the short-term costs? If a leading power on the winning side put forward political demands that were opposed by its allies, what leverage, if any, did it exert on those allies to gain their acquiescence?

Was there a truce? If so, did military leaders negotiate the terms of the truce? In doing so, did they have, and heed, strategic guidance from their political leaders? Did the terms of the truce crucially shape the postwar settlement? To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent was the losing side or coalition reconciled to its political and military losses? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out an occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a more limited aim and had left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country? Did the victors make appropriate deployments for postwar stability operations? Did they understand the cultural, religious, social and geopolitical contexts in which such operations would take place?

## **7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR**

To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement of the war stem from the nature of the settlement itself? Was the underlying conflict that had given rise to the war definitely resolved by the war? What were the implications, if any, of the “nature of the war” for the durability of the settlement? In the aftermath of a civil war, did a stable new political order emerge, or was there a recurrence of state failure? How did the outcome of an interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did a victorious power emerge from the war substantially stronger in relative and absolute terms? If so, did it attempt to exploit that strength to reshape the international order in a fundamental way? What ideological and/or geopolitical concepts informed the reshaped international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace? Did the victorious coalition survive for long in the postwar era? Did old allies become new threats? If so, why? Did postwar occupations of defeated countries turn old enemies into new friends or allies? If so, how? Did the victorious powers “downsize” their military forces to such an extent that they undercut their ability to continue to secure the postwar international order and prevent the outbreak of a new war?

What were the major “lessons” of the war? What did the victorious side think that they were? What did the losing side consider them to be? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the policies of winning, losing, and neutral powers? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the military thought and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Or did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? What impact did the previous war have on the character and tempo of military-technological progress and on the development of operational art? Was such progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war?

At what point did it become apparent that a postwar era had given way to a prewar era? Were there countries that should have recognized that transition earlier? Were there crises that portended the next war? If so, how well did status quo powers manage those crises? Did preoccupation with stabilizing the settlement of the last war distract attention from the next war that loomed? Were preparations for the next war hampered by bad memories, feelings of guilt, or long-term material costs from the last war? Did anticipation of mass destruction to the homeland in the next war affect preparations for it? Were preparations for the next war driven by a sense of injustice or a desire for revenge? How ready were a country’s government, society, and military establishment when a new war broke out? Were they ready for different types of war and a broad range of military operations?

## **MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT**

### **8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were those efforts and why? Did the belligerents manage to create multinational coalitions? If so, what common interests and/or policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners agree on who the primary enemy was? Did coalition partners generally agree about the strategy to be pursued in the war? If not, why not? What were the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power that each partner brought to the coalition? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did information, intelligence, and material resources pass among the members of a coalition? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war? Did that cohesion have ideological, cultural or geopolitical underpinnings? What contribution did intra-coalition diplomacy make to the cohesion?

Did the strategies of the coalition have the effect of solidifying it or splitting it apart? Did strategies have the effect of strengthening an opposing coalition or weakening it? To what extent did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated during the war, was this chiefly the result of internal stress, external

pressure, or a combination of both? If coalition partners were culturally diverse, did cultural or religious differences contribute to internal stress? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to strategic success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? If the winning coalition did not fall apart soon after the end of the war, what accounted for its postwar vitality?

How did the outcome of the war change the international system? Were there concerted efforts to reform those aspects of the international system that were thought to have caused the war? Were new international organizations and/or other transnational arrangements established in order to secure the peace? Did the war result in changes in the international distribution of both hard and “soft” power that had not been anticipated? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, ability to attract allies, and future military potential? Did the war stimulate non-state actors to rise up against existing states or empires? Did the war produce geopolitical change in the distribution of power among different regions? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for domestic and regional economies? For the world economic system as a whole? Did postwar economic instability breed new sources of political instability in the international environment?

## **9. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**

What sort of economic system did the country possess? Was it predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did the government direct or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense industrial base (where one existed) do a good job of producing the weapons and developing the military technology that the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit militarily from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation in the industrial, transportation, or communications sectors of the civilian economy? Was the economic system as a whole sufficiently dynamic, productive, and broad-based to support the country’s strategic efforts to preserve or enhance its position in the international arena? Did a country’s strategic efforts have the “feedback” effect of strengthening or weakening the country’s economy? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and economic/fiscal resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the ultimate consequences of that gap for the country’s security?

In wartime, how effectively did each belligerent mobilize the economic resources at its disposal? Did governments make wise decisions about how to allocate resources, including manpower, among different uses? Was there an effective interagency process for making such allocation decisions? How did a belligerent’s financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to maneuver creatively but prudently around financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent’s system of public finance for its staying power in a protracted war? Which of the belligerents had superior logistical systems for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters of war and

sustaining forces there? How vulnerable were those systems to enemy interdiction? What role did shipping play in the logistical systems? Was the outcome of the war due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted a strategy of economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? How vulnerable were the belligerents to attack by strategies of economic warfare? How economically self-sufficient were they? How important were communications by sea to the functioning of a belligerent's economy? If air power was available, did the structure of a country's industrial sector and the location of its key productive assets make that belligerent especially vulnerable to strategic bombing? How adept were the belligerents at working around the effects of attacks on their material capability to wage war?

## **10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**

Who were the main institutional players in the development of strategy? What were their roles, relationships, and functions? By what processes did they develop, integrate, and apply ends, ways, and means? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were the military forces of each belligerent organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing and training for joint and combined warfare? Did a regular interagency process exist to coordinate the employment of military power with the use of other instruments of national power in pursuit of a belligerent's political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might that process have been improved? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did this affect the design and execution of strategy? Did such rivalries impede the presentation of a coherent military point of view on strategy to the civilian leadership? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional? If dysfunctional, why was this so and what were the consequences? Did problems in the chain of command, the interagency process, or the institutional structure of governmental authority contribute to excessive friction in civil-military relations? If there was intense competition within the governmental elite or among the participants in the interagency process, did this obscure the military leaders' understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aim affect the wartime civil-military relationship? If the political leaders demanded of the military instrument something that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed overly stringent political restraints on the use of force, how did the military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, what was the reaction of the civil leadership? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship and the making of policy and strategy? Did any leader manifest conspicuous ability in managing civil-military relations and making sound tradeoffs between political and military considerations?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to any major institutional changes in the organization of a country's national security system? How well did new national-security institutions or a reformed interagency process perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively in both wartime and peacetime? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership either divided their respective tasks or shared responsibility for strategy?

## **11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**

How did a belligerent's culture, society, ideology and religion affect the formulation of policies and strategies? Did a belligerent's culture, ideology and social structure affect the quality of the policy/strategy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable "strategic culture" or "way of war" and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior?

If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or part, how did the character of military action affect its course and outcome? Did non-military action or factors have a greater impact on how the struggle turned out? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent a clear advantage? Did information operations and/or strategic communication have the effect of either reinforcing or negating any such advantage? If a conflict pitted different ethnic or religious groups against each other, how did the mobilization of ethnic and/or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the war? Was the war marked by heavy resort to terrorism? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention? If so, how? If not, why not?

Was the embodiment of Clausewitz's trinity—the relationship among government, people and the military—able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If not, why not? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary's society from within? Did information operations play a significant role in any such weakening? Did a belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient "incremental dividends"—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain support for the war? Or did the strategy have the effect of diminishing domestic support for the war? Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and if so, with what success? Did the existence of communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the "passions of the people" make it difficult for political and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?

## **Course Process and Standards**

- 1. Methodology.** Each case study will be examined in-depth through a combination of presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.
- 2. Seminar Assignments.** Each student has been assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each of these seminars will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic. Seminar discussion is crucial to understanding the issues of the individual case studies. It is thus essential that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the issues examined by the case study as well as course themes and objectives.
- 3. Presentations.** Students will attend four presentations each week. At the conclusion of each presentation, the speaker will address comments and questions about the presentation from the audience. This period set aside for comments, questions, and answers is considered an integral part of the presentation. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of this opportunity to make comments and ask questions so that others in the audience may benefit from them and the speaker's response.
- 4. Readings.** Before seminar, students are expected to have read the books and articles assigned for that week's topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are all the readings that are required for seminar preparation, for the writing of essays, and the taking of the final examination. At the conclusion of the course, books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room within four weeks.
- 5. Course Requirements.** In addition to attending presentations, completing the assigned readings, and participating actively in seminar discussions, students will write three essays—two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

**Essays—25 percent for each essay**

**Final Examination—25 percent**

**Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent**

Grading will be in accordance with the current Naval War College Instruction 1520.2 series. A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of a Master's degree.

- 6. Seminar Essays.** Each student will submit two essays of no more than ten double-spaced typewritten pages (Times New Roman, 12-pitch font) on questions listed in the syllabus. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis on issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in

which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned reading. For this reason, students **should not consult past student papers on their assigned topics**; doing so would contradict Department and College policy, negate the whole purpose of this exercise in independent analysis, and deprive the student of a valuable opportunity to exercise original strategic thought.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. In addition, the student will distribute a copy of the essay to each member of the seminar, as the papers are a part of the assigned readings for the week. Students must read the essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

A good essay will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while counterarguments are addressed completely. Essay indicates brilliance.

**A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is significant, consideration of arguments and counter-argument is comprehensive, and essay is very well-written.

**A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work. Thesis is clearly defined, evidence is relevant and purposeful, arguments and counter-argument are presented effectively.

**B+ (87-89):** A well-executed essay that meets all five standards of a seminar essay as outlined above. A solid effort in which a thesis is articulated, the treatment of supporting evidence and counterargument has strong points, and the answer is well-presented and constructed.

**B (84-86):** An essay that is a successful consideration of the topic and demonstrates average graduate performance. Thesis is stated and supported, counterarguments considered, and the essay is clear and organized.

**B- (80-83):** Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterarguments are not fully developed and the essay may have structural flaws.

**C+ (77-79):** Below the graduate-level performance. The essay is generally missing one or more of the elements described above. The thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and/or the treatment of the counterargument may be deficient.

**C (74-76):** The essay fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

**C- (70-73):** Attempts to address the question and approaches a responsible opinion, but is conspicuously below graduate-level standards in several areas. The thesis may be poorly stated with minimal evidence or support and counterarguments may not be considered. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

**D (56-69):** Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. Fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.

**F (0-55):** Fails conspicuously to meet graduate-level standards. Essay has no thesis, significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic, and displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

**7. Pretutorials and Tutorials.** These conferences will normally be with the students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the students or the moderators. A pretutorial is required for every essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A tutorial session will follow in which the thesis of the essay will be discussed. Students who are writing essays should schedule a tutorial session with their moderators no earlier than one week before the date the essay is due. All students are encouraged to take advantage of these individual tutorials with their moderators as an aid in the preparation of their seminar essays. The faculty moderators will hold tutorials during regularly scheduled office hours.

**8. Seminar Preparation and Contribution.** Student contribution to seminar discussion is an important part of this course. Seminar moderators evaluate the contribution made by each student, assessing the quality of the student's input. The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking critically about both. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar. Not to contribute or to say very

little in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, where teamwork is a critical component of success.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at end of term according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts.

**A- (90-93):** Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of their contribution and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

**B+ (87-89):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

**B (84-86):** Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, but may not adequately consider others' contributions.

**B- (80-83):** Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for individual lessons

**C+ (77-79):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

**D (56-69):** Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

**F (0-55):** Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

**9. Final Examination.** Students will take a final examination at the end of the term. This examination will cover the work of the entire course.

**10. Grade Appeals.** The Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), Annex A, Section 2c, on Examination and Grading, sets forth the following procedures for appealing grades assigned in the Strategy Department. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will normally be final.

**11. Academic Honor Code.** Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work are prohibited at the Naval War College. Definition of these acts and their consequences are discussed in detail in Naval War College SORM, Annex A, Section 8a, and in Chapter II, Section 7 of the Student Handbook. **Students are encouraged to review these references carefully before writing their first paper.**

In general plagiarism is:

- "Duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes." (NWC SORM)
- "The use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes." (NWC SORM)

Points to keep in mind:

- Facts are facts and need not be referenced or footnoted. For example:

“The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.”

- Another author’s ideas, style, analysis, or insight are his or her own and must be referenced. If using his or her words, quote directly (either a formal footnote or the shortened version below is required along with quotation marks):

“It was an asymmetry between the crisp running analysis being performed in Berlin, and not one but a whole series of analytic failures in Vienna that was perhaps the decisive factor in establishing the initial war context the Prussians needed.” (Smoke, p.93)

- Changing a few words here or there does not alter the need for direct credit (i.e., citation).

- If using ideas, analysis, or insight in a general context, give general credit:

One of the central reasons Vienna was unprepared at the beginning of the war was lack of intelligence and good analysis. This contrasted sharply with the situation in Berlin where intelligence was constantly updated and evaluated. (Smoke, p.93)

- If in doubt:

- Consult your moderator.

- Give credit—always use quotation marks and proper citation for direct (or nearly so) quotes.

**12. Course Critique.** Student input is vital to the future development of this course. Each student will be provided with a password that will provide access to the critique and permit work on it at any time during the semester. Links to the critique are available on the Strategy Department sites on the NWC Portal and Internet. **Strategy faculty will not have access to your critique until after course grades have been recorded at the end of the term.**

Students ought not to complete the entire critique in one sitting. The critique can be completed one page at a time and then saved. Annex C is a paper copy of the critique that can be annotated as the course progresses, if desired, to assist in making the required entries in the electronic critique. Note that the hard copy is provided as a convenience and will not be accepted in lieu of the electronic critique at course completion. Seminar leaders will ensure that all students have completed their course critiques prior to the final exam and will provide this information to the seminar moderators so that individual student grades can be promptly released upon course completion.

**13. Web Access.** Access to most Strategy and Policy Course materials is available online. The Strategy and Policy Department site on the NWC Portal is the most comprehensive and up-to-date, containing the course syllabus and interactive calendar, as well as links to lecture outlines and the course critique. The syllabus is also available on the NWC Internet site at [www.usnwc.edu/academics](http://www.usnwc.edu/academics).

Please refer any questions to Carol Keelty (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator): E-mail: [carol.keelty@usnwc.edu](mailto:carol.keelty@usnwc.edu); Phone (401) 841-2188, Strategy and Policy Department offices, H-333.

## THE STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

**Professor John H. Maurer** serves as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. He is a graduate of Yale University and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he served as executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, and held the position of senior research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served on the Secretary of the Navy's advisory committee on naval history. In addition, he is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval arms control between the two world wars, and Winston Churchill's views on British foreign policy and strategy. His current research includes work on Winston Churchill and Great Britain's decline as a world power, and great power arms competitions. In June 2001, he received the U.S. Navy's Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

**LtCol Brian P. Annichiarico, USMC**, is a 1988 graduate of the New York State University at Albany. He holds a B.A. in Communications and an M.A. in Military Operational Arts and Science from Air Command and Staff at Maxwell AFB. His staff experience includes service with the Aviation Department at Headquarters Marine Corps where he was the Joint Matters Officers. During this time he authored the Joint Terminal Attack Controller MOA for DOD and was the Marine Corps subject matter expert for Close Air Support. Upon arrival back with the fleet, he served as an Executive Officer before being selected to command the Personnel Support Division for Marine Aircraft Group 14. An AV-8B pilot, his operational experience includes three tours flying the Harrier, the last of which he led Marine Attack Squadron 231 to Iraq as their Commanding Officer.

**Dr. George W. Baer** is Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy Emeritus at the Naval War College. He earned his A.B. from Stanford University, B.A. and M.A. from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. He served as a member of the faculty at Dartmouth College and Chair, Department of History, at University of California, Santa Cruz. A former Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, he is currently Professor of Strategy and Policy in the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author or editor of major studies in diplomatic and naval history, including *The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War*, *Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations*, *Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Memoirs of Loy Henderson*, *International Organizations, 1918-1945*. His book, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*, a text used in the Strategy Course at the College, has won the Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize, the 1996 Distinguished Book Award from the Society for Military History, and the Bonnot Award for Naval History. In addition, he has received the Department of the Navy Meritorious and Superior Civilian Service Awards.

**Colonel David A. Brown, U.S. Army**, is a designated Army Strategist who holds a B.A. in Philosophy, a diploma from D.L.I. for studies in the Greek language, a diploma from the Army's Command and General Staff College, a M.S. from Long Island University in Counseling and Leader Development, a M.M.A.S. from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies Program, and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. COL Brown's career spans over 24 years in Field Artillery units and a variety of command and staff positions in the United States and overseas. His operational experience includes nuclear weapons programs, combat experience in Desert Storm and OIF, frequent visits to Bosnia and Kosovo and operational planning experience at Battalion, Brigade, Division and Theater levels, where he served as 1st Armored Division Chief of Plans and Chief of Contingency Plans for United States Army Europe. COL Brown also served as a Tactical Officer at the U.S. Military Academy, and commanded the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He is a recipient of the James D. Forrestal Award for excellence in Strategy and Force Planning and a graduate of the Institute of Counter-Terrorism's Executive Studies Program at Herzliya, Israel. He has lectured on armed groups and counterterrorism, as well as on ethics, theology and history, and is the author of *Intifada and The Blood of Abraham, Lessons in Asymmetrical Warfare—Written in Stone*, published by the Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare. After two years teaching Strategy and Policy, COL Brown served as the senior military advisor and team chief for 15 Military Transition Teams advising the 2<sup>nd</sup> Iraqi Army Division in 2008.

**Professor Michael S. Chase** earned a Ph.D. in international affairs from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He holds an M.A. in China studies from SAIS and a B.A. from Brandeis University. In addition, Professor Chase studied at the University of Bristol in England and the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China. Prior to joining the Strategy and Policy Department, he served as a research analyst with Defense Group Inc. and the RAND Corporation. He is the author of the book *Taiwan's Security Policy: External threats and Domestic Politics*. Professor Chase's current research includes work on Chinese military strategy, Chinese nuclear and missile force modernization, and Taiwan's security policy. His recent publications include studies on Chinese nuclear force modernization and strategy, defense reform and domestic politics in Taiwan, Taiwan's defense spending debate, and contemporary U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation.

**Colonel Kevin S.C. Darnell, U.S. Air Force**, has held the position of Senior Air Force Advisor to the President, U.S. Naval War College, since 2006. A Master Navigator, he has over 3,800 hours in AWACS and training aircraft, was a MAJCOM flying hours analyst, oversaw counter-drug air operations in a Joint-Interagency Task Force, and commanded a squadron in Panama. In 2000, he graduated from the College of Naval Warfare with Highest Distinction and stayed to teach Strategy and Policy for three years. Before his return to Newport, he spent nineteen months as the Air Attaché to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and a year on the staff of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, as the Policy Division chief for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects.

**Commander Kevin J. Delamer, U.S. Navy**, is a 1986 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He holds a B.S. in Naval Architecture and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School. A naval helicopter pilot, his operational experience includes tours flying the SH-3H, SH-60F and HH-60H, and his staff tours have included service with Carrier Air Wing FOURTEEN, the Naval Air Systems Command and NASA's Ames Research Center. His flight test assignments have included the Executive Transport (Presidential Helicopter) Program and the Army-NASA Experimental Rotorcraft Program. His most recent assignment was on the staff of Commander Naval Forces Central Command where he served first as the Director of Political-Military Affairs and subsequently as Executive Assistant to the Commander. He has also served as the Executive Assistant to the President, Naval War College.

**Professor Andrea J. Dew** holds a B.A. (Hons.) in History from Southampton University in the United Kingdom, and an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. She is the coauthor of a book on armed groups entitled *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat*. She has also served as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and Senior Counter Terrorism Fellow at the Jebson Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School. She has just completed a study about risk management in U.S. commercial space policy, and is currently working on several research projects focusing on irregular warfare, armed groups, and counterinsurgency strategies. Dr. Dew is Co-Director for the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College.

**Professor Frank "Scott" Douglas** earned his doctorate with Columbia University's Political Science Department, focusing on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the ways authoritarian regimes may be open to pressure. He also holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a BSFS degree from Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. Prof. Douglas holds an area studies certificate in East /Central Europe from Columbia's Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. In addition to his scholarly work, he has backpacked through Central Asia, served as an election observer in Bosnia, and directed a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic. His work currently focuses on making strategic sense of the GWOT as a multi-theater war, focusing on interaction effects, establishing a baseline to inform debates, and projecting futures for the conflict.

**Captain Michael J. Foster, U.S. Navy**, is a 1984 graduate of Maine Maritime Academy, where he earned a B.S. in Marine Engineering and a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate School where he earned a M.S. in Management. A Surface Warfare Officer and Full Time Support Officer, he had command of USS SPRUANCE DD 963 and Navy Operational Support Center Kansas City. He most recently commanded Reserve Component Command Mid-West at Great Lakes IL. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College and has completed joint tours at U.S. Atlantic Command in the J-8 Directorate and at U.S.

Northern Command in the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Directorate. Captain Foster is a designated Joint Qualified Officer (JQO).

**Dr. William C. Fuller** is Professor Emeritus at the Naval War College. He earned his Ph.D. from Harvard, and taught at Harvard and Colgate University. A former Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, he is the author of many studies on Russian history, including *Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914* and *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. His latest book, *The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia*, is a fresh examination of the Tsarist regime's collapse during the First World War. He is currently writing a major work on the strategies of terrorist movements. In June 2006, he received the U.S. Navy's Superior Civilian Service Award.

**Captain Stephen G. Gabriele, U.S. Navy**, is a distinguished graduate of both the U.S. Naval Academy (1979) and the Naval War College (2003). A submarine officer, he had command of USS ALBUQUERQUE (SSN 706) and was most recently Commander Undersea Surveillance with worldwide operational oversight of the Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. Other assignments include tours on several submarines and operational staffs, Executive Assistant to the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs, and several training commands. Captain Gabriele served as Director of the Central Command Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) Friendly Forces Coordination Center (F2C2) in Bahrain during a seven-month sabbatical from the War College in 2006.

**Professor John Garofano** received a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University and an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington). Dr. Garofano's research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. His writings include *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment*, *Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record*, and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis* and the *Naval War College Review*, among other publications. Prior to joining the War College's faculty, Dr. Garofano was Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and he has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. Currently, he holds the Jerome Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security, and is an Area of Study Coordinator for Asia-Pacific electives.

**Professor Marc A. Genest** earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Politics. Dr. Genest is also Co-Director for the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG), and is an Area Study Co-Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives. He has taught at Georgetown University, the University of Rhode Island, and the U.S. Air Force War College. At the University of Rhode Island, Dr. Genest was awarded the Teaching Excellence Award as the outstanding teacher at the University. He serves as a political commentator for local radio and news stations as well as for Rhode Island and national print media. In addition, Dr Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Dr. Genest has received fellowships, grants, and awards from numerous organizations including the

United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation, Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, and the Bradley Foundation. Professor Genest's books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*, and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, American foreign policy, and public opinion.

**Professor James Holmes** is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University and earned graduate degrees at Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He graduated from the Naval War College with highest distinction in 1994 and was the recipient of the Naval War College Foundation Award, signifying the top graduate in his class. Before joining the Naval War College faculty in the spring of 2007, he was a senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, Athens, GA; a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA; and a U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, serving in the engineering and weapons departments on board the battleship *Wisconsin*, directing an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and teaching Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. He is the author of *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*, co-author of *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*, and co-editor of *Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy*. He has completed two forthcoming studies, entitled *Indian Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century* and *Eagle and the Dragon: U.S. Maritime Strategy in Asia*.

**Professor Timothy D. Hoyt** received his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in 1997. At Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, 1998-2002, he taught graduate courses on security in the developing world, South Asian security, technology and international security, and military strategy. He has testified before two subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia. Dr. Hoyt's recent publications include chapters and articles on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation and warfare in the developing world, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel*. He is currently working on a book on American military strategy in the 21st Century, a study of the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, a series of projects examining US relations with India and Pakistan, and analyses of irregular warfare and terrorism in South Asia. In 2009, Dr. Hoyt was selected as co-chair of the new Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College.

**Professor Colin F. Jackson** studied at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School (M.B.A., Finance), Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (M.A., International Economics and Strategic Studies), Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson

School (B.A., Public and International Affairs), and MIT (Ph.D., Political Science—Security Studies). Professor Jackson's current research includes work on counterinsurgency, military operations in urban terrain, public and private sector risk management, organizational learning, and intelligence operations. Professor Jackson worked for several years in the corporate sector in financial trading, telecommunications, transportation markets, and power development. He also served four years on active duty with the United States Army in Germany as an armor and cavalry officer. Professor Jackson continues to serve as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

**Commander Peter R. Jannotta, U.S. Navy**, is a 1985 graduate of Ohio Wesleyan University. He holds a B.A. in History and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a Surface Warfare Officer and has served on several ships. His staff tours include instructor duty, detailer, and most recently with NATO in Joint Forces Command, Brunssum, The Netherlands. While stationed at JFC Brunssum, his duties focused on NATO's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), Kabul, Afghanistan and included several deployments to Afghanistan.

**Professor David Kaiser** holds the Naval War College's Admiral William V. Pratt Chair in Military History. He earned his A.B. and Ph.D. from Harvard. Before coming to the War College, he taught at Harvard and at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the author of numerous books and articles: *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War*; *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*, a bold and wide ranging book analyzing five centuries of conflict; books on baseball and the celebrated case of Sacco and Vanzetti; and *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War*. His most recent book is *The Road to Dallas, the Assassination of John F. Kennedy*. In 2006-7, he was the Stanley Kaplan Visiting Professor at Williams College.

**Professor David J. Katz** received his Ph.D. in Anthropology in 1982 from UCLA. His dissertation was based on field research that examined ethnicity, religion and political integration in the remote and mountainous Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan. He also holds a B.A. in Anthropology from the University of Washington, Seattle, and an M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. A career Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State since 1984, he has held assignments in Iceland, Afghanistan, Yemen, Estonia, Pakistan and Eritrea. He also served as a Civilian Observer with the Multinational Force and Observers based in the Sinai, Egypt which is tasked with monitoring compliance with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. During his Foreign Service career he has spent over 10 years in positions both in Washington and abroad dealing with Pakistan and Afghanistan. He served as the Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate, Peshawar, Pakistan (1999-2002) and as Deputy Director, Office of Pakistan and Bangladesh, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (2004-2006). Dr. Katz's most recent Foreign Service assignment was as the State Department Representative at the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Team for Afghanistan's Nuristan Province.

**Lieutenant Colonel Paul C. Krajewski, U.S. Army**, graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1985. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Florida State University and is the author of *In the Shadow of Nelson: The Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton*. He taught “History of the Military Art” in the West Point Department of History from 1995-1998. His most recent assignment was Chief, National Military Academy of Afghanistan Implementation Team, responsible for development of the Afghan National Army’s premier officer commissioning source. He has served in various Infantry positions in Korea, 1<sup>st</sup> Ranger Battalion, “The Old Guard,” Ft. Campbell, and Kosovo, and was the Professor of Military Science for the University of Rhode Island ROTC from 2002-2006.

**Colonel Jeffrey J. Kubiak, U.S. Air Force**, is a 1984 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy where he earned his commission and a B.S. in Political Science/American Politics. He also holds a M.A. in political science from the University of Wisconsin – Madison, and a M.A. in Military Operational Arts and Science from the Air Command and Staff College. He is currently completing his Ph.D. dissertation entitled “Battle on the Home Front: the American National Will in War” at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has also served as a National Defense Fellow at Boston University’s Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy where he contributed analyses of the Russian Army for the Institute’s online publication. Colonel Kubiak is a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours in the T-38, B-1, and T-1 aircraft. He has commanded a flying training squadron and his staff experience includes time as Chief, War Plans Branch at the HQ U.S. Air Forces Europe, as well as Executive Officer to the Commanding General of Operation Northern Watch.

**Professor Heidi E. Lane** earned her Ph.D. in Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. She received her B.A. from the University of Chicago and her M.A. at UCLA. She has conducted extensive field research in the Middle East and was a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at the GWU-Elliott School of International Affairs/Security Studies Program. Dr. Lane has been the recipient of a U.S. Fulbright Grant (Damascus, Syria), a National Security Education Award (NSEA), and a fellowship from the Institute for International Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). Her areas of specialization are ethnic-conflict and religious nationalism, insurgency and terrorism, and political liberalization in the Middle East. She is also trained in Arabic, Persian, and Hebrew. She is currently working on a book about liberalization and counterterrorism in the Middle East. She has previously taught as a visiting instructor in the Department of Government at Claremont McKenna College and as adjunct faculty at San Diego State University, UC-Riverside, and Cal-State Long Beach.

**Commander Thomas Lang, U.S. Navy**, holds a B.S. from Central Michigan University and an M.A. from the Naval War College, where he graduated with distinction. During assignments in operational and training squadrons as a Radar Intercept Officer, he flew the F-14 Tomcat over 4200 hours and made over 1000 carrier arrested landings. He has also completed staff assignments with a Carrier Battle Group, the Navy Staff in the Pentagon and, prior to joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, the European Staff Element of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, in Mons, Belgium.

**Professor Bradford A. Lee** holds the Naval War College's Philip A. Crowl Chair in Comparative Strategy. A graduate of Yale College, he earned his Ph.D. from Cambridge University. He was a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, where he taught for eight years before coming to the Naval War College in 1987. At Harvard, Professor Lee was awarded the Levenson Memorial Teaching Prize as the best teacher among the assistant and associate professors. He has written extensively on strategy, diplomacy, politics, and economics in the affairs of modern states. He is now at work on a book, entitled "On Winning Wars," an analysis of how military operations translate into political results. He recently contributed a piece on "The Cold War as a Coalition Struggle" for the book *Naval Coalition Warfare*, edited by War College faculty members Sally Paine and Bruce Elleman, and co-edited and contributed a chapter on war termination to *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality*, a volume in honor of the late Michael Handel.

**Commander Daniel J. Lynch, U.S. Navy**, holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester, an M.S. from Troy State University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. A career naval aviator, he has served in a number of operational, staff and instructional tours in the SH-3H, HH-1N, and TH-57. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he served as Executive Officer of the Naval ROTC Unit at Purdue University.

**Lieutenant Colonel Jon Scott Logel, U.S. Army**, is a 1990 graduate of Wake Forest University and holds a M.A. in History from Syracuse University. He taught "History of the United States" and "The Making of Modern America, 1877-1945" in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy from 2000-2003. Commissioned through Army ROTC, he has served in various Army Aviation assignments in Germany, the 10th Mountain Division, Korea, Afghanistan, and the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. His most recent assignment was as the Deputy G3 (Operations) for Multi-National Division North-Iraq at Contingency Operating Base Speicher, Iraq.

**Professor Kevin D. McCranie** received a B.A. in History and Political Science from Florida Southern College, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. Specializing in British naval history during the "Age of Sail," he is the author of *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon*. He has also written a study about British naval recruitment during the Napoleonic Wars, as well as articles on warfare at sea, navies, and sea power. His current research is on the strategy and operations of Great Britain's Royal Navy during the long war against Napoleon. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History.

**Captain William J. Nolan, U.S. Navy**, is a 1985 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Mathematics. He also holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A Naval Flight Officer in the S-3B

Viking, he had command of Sea Control Squadron THREE THREE (VS-33) from March 2004 to June 2005. He has completed various operational tours and instructor duty in the S-3B aboard USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72), and USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70). From 1999-2001, he served in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Directorate of Operations, Readiness Branch (J-38) as an Action Officer. Immediately before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he served as Major Staff Placement Officer (PERS-442) at the Navy Personnel Command in Millington, TN.

**Commander Ronald J. Oard II, U.S. Navy**, is a graduate of Purdue University and holds master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA as well as the Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, upon completing nuclear power training he served as a Repair Division Officer in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CNV 69) and later as Electrical Officer in USS LONG BEACH (CGN 9). He also served as Navigator in USS CLAUDE V. RICKETTS (DDG 5) and Operations Officer in USS FORT MCHENRY (LSD 43). Commander Oard most recently served at sea as Executive Officer in USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44). His shore assignments include Steam Propulsion Instructor at Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he was assigned to the Headquarters Staff, U.S. Transportation Command. He is currently completing a dissertation in the Ph.D. program at Salve Regina University.

**Captain Lawrence E. Olsen, U.S. Navy**, is a 1981 Graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in Chemistry. He also holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, graduating from the Norfolk, VA Fleet Seminar Program in 1999. A former Radioman and now a Surface Warfare Officer, he did tours on USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, USS VIRGINIA, USS AUSTIN, USS TRIPPE and USS PENSACOLA before transferring to the Navy Reserve. His ten years as a Reservist included a tour as CO of the Fleet Training Center Norfolk Unit. During six of these ten years, he was back on temporary Active Duty, including three years at the Joint Forces Staff College, co-developing and teaching the Advanced Joint Professional Military Education course, the Reserve Component follow-on to JPME Phase I. His civilian jobs include three years working as a contractor, providing weapons range support services to AFWTF and PMRF and six years as a Civil Servant at Commander Fleet Forces Command N7. Since returning to full active duty, Capt Olsen has been the Deputy, Joint Forces Division, and interim Chief of Staff, USMTM, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, then Deputy, Plans Division and Battle Watch Commander, USSTRATCOM.

**Professor Sarah C. M. Paine** earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an M.I.A. at Columbia's School for International and Public Affairs, an M.A. in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan, and wrote the prize-winning book, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier*, and *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*; and co-edited with Bruce A. Elleman *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805-2005* and *Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom*. She has received year-long grants twice from the Fulbright Program (Taiwan, Japan), twice from the International Research and Exchanges

Board (Taiwan, Soviet Union), and once each from the Committee for Scholarly Communication with the PRC (China), Hokkaido University's Slavic Research Center (Japan), and the National Library of Australia's Harold White Fellowship, a Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation fellowship and an Earhart Foundation grant (Australia).

**Commander Scott A. Parvin, U.S. Navy**, is a 1990 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a B.S. in General Engineering. He also holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, graduating in 2005. As a Navy Pilot, he has attained every operational and training qualification available in both the P-3C and T-44A. He has completed numerous operational, staff, and instructor pilot tours as well as served aboard USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) as the Operations Administration Officer and Officer of the Deck (Underway). His most recent tour was aboard USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76) as the Weapons Officer, completing two operational deployments including the ship's maiden deployment.

**Professor S. Mike Pavelec** completed his Ph.D. in History (Ohio State, 2004) with a specialization in military science and technology. He is the author of *The Jet Race and the Second World War*. Dr. Pavelec was the Fleet Professor in Strategy and Policy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii for two years while teaching at Hawaii Pacific University. He has attended the West Point Summer Seminar on Military History, the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS-sponsored by Columbia University), and the National Security Summer Seminar (hosted by the Army War College). Dr. Pavelec's current research is on the mobilization of technology as well as ongoing research on war termination.

**Professor Michael F. Pavković** received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in history from the University of Hawaii at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an associate professor of history at Hawaii Pacific University, where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of *What is Military History?* and is currently completing a book on the Punic Wars. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

**Commander John Pucciarelli, U.S. Navy**, is a 1989 graduate of the College of the Holy Cross with a B.A. in History. He also holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, graduating in 2005. As a Surface Warfare Officer, he has served in frigates, combat logistics force, and aircraft carriers. He has extensive staff, operational, and command-level experience in Anti-terrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP), law enforcement, correctional custody, and Enemy Combatant Detention Operations. CDR Pucciarelli's most recent tour was as Commanding Officer, Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, with responsibility for the confinement of up to 400 multi-service prisoners as well as maintaining the sole U.S.-based facility housing Enemy Combatants under the Laws of War.

**Professor Joshua Rovner** holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is an alumnus of the MIT Security Studies Program. He also studied at Boston College (M.A., Political Science) and the University of California, San Diego (B.A., Political Science). Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Leadership Studies at Williams College. He has also taught courses on international relations and American foreign policy at Clark University and the College of the Holy Cross. Dr. Rovner is currently editing a book manuscript, entitled *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence*, and has recently begun research on deterrence theory and emerging nuclear powers.

**Professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes** has a Ph.D. in history from the University of Southern California. He also holds a M.A. degree in history from the University of Kentucky. Before that he earned a B.A. in history from the University of Texas. He is the author of three books: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*, *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell*, and *Allies to the Very End: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan*. He is currently finishing work on a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. He has published a number of articles in journals such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *The Journal of Military History*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com, and both his academic and military publications have won him writing awards. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

**Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey M. Shaw, U.S. Air Force**, is a navigator with over 3,500 hours in the KC-135 and the C-130, with flying experience in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Bosnia, Kosovo and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. He most recently served as the deputy commander, 386<sup>th</sup> Operations Group at Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait before arriving in Newport, joining the Naval Warfare Development Command as the Air Force liaison. Prior staff assignments include command briefer to the commander, US Air Forces Europe, chief of C-130 assignments at the Air Force Personnel Center, liaison to the Japan Air Self Defense Force through the Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs office, and deputy chief of the Air Force Foreign Liaison division in the office of the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. He holds a degree in History from St. Anselm College and an M.A. in Military History from the American Military University, as well as a degree from the Air Command and Staff College. He is currently enrolled in the PhD program at Salve Regina University.

**Professor Karl F. Walling** received a joint Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government*, and many studies of American and European political thought and action. He has taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Carleton College, Ashland University, and Colorado College, and was a Fellow at the Liberty Fund before coming to Naval War College. At

present, he is writing on Thucydides, as well as strategy and policy in American political thought.

**Professor Andrew R. Wilson** is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara and received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty in 1998, Dr. Wilson taught Chinese History at both Wellesley College and at Harvard, where he received several awards for teaching excellence. He is the author of numerous articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, *Sun Tzu's Art of War*, as well as the Chinese diaspora. He is also the author or editor of two books on the Chinese overseas, *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916* and *The Chinese in the Caribbean*. Recently he has been involved in editing a multi-volume history of the China War, 1937-1945; a conference volume entitled *War, Virtual War and Society*; another conference volume on the Chinese nuclear submarine force, and he is completing a new translation of *Sun Tzu's Art of War*. Among his other duties at the Naval War College, Professor Wilson is a founding member of both the Asia-Pacific Studies Group and the China Maritime Studies Institute.

**Professor Toshi Yoshihara** is a graduate of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds a M.A. from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and received a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has taught in the Department of Strategy at the U.S. Air War College. In addition, he has served at the American Enterprise Institute, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He is the author of over twenty monographs, book chapters, and articles on the international strategic environment in Asia, maritime strategy and sea power, strategic culture, nuclear strategy, information warfare doctrine, and military space programs. He is also co-author of *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* and co-editor of *Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy*.

## I. MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT

**A. General:** How do theories of war fit into professional military education? One answer to that question emerges from a syllogism. If officers or officials want to act effectively in the real world of war, they have to be able to think productively. To think productively, they have to organize their minds properly. To organize their minds properly, they have to assimilate useful concepts, broad perspectives, relevant considerations, and leading questions. The Strategy and Policy Course themes supply the questions. The individual modules of the course highlight considerations appropriate to various real-world strategic circumstances. The case studies, with their wide range of historical and contemporary experience, provide broad perspective on current strategic problems and may reveal patterns with some predictive value for the future. The theorists whom we study offer the concepts that shape our understanding of war and that help guide our selection of strategic courses of action.

Where should we turn for theoretical guidance? There are no better places to start than with Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Though produced long ago, both texts still provide solid conceptual foundations for understanding war, strategy, and leadership. The authors of both were primarily concerned with the intellectual development of professional military officers, whom they identified as vital to the security of the state. Both expected their students to use their minds critically and creatively—as does the Naval War College. Clausewitz was systematic in his approach, whereas the *Sun Tzu* was suggestive, and the two were representatives of very different cultures. Yet, as Michael Handel pointed out in Reading 3 below, they partook of a common strategic logic. Each, however, took that logic in some distinctive directions, in ways that give us plenty of important ideas to work with in this course and in the real world.

Clausewitz's description and analysis of the essential characteristics of war have never been superseded. Wars at all times and in all places feature a dynamic swirl of uncertainty and chance, of violence and intellect, of physical forces and moral forces, of passions and politics. New technology may on occasion diminish but will never dispel the "fog" and "friction" that Clausewitz sees as permeating war. Indeed, Sun Tzu suggests that a smart commander will try to increase the fog and friction on the enemy side. War will always be the violent but purposeful clash of interacting wills that Clausewitz portrays. Sun Tzu usefully adds to the picture of war as a contest over information.

Although Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* both shy away from an exaltation of principles as veritable formulas for proper practice, they each offer prescriptive concepts. Both stress the importance of making assessments before taking action. The famous Sun Tzuian injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of "net assessment." The Clausewitzian injunction to concentrate forces against the enemy's "center of gravity" is still at the heart of joint U.S. military doctrine and planning processes. Clausewitz's concept of the culminating point of victory also

remains embedded in contemporary doctrine and planning. The *Sun Tzu*, with its emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise, foreshadowed many aspects of what we now call “maneuver warfare”—an important element of modern approaches to warfare, not least among U.S. Marines. The ancient Chinese text also stands as a forerunner of certain aspects of contemporary information operations, especially the use of deception. Indeed, *The Art of War* treats information superiority as a key determinant of strategic success. Clausewitz, for his part, was more skeptical that intelligence and deception could deliver what the *Sun Tzu* promised.

The most important prescriptive point for students of strategy in these two texts—a point on which we can readily see the authors in full agreement—is that war must serve a rational political purpose. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* stress the need to match strategy to policy, as do the first theme of this Strategy and Policy course and official documents such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and *National Military Strategy of the United States*. Military (and non-military) instruments must be used in ways calculated to achieve specified political objectives. What is more, both Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* emphasize, the costs of waging war must be taken into rational account. Clausewitz counsels his readers that as the costs come to exceed the “value of the object” in a war, the use of force must be reassessed and even renounced. Sun Tzu cautions against allowing the costs of protraction in a war to undermine the social and economic stability of one’s own political system. Adhering to such strictures of rationality in war is no easy matter. Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* are well aware that irrationality abounds in war. Chance, complexity, human passions, and factors beyond human control all make rational calculation very difficult. The enemy may act or react in quite unpredictable ways. Indeed, in a warning worth the close attention of contemporary theorists, such as those advocating the controversial concept of effects-based operations, Clausewitz highlights how hard it is to anticipate the effects that the actions of one side will have on the other side in a war.

It is at this point that the crucial issue of strategic leadership looms large in both *On War* and *The Art of War*, as it does in this course. Strategic leaders must master interaction with the enemy if they are to succeed in achieving policy aims within rational constraints. Much of the detailed analysis by Clausewitz and many of the aphorisms in the *Sun Tzu* are about the attributes and activities of strategic leadership necessary to handle the problems of rationality and interaction effectively. Clausewitz highlights character, experience, and intuition. The *Sun Tzu* plays up calculation, creativity, and flexibility. What they say can be tested in light of the strategic leaders who stand out in the historical modules of this course and considered in relation to contemporary models of leadership. Students should also bear in mind that what makes for superior operational leadership may not make for superior strategic leadership (and vice versa).

Two categories of strategic leaders are in evidence in both *On War* and *The Art of War*: political leaders and military leaders. Under the rubric of “civil-military relations” we shall consider the interactions of these two sets of leaders throughout this course. Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* provide much food for thought and material for debate about the proper roles of political and military leaders. Both agree that political leaders must

determine the overall policy objectives that military (and non-military) strategies must support in any war. At the same time, the dynamics of interaction and other pressures faced by military commanders in the theaters of war give rise to civil-military tensions regarding the best ways and means to employ force against the enemy. Students should consider carefully the different approaches to the resolution of those tensions that Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* offer.

A hallmark of the Strategy and Policy Course is the many different types of war and the wide range of operations that it covers. Here, too, our two texts of classical theory give us advantageous points of departure. Clausewitz, in a famous passage, stresses the importance for both political leaders and military leaders of understanding the nature of the war that they face. He also broaches a distinction between wars of limited and unlimited political objectives that can serve as a good first step in understanding how one war may differ from another. This course adds other variables to the analysis of different types of war that we shall come across and categorize. For instance, Clausewitz points out how the character of warfare may change, sometimes quite dramatically, from one era to the next. Indeed, we can detect in *On War* and in *The Art of War* the imprint of transformations of war in the respective eras in which they were composed. The Strategy and Policy course, covering as it does many eras of warfare from the ancient world to the twenty-first century, allows students to gain a well-rounded understanding of how and why such transformations have occurred in the past and the present. As we approach the end of the course, where we deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the demise of a communist superpower, and the rise of transnational jihadist networks, the *Sun Tzu* offers a range of operations that can be adapted to the strategic problems posed by a nuclear power in a “cold war” and outmaneuvering non-state actors in a global counterinsurgency. As a wise man once averred, if one wants to find new ideas, start by looking in old books.

Of course, strategic leaders in the twenty-first century cannot find everything that they need or want in the classical texts. Required Reading 4 for this module surveys new ideas about contemporary strategic issues. Those with new ideas often criticize, either explicitly or implicitly, Clausewitz and (less frequently) the *Sun Tzu*. One set of critics has argued that the classical theorists are of little help with regard to irregular warfare involving non-state actors. It is noteworthy, however, that the first and foremost theorist and practitioner of warfare by non-state actors, Mao Tse-tung, drew substantially on both Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* (as we shall see later in the course in Module VII). There is also evidence that would-be AQAM (Al Qaeda and Associated Movements) strategic thinkers have been studying *On War* and *The Art of War*. Another set of critics has suggested that modern technological developments have revolutionized warfare to such an extent that classical strategic theory is at best of secondary relevance. But, as we shall have ample opportunity to see in this course, new technology is only one source of transformations in warfare even at the operational level and is only one element in patterns of success and failure at the strategic level. A third group of analysts, who advocate greater reliance on the use of “soft power” by the United States, may implicitly look askance at classical strategic theory because it encourages leaders to think too much about military instruments and too little about non-military instruments. But in fact

neither Clausewitz nor the *Sun Tzu* encouraged readers to dismiss the importance of non-military courses of action. For Clausewitz, after all, war was the “continuation of policy” with the “addition” of military means to non-military means. And for the *Sun Tzu*, the ideal outcome was to win without fighting. One need not resort to violence to execute the two strategic options most highly recommended in *The Art of War*—thwarting the enemy’s strategy and disrupting the enemy’s alliances.

The Joint Staff, in their guidance to American war colleges about learning objectives in joint professional military education, emphasizes the importance of understanding how JIM (Joint, Interagency, and Multinational partners) uses DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments of power) in a multidimensional effort to achieve strategic success. There is not much well-developed theory, classical or contemporary, to ease our way into these broad areas of inquiry. For sea power and maritime strategy, we will explore the celebrated theoretical (and historical) writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. For air power, there is not a wide-ranging body of theoretical writing of equal stature, but we will examine how theoretical notions of the strategic effects of the air instrument have played out in wars since 1940. Beyond some partial insights from Corbett, we will have to supply for ourselves a full-fledged exposition of how joint and combined military operations can make a decisive difference at the strategic level in various types of wars. Apart from some embryonic international-relations theory about economic sanctions as a putative alternative to the use of military force, there is no substantial theory to guide us in understanding how civilian agencies and military services wield diplomatic, informational, and economic influence. Again, we will have to proceed largely on our own. This course is a long intellectual journey into the various domains and dimensions of contemporary strategy. The classical theorists do no more—and no less—than enable us to take the first steps of this journey.

The most distinguished Congressional expert on joint professional military education, the Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, has recently written that “as time passes, I appreciate the timelessness of Clausewitz’s thoughts on the art of war and strategy more and more. These ideas, distilled from history, his extensive and broad wartime experience, and his powerful intellect, will continue to be relevant in the future.” On his National Security Booklist, after the Constitution of the United States, the next three items listed are Clausewitz’s *On War*, the *Sun Tzu Art of War*, and Handel’s *Masters of War*.<sup>1</sup> This course builds a formidable structure on the foundation provided by the relevant ideas and concepts of the classical masters of war. It provides materials for renovations of and additions to the structure as we move forward in time. And it provides the tools to use the course as a platform for strategic leaders to find creative solutions to the strategy and policy problems of the twenty-first century.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. Representative, “Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders,” *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3. Congressman Skelton’s National Security Book List can be found at [http://www.house.gov/skelton/book\\_list.pdf](http://www.house.gov/skelton/book_list.pdf).

## B. Discussion Questions:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. “Policy,” he states, “will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, he notes that “the political aim is not a tyrant,” that political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and that “policy will not extend its influence to operational details.” How can we reconcile the first statement with the last three? Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered in *The Art of War*?

2. The authors of *The Art of War* and *On War* agree that, although war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and war?

3. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are “the culminating point of victory,” “the center of gravity,” and “the need to be strong at the decisive point.” How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are they as valuable on the strategic level as they are on the operational level?

4. Evaluate the role of intelligence in *The Art of War*. Would Clausewitz agree with the *Sun Tzu* view? Which view is more relevant today?

5. Clausewitz emphasized the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and how do they interact?

6. *The Art of War* says that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” while Clausewitz stated that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

7. In Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a theoretical distinction between war in theory—which tends to escalate until all the available forces are used—and war in reality or in practice. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

8. Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognized two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?

9. Some proponents of “transformation” and network-centric warfare have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

10. Which theorist do you regard as more relevant to the current global war on terrorism, Clausewitz or the *Sun Tzu*?

11. Contemporary writers on strategy emphasize the growth of violence by non-state actors since 1945, suggesting that such conflicts cannot be evaluated by reference to Clausewitz's trinity. Do you agree?
12. One of the preferred strategies presented in *The Art of War* is to disrupt an enemy's alliances, and Clausewitz argues that an ally can sometimes be the enemy's center of gravity. How, and to what extent, do these insights relate to the current war against terrorist extremism?
13. Does the *Sun Tzu* represent a culturally different, quintessentially Asian approach to strategy in contrast to Clausewitz's Western approach?
14. What is Clausewitz's definition of "military genius"? How does it differ from the vision of strategic leadership in *The Art of War*?
15. Proponents of "fourth-generation warfare" challenge the validity of Clausewitz for understanding warfare in the twenty-first century. Is Clausewitz largely irrelevant for today's strategists?
16. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* were written in response to revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. Which text, however, is the better guide for political and military leaders attempting to anticipate and manage changes in warfare during the periods of peace between major wars?
17. Do these classic works in strategic thought provide much guidance for using information as an instrument of national power?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1989. Author's Preface, Comment and Notes; Book 1; Book 2, Chapters 2-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chapter 11; Book 5, Chapter 3; Book 6, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chapters 2-5, 22; Book 8.

[This translation of *On War*, undertaken by the noted historians Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a commentary by the famous strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. More than thirty years later, it remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's famous work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Samuel B. Griffith's experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text both scholarly and approachable for the professional soldier.]

3. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-39, 53-63, 77-117, 135-154, 165-193 (including the map), 215-253, 299-302.

[The late Michael Handel, who served on the faculty of the Naval War College, argues in *Masters of War* that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal strategic logic or unified strategic theory that transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. This book is relevant to subsequent modules, making it an invaluable reference for the study of Strategy and Policy.]

4. Freedman, Lawrence. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. Adelphi Paper 379. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

[Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading strategic analysts, provides a masterful and comprehensive overview of contemporary strategic thought. He examines key concepts and issues in strategy that have gained prominence since the end of the Cold War: irregular warfare, transformation, revolutions in military affairs, network-centric warfare, culture-centric warfare, asymmetric wars, fourth-generation warfare, terrorism, counterterrorism, grand strategy, globalization, strategic communication, information operations, and the changing international strategic environment.]

5. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper (U.S.MC, ret.) assesses the usefulness of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of the education that he received as a student at the Naval War College for his professional development.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Strategic Theorists module raises the most fundamental and enduring problems of strategy and policy – the sort students will see again and again both in later case studies and in their careers. Students will:

- Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national policy.

- Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, SecDef, CJCS, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels of war.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture and religion plays in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- Analyze how the interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
- Analyze how information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.
- Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of national security threats.
- Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.

## II. DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG WAR: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

**A. General:** The Strategy and Policy Course evaluates key concepts and frameworks for analysis at the strategic and policy level by studying the Peloponnesian War. This conflict, although it occurred 2500 years ago in ancient Greece, remains timely for analyzing strategy and the employment of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. In this conflict, the Delian League, controlled by a sea power, democratic Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, led by the militaristic land power, Sparta. The contest between the two sides resulted in a long war, lasting twenty-seven years. The prominent historian Thucydides provided an account of this struggle. Thucydides served as a general in the Peloponnesian War. He meant for his history to be “a possession for all time,” and that has indeed turned out to be the case. All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble this one, as long as human nature remains the same. So his account of this particular war was meant to provide a microcosm of war in general. By understanding this one conflict, you may understand the persistent problems of strategy and policy more thoroughly and deeply than if you read an entire library. Whether considering the nature of strategic leadership, homeland security, the disruptive effects on society and politics of a biological catastrophe, how and when to mount joint and combined operations, generating and sustaining domestic and international support in a long war, confronting an adversary with asymmetric capabilities, controlling the sea, understanding an enemy from a radically different culture, the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, the use of revolution to undermine an enemy’s regime or alliances, the constraints and opportunities supplied by geopolitical position, the unique problems, strengths, and weaknesses of democracies at war, or the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, Thucydides supplies archetypes, or models, of the recurring problems of strategy, with his readers usually left to judge how well the particular leaders of the time were able to solve them. Such appears to be Thucydides’ thesis: he offers more strategic wisdom than perhaps any other historian of politics and war. We need to take him seriously.

To test Thucydides’ bold thesis, it may help to consider how he is different from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Whereas they introduced us to essential elements of strategic theory, Thucydides supplied the perspective from a school of hard knocks, the lessons of experience, which invite us today to understand how a great democracy, much like our own in many respects, lost a war to a bitter rival and its free way of life as a result. The stakes are high in this case study: if we cannot understand the strategic strengths and weaknesses of ancient Athenian democracy, perhaps we will not understand our own democracy, thus condemning ourselves to follow in the footsteps of Athens. Learning from its example may be the prerequisite for thinking clearly about the strategic problems and advantages of democracy in our own age. To be sure, the differences between Athenian “pure democracy” and modern “liberal, representative democracy” are as glaring as the similarities are intriguing, and the differences are cultural as well as institutional. The great Athenian leader, Pericles, advocated retreating behind the long walls of Athens rather than engaging in a land battle with Sparta and its allies. Yet he also encouraged his people to seek immortal fame, perhaps the most coveted goal among

Greeks since the time of Homer, with Athens earning its unique glory by dominating the sea and ruling over more Greek cities than any Greek city before it. Whereas both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encouraged rational calculations about the interests of the state, Thucydides revealed the extent to which passion always threatens to escape rational control in time of war, with fatal consequences for both policy and strategy. Indeed, during his accounts of the plague in Athens, the civil war in Corcyra, the witch hunt for religious heretics in Athens, and the revolution and counter-revolution in Athens, Thucydides sometimes seems to be leading his readers on a journey to Hades, that is, to strategic madness, with not merely democratic institutions, but civilization itself proving extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed and encouraged during this war. Terrorist attacks on diplomats; atrocities, like the mass murder of school children; even genocide, sometimes merely proposed as for the case of Mytilene, but sometimes actually carried out, as at Plataea, Scione, and Melos—all these horrors fill the pages of Thucydides' account and make one wonder whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also goes beyond Clausewitz and Sun Tzu by emphasizing the extent to which you cannot understand either strategy or policy without looking at the politics that shape them. So while Thucydides takes pains to describe unfolding battles, he also compels us to look at political speeches and debates, with different leaders (Archidamus, Pericles, Cleon, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Nicias, Alcibiades, etc.) competing for the power to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as commanders in far-flung theaters. The goals of the belligerents and the strategies they choose to achieve them at any stage of this war are not self-evident. Indeed, the different leaders of different cities in Thucydides' account often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. As we do what we can to peer through Thucydides' "fog of politics", we are forced to come to terms with the limits of understanding in any war, in which not merely chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but also the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders often triumph over the interest of the state. Hence, strategy is most emphatically a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political factions at home and relations between political and military authorities frequently proving decisive in the success or failure of different campaigns, in particular under the Spartan commander, Brasidas, and the Athenian commanders, Alcibiades and Nicias,.

The origins of this great war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra's colony, Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into what for the ancient Greeks can be considered a world war. Yet as Thucydides' account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta's allies (Corinth especially) to persuade Sparta to lead them to overthrow the Athenian empire before it was too late to stop it from dominating the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to cave in to ultimatums from the Peloponnesian League force us to think carefully about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed (strategy). Which side was trying to preserve the status quo? Which was trying to

overturn it? Is it possible that each side was trying to preserve and revise the status quo? Were their ends limited, unlimited, or some mix of both? What gave either side hope of success?

Simple answers to these questions are hard to come by, but it helps to think about the likely nature of the war, which Thucydides predicted would be like no other in ancient Greece. Not only would it be an asymmetric struggle between a land power and a sea power; it would also be a conflict between two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses. And the coalitions would be led by two cities with radically different characteristics. Sparta was a militarized regime in which an elite group of citizens, who were also soldiers from age six to sixty, dominated brutally over a majority of the population, the Helots, whom the Spartans had enslaved several hundred years previously. Yet Sparta also had a complex constitutional system of government, with multiple checks and balances, making Sparta the city most admired in Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Fearing slave revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. In contrast, the Athenians proved to be energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They consistently tested the limits of the humanly possible and sailed almost anywhere in the ancient Greek world their ships could carry them. Their democratic system of government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece at home, though abroad even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its allies like a tyrant by demanding tribute at the point of a sword. For its part, Sparta did not demand tribute from its allies, who followed it more voluntarily. Trade and tribute from its allies made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, but living off the labor of its slaves, Sparta was self-sufficient while Athens depended on supplies and revenue from abroad. If Sparta's regime sometimes made it too cautious, Athens' regime perhaps made it too bold. Thucydides forces us to assess the nature of this war not merely in terms of the military capabilities, plans, and objectives of the belligerents, but also in light of all the relevant material, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditionally, Greek warfare consisted of hoplites (heavy armored infantry) from two different cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won in one battle on a single day. But the Spartans, who excelled at this type of warfare, were unprepared materially and intellectually for the revolution in military affairs, the Athenian strategic defense initiative, of the long walls enabling Athens to feed itself by sea and withstand a lengthy siege of the city. Predictably, as the conflict unfolded, Athenian sea power found it difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Spartan land power, and vice versa, thus producing a protracted stalemate, as well as much unhappiness on the home front in Athens especially. As much as anything, frustration with the stalemate fueled the angry, vengeful passions that led the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate the traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not necessarily in their strategic interest. Yet success for either side depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Hope of decisive victory appeared to depend as much on compensating for either side's strategic weaknesses through other means of national power including diplomacy, intelligence, and economic aid in particular, as on gaining leverage through its traditional

strengths on land or sea. So Thucydides shows us each side reassessing its initial policies and strategies. The Athenians, for example, opened a new theater at Pylos in the Peloponnese to inspire a revolt of the Helot slaves against the Spartans. Sparta's ally, Corinth, used revolution to knock Athens' ally Corcyra out of the war and Sparta uncharacteristically took the initiative to liberate some of Athens' allies, most of whom were unreachable for Sparta by sea, in a daring land campaign in another distant theater in Thrace.

Significantly, such reassessments went hand in hand with changing political and military leaders in Athens and Sparta. Pericles did not invent the strategy of defending Athens by land while expanding the empire by sea; that honor, including the strategic revolution of using the long walls to transform Athens into a de facto island, belonged to Themistocles, the hero of the Persian War, but Pericles did put some version of that strategy into execution. The strengths and weaknesses of his strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, as well as the strategy and leadership qualities of the Spartan king Archidamus, must be evaluated against the successes and failures of their successors. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander, Brasidas, in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander, Demosthenes, in joint and unconventional operations, supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. In contrast, the Athenian political general, Cleon, always sparks controversy over the sorts of political demands to make against an enemy when it sues for peace. Whereas the pious Athenian commander, Nicias, often seemed to be a conservative Spartan in Athenian clothing, the daring (some say reckless) Athenian commander, Alcibiades, no less often personified the energetic, innovative spirit of Athens, both when he served as a commander and advisor and when his playboy lifestyle so offended the Athenians that they tried him in absentia and sentenced him to death. If Nicias's caution (some say indecision and superstition) in Sicily lost the opportunity for Athens to exploit its gains and avoid disaster, much credit belongs to the Spartan theater commander, Gylippus, for exploiting Athenian mistakes in Sicily to tie Sparta's overextended enemy down in a two-front war. The ultimate model of strategic adaptation, however, may be the Spartan admiral, Lysander. After almost three decades of war, he found a way to defeat Athens in its own element, at sea, thus suggesting that however useful indirect strategies may be for weakening an enemy, decisive victory may still require overthrowing his center of gravity. To explore the strengths and weaknesses of these diverse strategic leaders, we have included in the readings some biographical sketches from the ancient historian, Plutarch, who discusses their personalities and accomplishments in greater detail than Thucydides.

Given the duration and the magnitude of costs of this war, not merely to Athens and Sparta, but to all of Greece, it is reasonable to ask whether each side should have reassessed its political goals enough to make a lasting peace. Thucydides shows first Athens during the plague where the unintended consequences of high population density and close association between humans and animals killed as much as a third of its people, then Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria, and then both Athens and Sparta, after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis, seeking peace, but never quite managing to

terminate the war effectively. Whether this was because one side or the other demanded too much politically or failed to go far enough militarily to compel its enemy to do its will is a matter of dispute. So too is whether the famous Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was doomed to failure because it had not eliminated the original causes of the war and lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea in 418 B.C., occurred during the Peace of Nicias, one must question whether the Athenians would have done better to have committed everything to aid their principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively, or to have labored to fix the peace before it broke down completely. Ironically, the climax of Thucydides' account, the famous Sicilian expedition, began while Athens was still technically at peace with Sparta, thus making it possible for some to assume Athens would not have to fight on two fronts if it went to war in Sicily.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a novel, or perhaps more accurately, a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, which compels us to inquire how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Indeed, all course themes are relevant for understanding this campaign. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city, exactly the worst strategic option, from a Sun Tzuian point of view, unless there is no other alternative. Whether the resulting quagmire and ultimate loss of the cream of the Athenian army and navy was because of unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy is always a matter of vigorous debate. Don't forget, however, to think about Athens' failure to acquire significant allies in Sicily, friction and chance, Athenian distraction with scandals on the home front, Athens' lack of cavalry in Sicily, and poor relations between theater commanders and the Athenian people. A Clausewitzian critical analysis of the expedition might also consider failures to make timely reassessments, and failures to exploit Athenian command of the sea. Not to be forgotten are the skill of Spartan leaders, Corinthian and Sicilian reinforcements to Syracuse, technological innovation, the toughness and adaptability of Syracuse (a democracy almost as large as Athens), bad luck, shifting morale, and just about anything else that can go wrong when a theater commander such as Nicias loses the initiative. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient in adversity, and perhaps more moderate strategically when the chips were down than when the fortunes of war were in their favor. They recovered enough from defeat in Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade, though they could not afford to lose a major naval battle, lest they lose command of the sea and control of the sea lines of communications necessary to feed their people. With a coup d'état at home, revolt among their allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta and its allies, however, there is no doubt that the Sicilian expedition had weakened Athens substantially.

Whether Sparta and its allies could have defeated Athens without the Persian intervention that enabled them to overthrow Athens at sea is another disputed question, but many suggest it was not Sparta that defeated Athens in this war. Athens' greatest

defeat prior to its surrender occurred in Sicily. Had Athens not overextended itself, or had relations between its generals and the Athenian people not distorted the proper match between strategy and policy, then perhaps Athens might have won the war or, failing that, have avoided catastrophic defeat. To whatever extent modern democracies, like the United States, share in the characteristics of ancient Athens, Thucydides' account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies us an opportunity to look ourselves in the mirror. Thucydides does not flatter his readers. He shows us both human nature and the character of democracy, warts and all. Certainly in that respect, Thucydides is in harmony with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy.

## **B. Discussion Questions:**

1. How coherent were the policies and strategies of Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 BC)?
2. During the plague, the Athenians came to blame Pericles for a policy that led to war and a strategy that seemed incapable of winning it, but Thucydides seemed to think that Athens' major mistake was to abandon the political goals and strategy of Pericles (see Book II, paragraph 65). Who is right, Thucydides or the critics of Pericles?
3. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?
4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?
5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?
6. Which side was more successful at using revolts as a tool of policy, Athens or Sparta and its allies?
7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic results, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?
8. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good idea badly executed, or a bad idea?
9. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.
10. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius?

11. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu's ideal of a general?
12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems they reveal about the process of war termination.
13. "Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations." Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.
14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, in what ways did problems in civil-military relations have an impact on strategic effectiveness in this war?
15. "Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself." Explain why you agree or disagree.
16. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?
17. How strategically effective were the strikes made by both sides on the Athenian and Spartan homelands in determining the war's outcome?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Strassler, R. B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books 1-8, pages 3-483; Epilogue, pages 549-554.

[Arguably the deepest and most comprehensive mind ever to study the relation between politics and war, Thucydides covers all eleven of our course themes in his account of this war, but compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy on their own.]

#### *Key Passages:*

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| Book I   | - pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).   |
| Book II  | - Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.<br>- Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Plague and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128. |
| Book III | - Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.<br>- The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.<br>- Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.  |

- Book IV        - Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.  
                   - Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.  
                   - Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.
- Book V        - Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.  
                   - The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.  
                   - The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.
- Book VI        - Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.
- Book VII       - Athenian disaster, pages 427-478.
- Book VIII     - Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.
- Epilogue       - The end of the war, pages 549-554.

2. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated with an introduction by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 79-108, 252-318.

[Plutarch's famous biographies of Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership, the transformation of Athens into a sea power, the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations, and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]

3. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Chap. 1.

[The well-known historian Donald Kagan provides an account that is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

4. Walling, K.F. "Reader's Guide to Key Leaders, Battles, Cities, and Concepts of the Peloponnesian War." Naval War College, 2002.

[Keep this reference by your side as you read Kagan, Thucydides, and Plutarch, to look up names, battles, cities, and concepts that may be unfamiliar to you.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** Some things never change, or so Thucydides seemed to think, arguing that the sorts of questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League would arise in time of both war and peace, so long as human nature remains the same. Students will come to terms with these enduring questions as they:

- Apply key strategic concepts, logic and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy to include the current US national security strategy and military strategy.
- Apply appropriate strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument of national power both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national power.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Evaluate the principles of joint warfare, joint military doctrine and emerging concepts to joint, unified, interagency and multinational operations, in peace and war.
- Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic and operational levels in war.
- Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine and national power affect the planning process.
- Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning processes.
- Analyze how the interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other Services—to include Special Operations Forces (SOF)) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Analyze how information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.
- Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.

- Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.

### III. COMMANDING THE MARITIME COMMONS: GREAT BRITAIN'S GRAND STRATEGY AND RISE TO NAVAL MASTERY—THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE NAPOLEONIC WARS

**A. General:** This case study focuses on two principal subjects in grand strategy: winning command of the seas—or the maritime environment that Alfred Thayer Mahan said represents “a wide common” (*The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, p. 25)—and the strategic advantages that a country derives from exercising that command. Commanding the maritime commons can become a crucial enabler for the development of a successful joint and combined strategy. The innovative strategic thinkers Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett provide an analytical foundation for assessing how controlling the maritime domain contributes to winning wars and shaping the international environment. Strategic leadership entails putting together different instruments of national power into a grand strategy that leverages a country's strengths and compensates for its weaknesses. This case study examines how Great Britain developed and put to use a powerful seagoing, warfighting force in pursuit of national interest. By the early nineteenth century, “Britain had an unchallenged command of the sea, in quantity and quality, materially and psychologically, over her actual or potential enemies.” (Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, p. 543) Mahan evaluates the elements of sea power in peace and war, as well as the assessment of risk versus reward in naval strategy. Mahan presents an analytical framework and strategic guidelines for taking risks in a war at sea that deserve in-depth appraisal. Meanwhile, Corbett is often considered a leading and early strategic analyst of modern joint and combined operations. In addition, this course module provides a cautionary tale about the danger of strategic overextension brought on when a great power dissipates its resources by undertaking campaigns in secondary theaters that prove unexpectedly costly and difficult to terminate. This case study affords an opportunity to assess why superiority in conventional military and naval capabilities do not automatically translate into strategic success, as weaker adversaries adopt asymmetric, irregular methods of warfare to protract the fighting. This case study also contributes to course learning objectives by promoting critical thinking about the strategy and policy framework for analysis.

These fundamental topics in grand strategy figure prominently in Great Britain's emergence as the world's leading maritime power by the beginning of the nineteenth century and its use of this dominance at sea, in both war and peace, to serve as ‘the offshore balancer’ within the context of European affairs. This, however, did not come easily. Britain fought a long war, consisting of no fewer than seven major conflicts against France, its main rival for empire and naval mastery, over a period that stretched between the late 1680s and 1815. An examination of the final series of wars—the War for American Independence (1778-1783), the struggle against the French Republic (1793-1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)—offers insights into how Britain came to command the commons in this long contest with France.

The first conflict examined offers an object lesson in the failure of strategic leadership. In the War for American Independence, Britain's leaders failed to design a grand strategy that brought into balance their policy objectives with the military and

naval capabilities at their disposal. Consequently, Britain suffered a serious defeat that led to the establishment of the United States as an independent country. This British setback owed much to the role played by France, which supplied the Americans with arms, money, supplies, advisers, as well as French ground and naval forces. American and French forces, carrying out the most successful joint and combined operation of the eighteenth century, inflicted a stunning defeat against the British at Yorktown. This victory proved decisive in breaking the will of the British government to fight against American independence. Meanwhile, in contrast to the role played by Britain's decision makers, George Washington demonstrated his strategic leadership in a way that contributed significantly to the war's outcome.

Britain faced an even more daunting challenge in subsequent wars against France, led at first by an expansionist revolutionary regime and later by Napoleon. The new political identities that emerged in France challenged the existing international system. French governments demonstrated an ability to mobilize considerable military power and transform warfare on land. Napoleon's exploits on the battlefield, of course, have made him the most legendary of all ground commanders. His prowess made France seem unbeatable and came close to securing French hegemony over Europe. Britain defeated this extremely dangerous challenge by dint of its own tremendous mobilization of effort. This effort, coupled with good strategic judgment on the part of British leaders, led to Britain's dominance of the maritime environment. As the fighting progressed, the barriers to entry faced by adversaries seeking to contest Britain's mastery at sea became very high. "If there was any period in history when Britannia could have been said to have ruled the waves," writes the noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy, "then it was in the sixty or so years following the final defeat of Napoleon. . . . So unchallenged, so immense, did this influence [of British sea power] appear, that people spoke then and later of a 'Pax Britannica', finding the only noteworthy equivalent in history to be the centuries-long domination of the civilized world by imperial Rome." (*Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, p.149) In this case study, we examine the strategic leadership of the soldier-statesman Napoleon, as well as Britain's famous Admiral Lord Nelson and military commander the Duke of Wellington.

Another objective of this case study is to explore the interrelationship among economic sources of strength, the managerial skills of government organizations, and strategic effectiveness in wartime. Britain's command of the maritime commons rested on its economic power as well as the Royal Navy. Britain's financial strength enabled it to maintain powerful armed forces and support coalition partners. Trade also helped to buttress Britain's economic strength. In addition, in the closing stages of the long struggle with France, Britain pioneered the Industrial Revolution, becoming the world's leading manufacturing power. Defeating France at sea also depended on the Royal Navy's management as well as warfighting skills, which effectively harnessed the resources provided to it by the British government. This combination of commerce, finance, and industry, along with naval prowess, made Britain a formidable adversary in wartime and, subsequently, a superpower throughout the nineteenth century.

This section of the course explores the writings of the noted strategic analysts and naval historians Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Mahan served as a professor and the second president of the Naval War College. While in Newport, he turned his lectures on strategy into a best-selling series of books entitled *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. These books brought great fame both to their author and the Naval War College. Mahan wrote in an era of transformation in technology and naval warfare, as well as of major change in the international environment, with the rapid rise of new great powers to challenge existing leaders on the world stage. Despite these rapid changes, Mahan saw in the examination of historical case studies a way to discern underlying principles to guide political and naval leaders in the making of grand strategy. Mahan maintained: "From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock." (*Influence of Sea Power*, p. 88) One objective motivating Mahan was to alert Americans to the growing importance of sea power for the United States on the eve of the twentieth century. Mahan provided a high-level analysis of grand strategy, exploring the interrelationship among geopolitics, naval strategy, society, economy, and government institutions. The study of Britain's rise as a sea power, through the wars it fought against France, the Netherlands, and Spain, provided Mahan with the case studies that he needed to elaborate on grand strategy and identify keys to strategic effectiveness in wartime.

Mahan's writings also highlighted the issue of risk in the use of naval forces in wartime. In *The Influence of Sea Power*, Mahan castigated British leaders for the naval strategy that they employed during the War for American Independence. Mahan maintained that Britain should have used their naval forces in an aggressive manner. The risk-averse behavior of the British leadership gave French forces an opportunity to mount the successful joint and combined operation that resulted in the stunning victory at Yorktown and eventually led to American independence. By adopting a more aggressive strategy during the wars of the French Republic and Napoleon, Britain obtained better outcomes, winning a string of naval victories: the Glorious First of June, St. Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile, and, most memorably, Trafalgar. These successes depended, among a number of factors, on a marked qualitative edge in the combat power of British naval forces over their adversaries.

Another major strategic theorist examined in this module of the course is Sir Julian Corbett. A contemporary of Mahan, Corbett wrote detailed naval histories. His reputation as an outstanding naval historian prompted the Royal Navy's leadership to offer him an appointment as a lecturer on strategy in advanced professional education courses established for British naval officers. Today, Corbett is best known for his study *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Corbett, who drew heavily upon Clausewitz's *On War*, wanted to present a strategic analysis of how maritime powers fight and win their wars. Corbett maintained: "Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications." (*Some Principles*, p. 90) Corbett also wanted to show the importance of joint operations for generating important strategic effects. Unlike Mahan, who was notably concerned with the action of fleet against fleet, Corbett was interested in the integration of naval and land power that he

described as “maritime strategy.” Corbett argued that a maritime power, to win a war, must adopt a larger overall strategy to combine the strategies pursued by armed forces fighting in different operating environments. Naval operations must form a part of a larger grand strategy. In the British operations in the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars, Corbett believed that he had an outstanding example of the successful execution of such a strategy.

Following Corbett’s lead, this module of the course also examines the overall strategic impact of operations that occur in the maritime environment. The Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has achieved mythic status as an example of a decisive naval victory. A British fleet, commanded by the celebrated naval hero Admiral Lord Nelson, inflicted crushing losses on a combined force of French and Spanish battleships. What strategic effects, however, did Britain derive from Trafalgar? How did this battle contribute to the final defeat of Napoleon? The study of Britain in its struggles against France permits a close examination of the strategic effects generated by naval power in determining the outcome of a struggle between adversaries with asymmetric capabilities.

Finally, this module examines the role of coalitions in strategic success. Britain fought a coalition of naval powers in France, Spain, and the Netherlands during the War for American Independence. France provided considerable support to the Americans in their struggle for independence. This support tied Britain down in a costly conflict in North America. Faced by this powerful coalition, and mired in fighting against the Americans, Britain found it difficult to seize the strategic initiative. In the later wars against the French Republic and Napoleon, Britain’s grand strategy included repeated attempts to find coalition partners who would fight on the ground. Britain’s effort and burden sharing became key issues in the strategic success of the coalitions fighting France. British strategic leaders exploited a war in the Iberian Peninsula to inflict heavy losses on Napoleon’s army and puncture his aura of invincibility. British forces in Portugal and Spain, so ably led in joint and combined operations by the Duke of Wellington, maintained a major front in the war against Napoleon. Britain, benefiting from the economic growth that accrued to it from pioneering the Industrial Revolution, provided substantial financial assistance, arms, and supplies to its coalition partners. Without those partners, it seems unlikely that the British could have overthrown the Napoleonic regime and created a durable peace.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. How well did Great Britain exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with France in 1778-1783, 1793-1802, and 1803-1815?
2. Why did Great Britain find it difficult to crush the rebellion in the American colonies?

3. Alfred Thayer Mahan argued: “The ultimate crushing of the Americans . . . not by direct military effort but by exhaustion, was probable, if England were left unmolested to strangle their commerce and industry with her overwhelming naval strength.” (*Influence of Sea Power*, p. 524) Do you agree with Mahan’s assessment of the potential effectiveness of economic warfare?

4. How strategically effective was the British navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it during the wars examined in this module?

5. Assessing risk versus reward is a difficult strategic problem. Alfred Thayer Mahan maintained that Great Britain’s leaders should have run greater risks in using their naval forces during the War for American Independence. Do you agree with Mahan’s assessment that British leaders should have adopted a more aggressive stance for employing their fleet in 1778-1781, much as Britain would later do when it fought against the French Republic and Napoleon?

6. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?

7. How much did Great Britain’s efforts in the Peninsula War (1807-1814) contribute to the defeat of Napoleon?

8. How strategically effective were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this module?

9. Sun Tzu urged a strategist to defeat the enemy’s strategy. Why did France’s leaders find this strategic advice difficult to follow in their wars against Great Britain?

10. Why did the French navy prove more strategically effective in the War for American Independence than in the Napoleonic Wars?

11. The American and French campaign that culminated in the victory at Yorktown (1781) and the British campaigns with their Portuguese and Spanish coalition partners in the Iberian Peninsula (1807-1814) provide important historical examples of successful joint and combined efforts. What common strategic features account for the success of these campaigns?

12. What do the wars between Great Britain and France examined in this module show makes for a strategically effective coalition?

13. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks presented by Alfred Thayer Mahan for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

14. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks presented by Sir Julian Corbett for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

15. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks on irregular warfare presented by Clausewitz in Book Six, Chapter 26 (entitled “The People in Arms”) of *On War* for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

### C. Readings:

1. Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Oxford History of the American People*. New York: Meridian paperback edition, 1994. Chapters 14-17.

[The famous historian and U.S. Navy admiral Samuel Eliot Morison offers a well-written narrative of the political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military dimensions of the War for American Independence. This study provides essential background for exploring why Britain lost the struggle to crush the American bid for independence.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Chapters 1-2.

[The late Russell Weigley, one of the United States’ foremost military historians, considers American strategy during the War for Independence from both conventional and irregular warfare perspectives, suggesting that there was a synergistic relationship between the two.]

3. Esdaile, Charles J. *The French Wars, 1792-1815*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Pages 1-92.

[Charles Esdaile is a noted scholar of warfare in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. He has published extensively, both in English and Spanish, including a recent international history of the Napoleonic Wars, specializing on the struggle in the Iberian Peninsula. The current work is intended as a brief survey covering the major personalities, events, and issues of the French Wars.]

4. Rodger, N. A. M. *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Chapters 21-22, 28, 30, 34-36, Conclusion.

[Nicholas Rodger is a leading historian of the Royal Navy during the age of the fighting sail. In this acclaimed history, he provides an overview of British naval strategy and operations during the wars against France.]

5. Mahan, A[lfred]. T[hayer]. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Dover paperback edition, 1987. Preface, Introductory, Chapters 1 and 14.

[This classic study, by a former professor and President of the Naval War College, examines the elements of sea power and the principles of naval strategy. Mahan’s history

of the wars between Britain and France is valuable for thinking about risk in the use of naval forces. Mahan saw the key to victory in gaining command of the sea by concentration of force and offensive operations to win battles or to blockade enemy naval forces. Strategic effectiveness in wartime depended critically upon governments making adequate prewar preparations in building up naval forces and bases of operations. Despite the passage of time, Mahan's study remains an essential text for understanding both grand strategy and the employment of naval forces in wartime.]

6. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longmans, 1911. Introduction; Part I, Chapters 1-5; Part II, Chapter 1.

[Julian Corbett wrote this important study on strategy before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz's *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers. In particular, he wanted to show the effects that a maritime power might generate from a "joint" strategy for the employment of its army and navy. His analysis of maritime strategy drew heavily upon Britain's experience in fighting France during the Napoleonic Wars.]

7. Gates, David. *The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815*. London: Arnold, 1997. Chapter 8. (Selected Readings)

[Gates provides a succinct account of the fighting in the Iberian Peninsula—the so-called Peninsular War—that proved a turning point in the long struggle between Great Britain and Napoleonic France. The British army in Portugal and Spain was commanded by the famous Duke of Wellington. Wellington's strategy denied Napoleon's forces a quick victory, forcing them to fight a grisly, protracted war of attrition. The fighting in the Iberian Peninsula was marked not only by battles between conventional forces but widespread irregular warfare. Napoleon's inability to pacify the Spanish countryside overstretched his forces. The French army also suffered heavy casualties. Sir Julian Corbett would use the British experience in the Peninsula War to develop and illustrate his strategic theories about joint warfare.]

8. Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Ashfield Press, paperback edition, 1983. Chapters 4-6.

[Paul Kennedy examines the role of British sea power during the wars against France. In particular, he explores the interrelationship between Great Britain's naval power and economy. In Chapter 6, he describes Britain's use of its naval dominance to shape the international environment in the aftermath of the victory over Napoleon.]

9. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Book 1, Chapter 6 (intelligence in war), pp. 117-8; Book 2, Chapter 5 (critical analysis), pp. 156-69; Book 6, Chapter 26 (people in arms), pp. 479-83; Book 8, Chapter 4 (center of gravity), pp. 595-600; Book 8, Chapter 9 (Napoleon in Russia), pages 617-33.

[These passages from *On War*, previously assigned in the opening module of the course, provide Clausewitz's insights into some of the key strategic features of the wars in his lifetime.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Commanding the Common case study applies the theories, themes, and frameworks developed in the course to examine how they can be applied to all three types of wars discussed in the Strategy and Policy course. Students will also be exposed to issues of preparing for and fighting a war at sea, joint and combined conventional operations, and the unique problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The student will be able to:

- Apply key strategic concepts, logic and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy to include the current U.S. national security strategy and military strategy.
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument of national power both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national power.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic and operational levels in war.
- Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
- Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined, interagency efforts and teamwork.
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
- Assess maritime strategies designed to command the maritime commons and those developed to disrupt that command.
- Assess risk management in employment of naval forces.
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Assess the impact of mass nationalism and cultural passions on the making of policy and strategy.
- Evaluate the strategic effects of transformations in warfare brought about by changes in organizational structure, professional education and training, doctrine, technology, and weaponry.

#### IV. AT THE STRATEGIC CROSSROADS:<sup>1</sup> THE RISE AND FALL OF A PEER COMPETITOR—IMPERIAL GERMANY FROM THE WARS OF UNIFICATION TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

**A. General:** This case study examines fundamental course themes and concepts in strategy and policy. Special emphasis is given to understanding how success in policy and strategy hinges on the ability of political and military leaders to set coherent and realistic aims, while linking together the main instruments of national power—diplomacy, strategic communications, and economics, as well as joint military operations—into a comprehensive, overall grand strategy to achieve those aims. The concept of strategic crossroads, as presented in the last *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, also forms a prominent part in this examination of a famous case about a great power’s violent rise and fall in imperial Germany. In this case study, the readings and presentations provide the basis for an in-depth inquiry into the strategic effects of shifting power balances within the international environment, assessing the extent to which it is possible to shape the foreign policy choices and strategies of rising great powers, and to deter the onset of armed conflict. A recent report by the National Intelligence Council highlighted: “Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. . . . [While] we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system, as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. . . . [W]e cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.”<sup>2</sup> This case on imperial Germany considers the critically important question of why the leaders of a thriving, major industrial and trading power, which stood to gain economically and politically by adopting the role of a peaceful international stakeholder, choose instead to provoke wars in an attempt to dominate regional rivals and pursue global aspirations.

War marked the emergence of imperial Germany as a great power during the nineteenth century. The north German state of Prussia, with its capital in Berlin, fought three conflicts known as the Wars of German Unification—the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1—to forge a united Germany under its rule. The architect of these wars was the legendary statesman Otto von Bismarck. The strategic leadership of Bismarck receives close attention in this case study. Indeed, the writings of another famous world leader, Henry Kissinger, provide a core text for examining the statecraft and legacy of Bismarck. While serving as Prussia’s Minister-President, Bismarck showed himself a master at managing the delicate policy-strategy relationship in wars fought for limited aims. His goal was to make Prussia the dominant power in Germany. Bismarck understood that, to defeat Prussia’s rivals in war, he needed to calibrate objectives, to integrate effectively military operations and diplomacy, and to balance the triangular relationship among the people, government, and army. Bismarck faced and took great risks in what he did. There was always the danger of defeat on the battlefield, protracted war, or escalation to a wider, general European

---

<sup>1</sup> See “Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads” in *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, pp. 27-32.

<sup>2</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, November 2008.

conflict. Bismarck sought to control the escalatory dangers of ever more ambitious war aims and great-power intervention against Prussia. The study of Bismarck, this master of wars fought for limited aims, provides insights into the making of policy and strategy by a country that seeks to challenge the international status quo without provoking escalation to a wider, general war.

Early success, however, sometimes breeds later failure. The story of Germany's policy and strategy after Bismarck left office in 1890 provides a cautionary tale of how a great power can bring ruin on itself when a new generation of leaders adopts self-defeating strategies that provoke a strong, determined coalition of encircling enemies. For a period of some twenty years after the Franco-Prussian War, while Bismarck still held the reins of power, Germany acted as a satiated power on the international stage, trying to preserve the peace and consolidate the gains won in the Wars of German Unification. Germany under Bismarck's policy direction sought security through a skillful diplomacy that accorded it a leading role within the framework of Europe's balance of power. The Wars of German Unification established a Germany so powerful that it appeared poised to dominate the rest of Europe. Over the next generation, imperial Germany grew even more powerful. After 1890, Germany's economy made impressive strides, appearing as an economic powerhouse, with remarkable growth exhibited by its industry and foreign trade. Technological proficiency in the steel, chemical, electrical, machine tool, optics, and pharmaceutical industries spurred German economic growth. Germany, already possessing the best army in Europe, sought to acquire a powerful navy as well by harnessing the wealth provided by its growing economy. Germany's rulers wanted to translate this increasing strength in so-called hard power into enhanced international standing and security. In this attempt, they badly miscalculated, putting at risk Germany's considerable economic and technological achievements, bringing about a powerful coalition of adversaries intent on stopping their ambitious bid to establish a German hegemony over Europe. Germany stood at a strategic crossroads at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the actions of its leaders helped precipitate the outbreak of the First World War.

Whereas Bismarck sought to keep his country's goals limited, trying to avoid a general war, a later generation of German leaders pushed for greater policy aims that threatened to overturn the existing international order. When the German government pushed an international confrontation to bring on war during the summer of 1914, Germany fought to overthrow the balance of power within Europe. Germany's prewar military preparations and strategic planning proved inadequate to achieve these ambitious policy goals. Meanwhile, propagandists in Germany portrayed the war as a deep-rooted cultural clash, with a heroic German warrior nation engaged in a desperate struggle against adversaries that represented, on the one hand, the tawdry commercial values prevailing in the democracies of the West and, on the other, Russian despotism in the East. Germany's aims in the First World War came to reflect all too accurately the ambitions of nationalist extremists who sought to impose a German hegemony on Europe. This dramatic escalation of German aims only galvanized Germany's enemies to fight all the harder, resulting in a war fought for high stakes and with very high casualties. At the end of that hideous struggle, imperial Germany, less than fifty years

after its founding, suffered defeat and revolution. This case study, by examining strategy and policy decision-making in these wars, seeks to illuminate what led to the triumphal emergence of imperial Germany in the nineteenth century and to its later devastating defeat in the twentieth.

Another key aspect of this case study is to examine the interaction among technological innovation, geostrategic position, geopolitical environment, naval strategy, and operational doctrines for waging warfare at sea. Changes that occurred in the naval balance of power at the beginning of the twentieth century offer some striking parallels to developments taking place today in the maritime domain that shape the international strategic environment. One prominent policy commentator and strategic analyst has even argued that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, “we’re back to 1890, when a spark of naval competition among rising powers like Japan, Germany, and the United States left Britain unable to maintain its relative advantage.”<sup>1</sup> In particular, this case study highlights the use of deterrence, access-denial, and disruptive, asymmetric strategies, adopted by a weaker naval power, in an attempt to defeat a stronger maritime adversary. The German navy undertook a long-term transformation of its operational capabilities, changing from a coastal defense force to an interdiction force that could strike at a distance against critical shipping lanes. This transformation posed a serious security challenge to Great Britain, the world’s leading naval power, undermining its ability to retain command of the maritime commons. This case study examines the attitudes of political and naval leaders toward naval force structure, maritime strategy, and risk in the employment of naval forces and how they sought to manage that risk.

By examining the political consequences and strategic effects of Germany’s decision to build a powerful navy, this case study evaluates the limits of both coercion and deterrence in the grand strategies of great powers. At the end of the nineteenth century, Germany’s leaders concluded that to attain their foreign policy and security ambitions required the buildup of a powerful battle fleet to pose a direct threat to the very center of British power. Germany wanted to coerce Britain’s leaders away from joining any hostile coalition of great powers. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the German secretary of the navy, devised the strategic blueprint for this strategy. Meanwhile, Britain sought to deter Germany’s rulers from embarking on an aggressive war to establish a German hegemony over Europe. Both countries failed in their aims. Germany’s attempt to overturn Britain’s command of the maritime commons also led to confrontation with the United States during the First World War. President Woodrow Wilson worked to dissuade Germany from embarking on a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson’s diplomacy could not counteract the internal political dynamics within Germany that resulted in the German leadership making the strategic decision to seek a quick victory over its enemies by using submarines in an aggressive way even if it meant provoking war with the United States. This case study, then, provides an opportunity to examine how major powers interact with each other in the international system and why it is so difficult to devise a strategy that can successfully shape the actions of emerging competitors at strategic crossroads.

---

<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “America’s Elegant Decline,” *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 300, no. 4 (November 2007), pp. 104-116.

The strategic effects of transformations in warfare form an important part of this case study. German military leaders designed and built armed forces to fight short-duration, high-intensity conflicts. This case study provides an analytical framework for assessing when transformation might produce a capability to win quick decisive victories. The military professionalism of Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and later German general staff, made possible the victories achieved in the Wars of German Unification. The development of a modern general-staff concept by Moltke proved a key ingredient in Prussia's ability to inflict major defeats in quick succession on its adversaries during the Wars of German Unification. Railways, the telegraph, rapid-fire rifles, and longer-range artillery were bringing about a transformation in the conduct of operations and increasing the lethality of the battlefield. The Prussian army capitalized on these developments to gain a military edge on its adversaries and achieve rapid victories. Military historians and strategic analysts consider the transformation of the Prussian army during the mid-nineteenth century as one of the most important examples of a revolution in military affairs. A diffusion of this revolution occurred as other countries attempted to emulate what Prussia had done and to close the gap that had emerged during the Wars of German Unification.

Germany's military and naval leaders, in their quest for decisive victory, pursued further transformations in warfare during the First World War. In a bold bid to bring about the swift defeat of Britain, Germany adopted a disruptive strategy that employed submarines as a weapon of commerce destruction, striking at British and neutral merchant shipping. Instead of defeating Britain, however, this attempt at transformation failed. To combat the German submarine menace, Britain adopted convoys for the protection of merchant shipping. This adaptation by Germany's enemies blunted the damage inflicted by the German submarine offensive. In addition, by provoking the intervention of the United States in the fighting, this attempt to win the war quickly at sea backfired, contributing to Germany's downfall. The study of imperial Germany thus highlights that military transformation is no substitute for strategic wisdom.

The critical role played by civil-military relations in the making of strategy is an integral part of this case study. Perhaps no case study in civil-military relations provides as sobering an example of the adverse strategic consequences that can result from a breakdown in the proper relationship between statesman and soldier. This case study shows how strategic choices, for good or ill, result from the actions of decision makers and their staffs who bring differing bureaucratic backgrounds, strategic conceptions, and personalities to their deliberations. Bismarck used war as a way to outmaneuver his domestic political enemies, who wanted to control government policies by asserting the power of the Prussian parliament and the primacy of the rule of law. By defeating Denmark, Austria, and France on the battlefield, the Prussian army gave Bismarck the political leverage he needed to thwart internal opposition to the regime. At the same time that Bismarck gained an ascendancy over the regime's internal foes, he faced a stiff challenge to his authority on matters of war and peace from the Prussian military establishment. The disagreements between Bismarck and Moltke during the Wars of German Unification are legendary. These disagreements, by upsetting Bismarck's

political calculations, threatened to impair Prussia's strategic effectiveness. Later, during the First World War, deep disputes wracked the German political and military leadership. These disagreements pitted the chancellor against the army's chief of staff and the navy's leadership, as well as front-line theater military commanders against the High Command. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff emerged as popular national heroes, owing to their battlefield victories over Russia on the Eastern Front. They used their popularity to establish what practically amounted to a military dictatorship by the middle of the war. Militarism, as represented by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, provided the driving force behind Germany's actions and self-defeating strategic behavior during the First World War. An examination of Germany underscores the way that war can transform the interrelationship among a country's people, government, and armed forces with disastrous consequences.

Finally, this case study also affords an opportunity to examine the strategy and policy trade-offs and balancing of risks associated with planning and fighting multi-front wars. Before the First World War, Germany's military leaders faced the daunting strategic problem of preparing for a war on two fronts against France and Russia. Under the direction of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the younger (a nephew of the victor of the Wars of German Unification), the general staff devised an audacious strategy to launch the bulk of the German army onto the offensive against France, while fighting a holding action against Russia. This strategy is generally referred to as the Schlieffen Plan. The goal was to gain decisive strategic effects by seizing the initiative through a combination of speed, maneuver, and superior warfighting skills, defeating one adversary on the Western Front, and then redeploying forces to conduct a follow-on campaign on the Eastern Front. When this plan failed to bring about the collapse of French resistance, Germany found itself fighting a protracted war of attrition against a powerful coalition of enemies. This famous case shows how the rapid defeat of adversaries depends critically on the interrelationship of policy objectives, the availability of forces, the ability of foes to adapt, and the determination of the enemy people and leadership to resist.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions**

1. Some strategic analysts argue that Bismarck's success was largely the product of his own skill. Others argue that the keys to his success were a permissive domestic and international environment, "cooperative" adversaries, and good luck. Which argument has the most validity?
2. Why did Germany find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition during the First World War, in stark contrast to the quick victories achieved by Prussia in the Wars of German Unification?
3. Bismarck attempted to isolate Prussia's enemies before embarking on a war against them. In 1914, however, Germany fought against a powerful coalition of enemy countries. What accounts for the difference between Germany fighting a coalition of

major powers during the First World War and Bismarck's success in isolating adversaries?

4. Assess the relative strategic effectiveness of Germany's attempts to bring about a transformation of warfare during the Wars of German Unification and the First World War.

5. Who better understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, Bismarck or Moltke?

6. Admiral Tirpitz developed a strategic plan to challenge Great Britain that required the buildup of a powerful battle fleet, its concentration in the North Sea, and preparations for fighting in Germany's littoral waters. Did Germany have any better, realistic alternative strategic course of action open to it other than the strategy advocated by Admiral Tirpitz?

7. Imperial Germany provides a famous example of an emerging major power at a strategic crossroads. What accounts for Great Britain's inability to manage the rise of German power at the beginning of the twentieth century in a way that avoided conflict and deterred a decision for war by Germany's leaders?

8. Germany launched major offensives on the Western Front in 1914, 1916, and 1918. Were these offensives strategic blunders?

9. Imperial Germany during the First World War provides a glaring example of the breakdown in the proper relationship between political and military leaders in the making of policy and strategy. Why did this breakdown occur and what were its strategic consequences?

10. Germany launched a major ground offensive on the Western Front—the so-called Schlieffen Plan—at the beginning of the First World War. Was the German plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

11. In January 1917, did Germany's leaders have any better, realistic alternative strategic course of action open to them other than to embark upon a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare?

12. "Mahan's strategic theories were becoming irrelevant even as he developed them." Do you agree?

13. Assess the rewards, costs, risks, and feasibility of the alternative maritime strategies open to Germany and Great Britain for the employment of their naval forces during the First World War.

14. Was the failure of the major powers to negotiate an early end to the fighting during the First World War irrational?

15. What lessons does the rise and fall of imperial Germany hold for understanding the international strategic environment in the early part of the twenty-first century?

### C. Readings

1. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Chapters 5, 7-8.

[Henry Kissinger provides a valuable assessment of the famous German statesman Bismarck and the challenge posed by imperial Germany's ambitions to the peace of Europe in the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the First World War. In this account, Kissinger assesses the role played by strategic leadership in shaping the international environment in both peace and war.]

2. Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, paperback edition, 1964. Chapters 4-5, 8.

[This landmark study on civil-military relations examines the relationship between soldier and statesman. The institution of the general staff, pioneered by Prussia during the nineteenth century, gave the Prussian army an important strategic edge in planning for war and controlling operations once the fighting began. Prussia's operational successes during the Wars of German Unification owed much to the general staff's ability to generate a formidable pulse of military power by carrying out a rapid deployment of Prussian forces to the frontiers at the outset of war; it also owed much to the skill at maneuver warfare showed by its chief, Helmuth von Moltke. This study examines why Bismarck found it difficult to subordinate operations to policy during the Wars of German Unification even as Prussia won on the battlefield. It also illuminates the disastrous consequences for Germany in the First World War when its leaders substituted operational considerations for strategic wisdom.]

3. Wawro, Geoffrey. *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapters 1-2. (NWC Reprint)

[This study provides a useful background examination of the operational military environment and the diplomacy that preceded the outbreak of the Wars of German Unification.]

4. Badsey, Stephen. *The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871*. New York: Osprey, 2003. Pages 7-54, 59-76, 81-86.

[This concise history offers an overview of the operations that occurred during the Franco-Prussian War.]

5. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Chapters 2, 4-10.

[Hew Strachan, a professor at Oxford University and one of the world's leading authorities on the First World War, presents a lucid account of this hideous conflict, providing essential background information for evaluating Germany's policy and strategy.]

6. Rothenburg, Gunther. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1986. Chapter 11.

[This study provides a succinct examination of the strategic thought, operational doctrine, and war plans of Prussia-Germany's military leadership, from the Wars of German Unification down to the outbreak of the First World War.]

7. Kennedy, Paul M, ed. *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979. Chapters 3 and 8.

[These articles, by the noted historian Paul Kennedy, provide astute analyses of the international strategic environment at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the first essay, he explores the strategic advantages that Great Britain derived from its dominance of the international system of cable communications and its ability to control information. The second essay examines the prewar strategic calculations and operational planning of the German navy with regard to Britain. Germany faced an extraordinarily difficult geostrategic problem in having to plan and prepare for a war with Britain. The strategy and forces developed by Germany's leaders, however, contributed to the growing Anglo-German antagonism.]

8. \_\_\_\_\_. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Ashfield Press, paperback edition, 1987. Chapters 8-9.

[These chapters from Paul Kennedy's important study of British sea power examine Great Britain's response to the growing threats it faced in the maritime environment at the beginning of the twentieth century. In particular, Kennedy appraises Britain's efforts to stay ahead of the challenge posed by the German naval buildup engineered by Tirpitz. This reading thus dovetails with the previous one about Germany's naval strategy and planning before the First World War.]

9. Steffen, Dirk. "Document of Note: The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's Declaration of Unrestricted U-boat Warfare." *The Journal of Military History* (January 2004), pages 215-224.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3397253.pdf>

[In this important strategic assessment, the Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, argued for a submarine offensive to defeat Britain even if it meant provoking American intervention in the war against Germany. The decision of Germany's rulers to follow Holtzendorff's strategy proved a turning point in the First World War. The German submarine offensive, despite initial successes in sinking merchant shipping, failed to deliver a knockout blow, forcing Britain out of the war. Further, by bringing the United States into the fighting, Germany contributed to its own defeat.]

10. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, paperback edition, 1991. Chapter 24. (NWC Reprint)

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

11. Ropp, Theodore. "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power." Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1971. Chapter 18. (Selected Readings)

[This reading examines the large body of writings by strategic theorists who advocated asymmetric naval strategies to disrupt the ability of dominant sea powers to command the maritime commons. These theorists sought to exploit technological change, the introduction of new weapons, along with the development of innovative tactics and doctrines, to undercut the strategic advantages held by leading naval powers. Mahan, in his writings, attempted to counteract the appeal of these writings on the development of strategy and force structure.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study examines the behind-the-scenes and public diplomatic efforts, military plans, and economic policies employed by rising great powers to achieve their aim of reordering the international system. The last *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* emphasized the strategic challenge posed by rising great powers poised at strategic crossroads for American foreign policy and strategy decision makers. This case will apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks as presented by the course to evaluate the formulation of strategy in support of national objectives. Students will:

- Synthesize an analytical framework on strategic leadership skills necessary to produce successful policy outcomes in wars fought for limited aims.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining military resources, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Assess the impact of mass nationalism and cultural passions on the making of policy and strategy.

- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role played by factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across a range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Assess from a comparative perspective problems in civil-military relations that affect strategic decision making and operations.
- Evaluate the strategic effects of transformations in warfare brought about by changes in organizational structure, professional education and training, doctrine, technology, and weaponry.
- Assess the strategic and operational effects of the use of asymmetric, conventional, disruptive, and catastrophic attacks in wartime.
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
- Assess maritime strategies designed to command the maritime commons and those developed by an emerging peer competitor to disrupt that command.
- Examine the resource tradeoffs of alternative force structures for warfare in the maritime domain.
- Examine the strategic effectiveness of access-denial strategies in the maritime domain.
- Assess risk management in employment of naval forces.
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
- Assess the strategic effects of submarines and antisubmarine warfare.

## **V. LOSING GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: CONFRONTING CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC, AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES—GREAT BRITAIN BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS**

**A. General:** “Victory in the First World War brought the British Empire to its zenith: with the addition of the territories it had occupied in the Middle East and elsewhere, it had become larger than it—or any other empire—had ever been before.” (Fromkin, *Peace to End All Peace*, p. 383) The expansion of the British Empire after the First World War presented Great Britain’s leaders with new international responsibilities and strategic problems. The so-called Great War gave rise to a new international strategic environment, one that British decision makers needed to contend with and at the same time shape. Defending and policing an enlarged empire proved an extraordinarily difficult task, embroiling Britain in a number of conflicts as it attempted to enforce the peace. While determined that the British Empire remained (in the words of General Jan Smuts, the prime minister of the Union of South Africa) “the greatest power in the world,” Britain’s leaders were also conscious of the need to avoid imposing further heavy burdens on a war-weary people. Britain paid a fearful price to defeat Germany and its allies: over 700,000 Britons lost their lives in winning the First World War. The question facing Britain’s leaders was whether their country, after having sacrificed so much to win the war, would lose the peace.

An assessment of Great Britain’s experience between the two world wars provides an opportunity to examine strategic challenges—conventional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive—such as those identified by the last *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* as confronting the United States today. Britain’s armed forces, while constrained by political and fiscal realities, faced the challenge of meeting strategic goals across a range of military operations. In the Middle East, South Asia, and Ireland, the British armed forces fought against insurgents who employed terrorist and other irregular methods of warfare. The study of British counterinsurgency operations enables an evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of armed services (including special operations forces) in achieving strategic objectives.

Conventional threats also re-emerged during this period as great-power rivals transformed their armed services and developed new operational capabilities. The disruptive effects derived from the transformation then taking place in warfare almost brought about Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War. An increasing danger from the threat of catastrophic attacks on the homeland posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against the pre-1945 forerunner of what we today call WMD/E preoccupied policy makers and defense planners throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the development of the first integrated air defense system, along with an extensive effort in civil defenses—to protect the homeland in case deterrence failed. Another aspect of this module is its emphasis on information operations and strategic communication. Targeted at domestic public opinion, the enemy leadership, and international audiences, such efforts proved critical in countering the effects of air attacks

on the British homeland and in bolstering Britain's global strategic position during a period of grave crisis.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain faced a colossal task in controlling a vast area that stretched from the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East, to South Asia. The Ottoman Empire had dominated the Middle East for centuries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was a failing state, known as the “sick man” to contemporary observers. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, a power vacuum emerged in the Middle East that Britain attempted to fill. When British forces captured Baghdad in 1917, their commanding officer, General F. S. Maude, proclaimed: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.” Britain's attempt to impose a post-war settlement on the Middle East, however, led to clashes with local nationalist movements—most notably an uprising in Iraq during 1920. In these conflicts, Britain used air power in innovative ways to help keep the costs of controlling the region from outrunning available resources. Britain employed air power as part of campaigns in Aden, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Somaliland (present-day northern Somalia). In the 1919 war with Afghanistan, the bombing of Kabul, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief of Britain's Indian Army, played a crucial role “in producing a desire for peace at the headquarters of the Afghan Government.” But boots on the ground remained important. Indeed, in Palestine during the late 1930s, Britain needed to deploy a large ground force to suppress communal violence between Arabs and Jewish settlers. Maintaining the so-called *Pax Britannica*—that is, the British peace—entailed that Britain take on the burden of fighting campaigns throughout the Middle East and South Asia between the two world wars.

In facing international challenges and conflicts within the empire, Britain's decision-makers were constrained by economic circumstances. After a short-lived post-war boom, the British economy went into a deep economic slump, followed by sluggish economic growth throughout the 1920s. The worst was yet to come, with the onset of the Great Depression at the end of the decade. Britain, like most of the world, suffered throughout the 1930s from the lingering effects of the economic downturn even as the economy recovered. The economic orthodoxy of the time called for sharp cuts in military spending as a way of holding down government expenditures and balancing the budget. This drive for economy in the armed services' budgets forced Britain's leaders to face some awkward policy and strategy trade-offs. For example, the armed services needed to find money for force modernization even as British decision-makers expected them to carry out policing roles and to maintain a strong forward presence. To rein in the spending of Britain's armed services, the government issued a guideline for defense planning in the summer of 1919 that stated “the British empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” This defense planning guidance—the so-called Ten-Year Rule—is indicative of how Britain's leaders did not consider another war against a peer competitor likely in the near future. This case study thus affords an opportunity to examine the impact of severe economic constraints on the making of policy and strategy.

The British experience between the two world wars also provides insight into the difficulties that military organizations face in carrying out successful innovation in peacetime. Britain's armed services pioneered a transformation of war that began during the closing stages of the First World War. The British army was putting together an effective combined arms team of tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy was developing the capability to launch massed air strikes from aircraft carriers against targets afloat and ashore. A new, independent Royal Air Force was also taking steps to carry out long-range bombing and defend the homeland against aerial attack. Over the course of the next twenty years, however, Britain was to lose some of the operational advantages that its armed forces derived from wartime innovations in doctrine, weaponry, and force structure. During the initial stages of the Second World War, the armed forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan inflicted stunning defeats on Britain and the other Western democracies. To understand why the British armed forces began to lag behind great-power rivals in some critical operational capabilities requires us to make an analytical comparison of what happened in Britain with what occurred in other countries between the two world wars. This case study brings to the forefront the strategic topic of transformation. And not least, this case study assesses the role played by naval forces in meeting security challenges and at the strategic effects of transformation in warfare taking place in the maritime domain. By examining the concept of transformation, the obstacles to carrying it out, and the factors that promote it, we can deepen our understanding of military innovation and its potential strategic effects.

Beyond the challenges posed by insurgencies, economic stagnation, and military transformation, Britain was buffeted by a "perfect storm" in the international strategic environment of the 1930s: the gathering of simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the Pacific. Extremist regimes in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and (above all) Nazi Germany threatened the outbreak of a new war involving the great powers. Britain's leaders employed a grand strategy that has come to be known as appeasement to manage this increasingly dangerous international environment and avoid war. This case study thus highlights the vexing problem in policy and strategy of determining when to negotiate to avoid war and when to take a determined stand and fight.

The inability of Britain's leaders to avoid another great war put at risk the very existence of the British Empire. By the summer of 1940, Britain fought alone against a coalition of enemies, facing the danger of imminent invasion, its homeland under attack from the air and its sea-lanes threatened. Yet, despite this bleak strategic picture, Britain refused to negotiate with Nazi Germany, and rallied instead to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's call for continued resistance. What we today call strategic communication was an important weapon deployed by Britain in this critical moment in world history. By choosing to fight on, Britain became the foundation stone of the Grand Alliance that would ultimately defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan during the Second World War. Thus, we have here an example of how, in a democracy, the determination of government, people, and armed forces can stave off defeat and point the way to ultimate victory.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. To what extent did Great Britain suffer from strategic overextension during the period between the two world wars?
2. How effectively did Great Britain deal with the problems that it confronted in the Middle East between the two world wars?
3. Great Britain fought several insurgencies during the interwar period. What strategy and policy mistakes did British decision makers commit in fighting these conflicts?
4. How effectively did Great Britain integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East between the two world wars?
5. Great Britain's underlying source of strength for two centuries had been its financial staying power in war. In an effort to sustain this source of strength in the future, British leaders constricted defense spending in the 1920s and 1930s. How effectively did Britain's leaders manage the risks they ran by following this policy of holding down defense spending?
6. Did British military planners in the interwar era draw appropriate "lessons" from the First World War?
7. How effective were the British armed services in carrying out transformation between the two world wars?
8. How effectively did Great Britain respond to the challenges and threats that emerged between the world wars to its maritime security?
9. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity than a strategic threat to Great Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940? If so, how? If not, why not?
10. Homeland defense loomed increasingly large in British defense planning between the wars and during the initial stages of the Second World War. British leaders feared above all that massive air attacks on the homeland, producing what we today call WMD/E, would result in large numbers of civilian casualties and defeat in war. How effectively did Great Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?
11. A prominent defense analyst holds the view that military services typically "prepare for problems they prefer to solve rather than those that a cunning adversary might pose." Was that the case with Great Britain's armed services between the wars?

12. Evaluate the major alternative strategy and policy courses of action open to Great Britain for managing the strategic challenge posed by the rise of Nazi Germany. Did British leaders have any viable alternative course of action other than appeasement?

13. Did Great Britain commit a strategic error by going to war against Germany in September 1939?

14. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare undermine Great Britain's command of the maritime commons?

15. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan's views about sea power still relevant as strategic guidance for Great Britain's leaders in the era of the two world wars?

16. How effectively did Great Britain use intelligence, information, and strategic communication as instruments of national power during this era?

17. What strategy and policy lessons does Great Britain's experience in the Middle East in the era between the world wars hold for American decision-makers at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Chapter 6.

[The noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy explores in this best-selling book the interrelationship between a country's international position and its economic power. He writes: "[T]he historical record suggests that there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world power)." (p. xxii) The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars, providing background information for understanding Britain's increasingly desperate strategic predicament.]

2. Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. Pages 383-567.

[The First World War ushered into being the modern Middle East. In this acclaimed study, David Fromkin presents a well-written survey of Britain's strategic predicament in the Middle East and South Asia after the First World War. Britain faced a wide range of problems in trying to impose its control on the region. Fromkin examines Britain's interests in the region, the problems that it needed to overcome, and the efforts of British leaders to reconcile the two. Close study of the Middle East in this era provides insights into current-day problems in the region.]

3. Rayburn, Joel. "The Last Exit from Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006), pp. 29-40.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=19895475&site=ehost-live>

[This short article by a U.S. Army officer picks up where the account by Fromkin ends. Rayburn describes the political and security problems that confronted Great Britain in trying to bring stability to Iraq between the two world wars. British leaders faced an extraordinarily difficult task in their effort to establish a pro-British government that could govern effectively the peoples of Iraq. The upshot was that, early in the Second World War, Britain had to invade and reoccupy the country so that it did not become a base for Nazi operations in the Middle East.]

4. Liddell Hart[, B.H.] *The British Way in Warfare*. London: Faber, 1932. Chapter VII: "Air and Empire. The History of Air Control." (Selected Readings)

[The famous British strategic theorist and writer B.H. Liddell Hart, writing in the early 1930s, offers a policy and strategy assessment of the deterrent value of air power for policing the British Empire. In particular, he examines the strategic effects of air power in the campaigns fought by British forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somaliland, Waziristan, and Yemen during the decade following the First World War. Liddell Hart argued that "the real military value of air-power, a weapon of super-mobility, is that it may disperse at the shortest notice and longest distance a foe who gathers—and whenever he gathers—for a serious attack. Its real political value is that it may prevent the great mass of tribesmen who have property to lose from following the reckless few who have nothing to lose. . . . [T]he chief deterrent [afforded by air power] is the fear [induced in tribesmen] of losing their own [property]." (p. 151) This justification offered for the use of air control, written close to the events by a leading strategic commentator, can be contrasted with that presented in the next reading by the historian Charles Townshend.]

5. Townshend, Charles. "Civilization and 'Frightfulness': Air Control in the Middle East Between the Wars," in Chris Wrigley, ed., *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986. (Selected Readings)

[This article explores British views about air power as an instrument for policing the empire. Britain pioneered in the use of air power, which appeared to offer a cheaper way of controlling territory than large numbers of ground forces. This article also explores some of the limitations of air power as an instrument of imperial control, not least the moral issues raised by its use.]

6. \_\_\_\_\_. "The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936-1939." *The English Historical Review* (October 1988), pp. 917-949.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/570262.pdf>

[Great Britain faced escalating violence in Palestine during the late 1930s that proved difficult to quell. This violence involved Arabs, Jewish settlers, and British authorities in Palestine. Even before this struggle, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, one British official reported about Palestine: “The chief characteristic (indeed, the only characteristic worth taking into serious account) of the situation is, not only that no single section of the population accord the Government any appreciable measure of sympathy and support, but also that the vast majority regard it with increasing hostility, aversion and distrust.” (p. 948) Stability operations in Palestine required a large commitment of British ground forces at a time when Britain faced a growing menace closer to home in Nazi Germany. From this time on, Palestine has remained a notoriously troubled region.]

7. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Chapters 12-14.

[Henry Kissinger offers his assessment of the international system between the world wars and how the settlement that ended the First World War broke down when confronted by the violent extremism of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. In these chapters of *Diplomacy*, Kissinger once again emphasizes the role played by strategic leadership in making the decisions to initiate war.]

8. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights, New Jersey: The Ashfield Press edition, 1987. Chapter 10.

[This insightful account examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining its position of naval leadership between the two world wars. As other countries built up their navies during the 1930s, the burden of providing for Britain’s naval security grew dramatically heavier. Kennedy examines how difficult it was for Britain to provide for its naval security in this deteriorating international environment.]

9. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 10.

[This major study, supported by the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, examines how the armed forces of the major powers developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they would employ during the Second World War. Studying military transformation from a comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind between the wars.]

10. Parker, R. A. C. *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Chapters 2-3. (Chapter 1 is optional for those who want more background information on the events of the 1930s.)

[This history presents a lucid account of the major defeats suffered by Britain and its coalition partners during the initial campaigns of the Second World War. These defeats came about in part because of the inadequacy of Britain's prewar preparations. Despite these defeats, Britain under the leadership of Winston Churchill did not make peace but continued to fight until a new coalition came into being to defeat Nazi Germany.]

NOTE: You may receive the 1989 edition of this book OR the 1997 OR 2001 edition entitled *The Second World War: A Short History*.

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case examines the ends, ways, and means of employing the sea services to achieve strategic effects. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges that the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. Students will:

- Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- Assess the capabilities and limitations of armed forces—and particularly of naval forces—in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations against a spectrum of conflicts.
- Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate national military strategy, especially with respect to the changing character of warfare.
- Synthesize how national military and theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role played by factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across a range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Understand warfare at sea—past, present, and future.
- Evaluate alternative maritime strategies and force structures designed to command the maritime commons.
- Assess the strategic effects and interactions of transformations in warfare taking place in different fighting domains.
- Skilled in applying sea power to achieve strategic effects across a range of military operations.
- Understand air warfare—past, present, and future.

## **VI. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES IN WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR**

**A. General:** A series of global conflicts—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—wreaked havoc in the twentieth century. The outcome of each war helped to generate the origins of the next one. Each successive war grew larger in geographical scope. Within this pattern, there were radical changes in the character of war. As with other epochal changes in the history of warfare (including the Long War in the early twenty-first century), new forms of political organization and new forms of military technology created these changes.

The new forms of political organization that shaped the nature of World War II and the Cold War grew in part out of World War I and its aftermath. Totalitarian regimes emerged, both in fascist and communist variants. Externally, the ideologies of these regimes encouraged grandiose expansionist objectives in the world. Internally, these regimes sought to control their societies in ways that seemed to make them well-suited to wage total war against their external adversaries. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against the fascist variants of the new totalitarian forms of political organization. The Cold War was a struggle against the communist variants.

All the while, technological change was generating new means and ways of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in World War I, armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier-aviation strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became the main forms of military action in World War II. Germany and Japan made disruptive use of the new technology to achieve remarkable operational success in 1940-1942, but that early advantage did not last long. By the end of World War II, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and their mobilization of scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weaponry, except for jet aircraft and missiles. Of even greater importance for the future, the United States had developed the first nuclear capability and had ended the war against Japan by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American nuclear monopoly proved to be short-lived. Four years after the end of World War II, the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction on both sides that the technological application of modern science to war made possible.

Against this backdrop of global political conflict fuelled by new forms of political organization and new forms of military technology, this case study focuses on the key strategic issues involved in the emergence of the United States as a global power. After World War I, the United States had largely withdrawn from serious strategic engagement with the world beyond the western hemisphere. The dramatic events of 1940 called into question the wisdom of such “isolationism.” That spring and summer, Germany defeated France in a stunning Blitzkrieg and then attacked the British homeland in the first major strategic-bombing operations against a great European power in the history of warfare.

Japan, having already been at war against China for three years, now started to expand into Southeast Asia as well, threatening the Western colonial empires in that region. Germany, Japan, and Italy came together in a formal Axis alliance that American policymakers perceived as a conspiracy to conquer the world. The political and military leaders of the United States suddenly faced the challenge of making their nation a global power to meet a global threat.

The United States had meager capabilities in place in 1940 to meet such a global challenge. Militarily, there was relatively little American power in being. The United States Army was about the size of the Dutch Army that the Wehrmacht had defeated in a matter of days, and it had as yet virtually no capability for armored warfare. There were ambitious American plans to manufacture thousands of strategic bombers and other aircraft, but numbers on paper and activity in factories had not yet produced much of an air force. Though the United States Navy had benefited from some rearmament in the 1930s, only in mid-1940 did Congress authorize funding on a scale large enough to construct the naval forces necessary to achieve command of both the Atlantic and the Pacific. That new two-ocean fleet would not come to fruition until 1943. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United States Navy was inferior to the Imperial Japanese Navy both quantitatively and qualitatively in the early stages of World War II.

Politically, the outlook was equally grim. The United States had no great-power allies. German forces occupied much of France, while the rump Vichy regime in southern France embarked on a policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany. Japanese forces had occupied the most important areas of China, destroyed the best military forces of the Chinese government, pushed Chiang Kai-shek's regime into remote southwestern China, and established its own puppet regime. Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin's anti-Western policy involved substantial Soviet material assistance to Hitler's war machine. In 1940, only Britain loomed as a possible American ally of great strategic importance. Even with respect to Britain, there was much uncertainty. Though Prime Minister Winston Churchill was eager to form an Anglo-American alliance, domestic opinion that feared "entangling alliances" constrained President Roosevelt, and American military leaders strongly doubted that Britain could survive German attack.

Whereas the year 1940 is the starting point for this case study, the year 1951 is the ending point. The intervening eleven years produced a remarkable transformation in the American position in the world. Thanks to Japanese and German strategic decisions, the United States and the Soviet Union joined Britain in a Grand Alliance that achieved the complete defeat of the Axis powers by 1945. After the Grand Alliance broke down and the Soviets threatened the hard-won security of the Western democracies, the United States and Britain put together a new coalition to contain the Soviet Union that included their erstwhile German and Japanese adversaries. With the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the formation of a multinational communist coalition in East Asia in 1950, the Cold War, like World War II before it, expanded in geographical scope. Surprised by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the United States intervened in a regional war within the larger Cold War and, in a further

surprise, soon found itself fighting not only the Soviet client state of North Korea but also the newest and most important Soviet ally, Mao Tse-tung's China. The policy of containment of communism spread from Europe to East Asia. To support it with greater military power, the United States reversed the post-World War II downsizing of its conventional military forces; in the early 1950s, half the product of this surge of rearmament went to Western Europe and half to East Asia. In an atmosphere of Western fear that the war in Korea presaged Soviet aggression in Europe, NATO became in 1951 a full-fledged military alliance under American leadership. The United States desired to bring the recently constituted and soon-to-be rearmed Federal Republic of Germany into this alliance. Germany's former Axis partner Japan also became a formal ally of the United States. Thus, by 1951 isolationism had become but an historical memory for the United States. The American government, military, and people had met, twice in a decade, the challenge of global conflict and had made a long-term strategic commitment to remain a global power.

In meeting the challenge of global conflict, the United States along with its allies had to come to grips with a series of strategic tasks. Each of the remaining paragraphs of this introductory essay highlights a task. The key words describing each task are in italics.

Clausewitz had stressed that the first and foremost task of statesmen and commanders is to understand the nature of the war in which they are getting involved, while Sun Tzu had suggested that the necessary first step is to understand the enemy. *Assessment* of the threat posed by enemies in both World War II and the Cold War was no easy task. Radically new forms of political organization, cultural "blindness," and changes in military technology made it quite difficult to anticipate the dynamics of interaction between adversaries in 1940-1951. Early in World War II, the individual (and sometimes idiosyncratic) judgments of political leaders, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, dominated the process of assessment. In the Cold War, there developed a more elaborate institutional process of net assessment in Washington, D.C. Early on, an individual Foreign Service Officer, George Kennan, produced an assessment of the Soviet Union that still stands as the most remarkable and influential work of this sort ever done by anyone in the United States government.

A good assessment of the enemy should lead to the *formulation of a strategic concept* for waging the war. In a global war, that, too, is no simple matter. Yet this task was one that American strategists, despite the tradition of isolationism, handled quite well. The first good strategic concept was the work of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. His "Plan Dog" memorandum of November 1940 stands out as perhaps the most important essay on strategy and policy ever written by an American military leader. In the early Cold War, Kennan developed the strategic concept of "containment" from his assessment of the Soviet Union; it provided a theory of victory for bringing about the breakup or mellowing of the Stalinist regime. In 1950, just before the Korean War and just after the Soviet Union had demonstrated a nuclear capability, Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State

Department, circulated NSC-68, a document that made the case for a more muscular military posture in support of containment.

These strategic concepts all required American political and military leaders to come to grips with the issue of *geostrategic priorities*. No matter how great the potential power of the United States, it could not be strong everywhere in the world. Following the lead first of Stark and then of George Marshall, in both World War II and the early Cold War American strategists adhered to the principle that Europe should have top geostrategic priority. But in practice the United States decided to open or contest new theaters outside Europe in both World War II and the Cold War. In the Pacific theater of World War II the American decision to contest Japan's opening of a new theater in the southwest Pacific entailed a major diversion of strategic assets away from Europe, but it proved to be of great strategic importance to the ultimate victory over Japan. In the Cold War, when the North Koreans, Soviets, and Chinese decided to open a new theater in Korea, the American decision to intervene militarily also represented a major diversion from Europe. It, too, proved to be of crucial strategic significance in the larger Cold War.

As we have already seen in other high-stakes, multi-theater wars between great powers, a key determinant of strategic success is the ability to *create and sustain cohesive multinational coalitions*. In wrestling with this task from 1940 to 1951, the United States had to overcome major political obstacles. In World War II, the Grand Alliance had to keep together Western democratic regimes and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis alliance was comprised of regimes with greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Yet the Grand Alliance proved to be more strategically cohesive than the Axis. In the Cold War, the American-led coalition against the Soviet Union had to bring together nations that had been bitter adversaries in World War II. It is striking that both Germany and Japan emerged as allies of the United States after military occupations of those defeated countries. In the early Cold War as in World War II, formidable threats to national survival made the formation of coalitions possible. But the United States had to make heavy use of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to maintain its Cold War coalitions, just as it had done with the Grand Alliance in World War II.

Along with coalition cohesion enhanced by non-military instruments of power, the ability to *develop and integrate different forms of military power* is another key to strategic success in global wars. As always, troops on the ground were vital to achieving and sustaining such strategic success in 1940-1951. But naval power made it possible for the United States to open or contest new theaters around the globe and to support ground forces in even the most distant theaters. The newest instrument, air power, became a source of crucial competitive advantage from 1940 on. Indeed, students should consider whether, without air power, the Grand Alliance could have achieved a total defeat of the Axis in World War II. In the early Cold War, air power loomed even larger as a potential source of competitive advantage. Before the development in the 1950s of long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, only aircraft could deliver nuclear weapons against the enemy homeland. But as the Korean War demonstrated, conventional warfare with ground and naval forces supported by tactical aviation in joint operations remained

very important in the Cold War. Yet another instrument of potentially critical advantage concerned the information domain. The success of the British and American cryptanalysts in breaking German codes, it has been argued, may well have shortened World War II in Europe by several years. American prowess in breaking Japanese codes made possible the pivotal American naval success at Midway in June 1942, which accelerated the path to ultimate victory against Japan in the Pacific. Early in the Cold War, the United States had a similar code-breaking advantage against the Soviet Union, but Soviet espionage blunted that edge. Human intelligence, especially directed against the American nuclear program, allowed the Soviet Union to become a much more formidable competitor against the United States.

In an era of truly global conflict, political and military leaders in Washington came to appreciate the need to *reform the institutional dimension of American strategy-making*. Such reform was necessary to furnish sound estimates of new types of enemies, join together the new ways and means of waging war, and integrate military power and non-military instruments. New institutions, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint and combined theater commands, began to emerge in World War II, usually based on British counterparts and unanchored to statutory authority. The National Security Act of 1947 and amendments to it in 1949 provided a legislative basis for a wide range of new institutions. They added to an enhanced Joint Chiefs of Staff such enduring institutions as a Secretary of Defense, a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and an Armed Forces Security Agency (which became the National Security Agency in 1952). This new national-security establishment was supposed to facilitate greater jointness in force planning as well as in operational planning, to enhance civil-military relations and interagency coordination of policy and strategy, and to improve the collection and assessment of intelligence. The new institutions faced their first test of “hot” war in Korea in 1950.

While the period 1940-1951 was an era of remarkable achievement for American policy and strategy, some important strategic shortcomings appeared that have plagued the United States ever since. The *transitions* from peace to war in 1941 and in 1950 were marked by enemy surprise attacks that, initially, put the United States at a severe disadvantage. American war-termination strategies in World War II and the Korean War were inadequate in bringing about favorable transitions from war to peace. American political and military leaders did not find it easy to make a flexible transition from one type of war to another—from a global hot war to a global cold war and then to a limited regional war in Korea. The United States continues to wrestle with such problems of strategic transition in the twenty-first century.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. In 1940-1951 the United States was caught by surprise in attacks by three Asian adversaries: by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and by the Chinese military

intervention in Korea in October-November 1950. What lessons might usefully be drawn from this pattern of strategic surprise?

2. General George Marshall wrote to General Dwight Eisenhower in March 1945: “Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses.” In World War II what strategic advantages did the United States gain and what strategic disadvantages did it suffer from having a democratic political system?

3. Were American policy and strategy in World War II determined too much by short-term military necessity or expediency and too little by long-term political goals or principles?

4. The historian William O’Neill (Reading 4) calls air power “the democratic delusion.” Is that assessment justified by the evidence of World War II?

5. What good lessons could current theorists of effects-based operations learn from a close study of the use of the air instrument in World War II?

6. The first major, postwar, “revisionist” history of World War II in Europe made the mordant assessment that the Western democracies, for all their efforts from 1939 to 1945, had only succeeded in pushing back totalitarianism from the Rhine River to the Elbe River in Germany. Was there any operationally feasible and strategically rational course of action that the United States and Britain could have undertaken from 1943 to 1945 that would have tilted the postwar balance of power in Europe more in favor of freedom?

7. In global wars such as World War II and the Cold War, a decision to open or contest a new theater may prove to be of great strategic consequence. In the period 1940-1951, identify one such decision that brought major, positive consequences and another such decision that did not have positive consequences. Why were the strategic consequences different in the two cases?

8. Did American military operations in the Pacific theater(s) in 1942-1944 undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the Grand Alliance?

9. What difference did the existence of nuclear weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its Communist adversaries from 1945 to 1951?

10. How well did American political and military leaders make the transition from fighting World War II to waging a Cold War?

11. General Douglas MacArthur knew little about Japanese culture and, if anything, General Lucius Clay knew less about German culture. How, then, could they have been effective as leaders of the military occupations of Japan and Germany after World War II?

12. What lessons can one draw from the period 1940-1951 about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?
13. Compare and evaluate the strategic assessments and guidance provided by George Kennan's X article in 1947 and Paul Nitze's NSC-68 in 1950.
14. Does American policy and strategy in 1947-1950 represent a good example of the importance of interagency coordination and a good model for the integration of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power?
15. The new or reformed national-security institutions of the American government reflected the lessons of World War II. Were they well-suited to waging a Cold War?
16. In the period 1940-1951 there were several major episodes of American civil-military conflict, or at least intense disagreement between political leaders and military leaders on strategic issues. What lessons would you draw from those episodes?
17. Had the Soviet Union improved its long-term strategic position in the world from 1945 to 1951? If so, how? If not, why not?
18. In the period 1940-1951, which American theater commander was best and which was worst at knowing when to take risks and how to manage risks?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Weigley, Russell. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 269-359, 363-398.

[Weigley's book is perhaps the best known military history of the United States ever published. The first two chapters assigned here provide an overview of the American role in World War II from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military services made the transition from World War II to the early Cold War and then to the Korean War.]

2. Pearlman, Michael D. *Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Pages 221-279. (Selected Readings)

[Pearlman, a longtime faculty member at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, is interested in how the United States's democratic form of government has affected American "strategic culture." The chapter assigned complements the Weigley reading by bringing to the forefront the political background of American strategy in World War II. Pearlman is especially illuminating on the complexity of American policy and the impact of domestic politics and public opinion on American strategy. He also has

much to offer on civil-military relations, coalition management, strategic communication, and operational risk-aversion.]

3. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 146-180.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, formerly Chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, examines the interplay between U.S. Navy strategic leaders and President Franklin Roosevelt on issues of policy, strategy, and naval operations in the American transition from peace to war in 1940-1941. Students should take special note of Professor Baer's analysis of the Plan Dog essay written in November 1940 by Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.]

4. O'Neill, William. *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 10-14, 301-319. (Selected Readings)

[O'Neill, like Pearlman, is interested in the relationship between American democracy and American strategy. In the first, brief excerpt, he shows how traditional balance-of-power considerations and geostrategic thinking should have had more influence on American policy and strategy in World War II, but did not have much appeal for Americans at the time. In the second, longer selection, O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a hi-tech, low-cost way to victory in World War II. In the event, according to O'Neill, strategic bombing was both inefficient and unethical.]

5. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 2000), pages 89-111.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=6904740&site=ehost-live>

[Providing a new look at the elements of strategic success in a total war such as World War II, O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counter-argument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing and as a useful source of instruction to theorists of effects-based operations in our era.]

6. Wilson, Theodore A. *et al.* "Coalition: Strategy, Structure, and Statecraft," in David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A.O. Chubarian, eds. *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Pages 79-104. (Selected Readings)

[In this book of essays about the Grand Alliance in World War II, Wilson's contribution stands out for its careful analysis of the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations between political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational coordination, arrangements at the theater level for combined and joint warfare, and the important role played by intelligence and information operations in the defeat of Germany.]

7. Weinberg, Gerhard L. "Global Conflict: The interaction between the European and Pacific theaters of war in World War II" and "D-Day after fifty years: Assessments of costs and benefits," both in Weinberg, *Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pages 205-216, 254-273. (Selected Readings)

[Weinberg, the most distinguished American historian of World War II in our era, wrote these essays while preparing his monumental tome *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. The first essay assigned shows how strategic developments in different theaters were inter-related in a way that made World War II a truly global conflict, and it highlights the deficiencies of the Axis as a coalition for fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem that was most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to the issue of war termination in the European theater.]

8. Frank, Richard B. "Ending the Pacific War: 'No alternative to annihilation,'" in Daniel Marston, ed. *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapter 13.

[Frank is one of a number of non-academic historians who in recent years have shed brilliant new light on the Pacific War. This article summarizes some of the main points that he developed in great detail in his remarkable book on war termination in 1945, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*. Frank does an especially good job of evaluating the use of the atomic bombs in relation both to alternative American war-termination strategies and to decision-making in the Japanese political system.]

9. Spector, Ronald H. "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947," in *Journal of Military History* (October 2005), pages 1121-1136. (Selected Readings)

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397181>

[Spector, author of one of the best histories of the Pacific War, here carries the story of war termination into the postwar situation in East Asia. American and other Western ground forces were largely absent from the East Asian mainland when Japan surrendered in 1945. A power vacuum and indigenous turmoil developed in Korea, China, Indochina, and elsewhere that not only posed formidable problems for hastily improvised stability

operations by occupation forces, but also pointed toward future wars in East Asia that we shall study in the next two modules in this course.]

10. Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pages 4-129.

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy faculty at the Naval War College and the preeminent American historian of the Cold War, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the period from the mid-1940s to the early 1950s in light of newly available information on Communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong, for both sides of the Cold War, on the role of ideology as well as security considerations in the development of policy and strategy; on the formation of coalitions; and on the impact of nuclear weapons on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.]

11. Smith, Tony. "Democratizing Japan and Germany," in Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pages 146-176. (Selected Readings)

[Smith, a political scientist at Tufts University, views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after World War II as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread forms of democratic government around the world. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles for achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights the American actions that overcame these obstacles, while perhaps giving too little emphasis to the role that the Germans and Japanese themselves—not to speak of the looming Communist threat—played in bringing about favorable outcomes in the context of the Cold War.]

12. Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005. Pages 86-99, 197-225. (Selected Readings)

[In this highly acclaimed study of Europe since World War II, Judt, a British historian who teaches at New York University, provides insights into American use of the economic and informational elements of national power in the early Cold War. The first excerpt presents a judicious appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. The second excerpt takes a skeptical look at American attempts to shape a cultural environment in postwar Europe that was heavily influenced by intellectuals who, for the most part, were more inclined to look to the Soviet Union than to the United States for political inspiration.]

13. Etzold, Thomas H. "American Organization for National Security 1945-50," in Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pages 1-23. (Selected Readings)

[Etzold, who wrote this piece while a member of the Strategy faculty at the Naval War College, looks at the institutional dimension of American strategy-making in the 1940s, tracing an evolution that began in World War II and culminated during the early Cold War with the establishment of the national-security organizations that are still with us in the twenty-first century: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council. Etzold notes that war is “the great arbiter of institutions.” Accordingly, students should consider not only how well-suited the new institutions for intelligence, civil-military relations, jointness, and interagency coordination were to the demands of the Cold War, but also how well they met the test of the Korean War.]

14. James, D. Clayton. “Prologue: The Last War Revisited” and “MacArthur: The Flawed Military Genius,” both in James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 1-8, 29-52. (Selected Readings)

[James, an historian best known for his three-volume biography of General Douglas MacArthur, considers MacArthur’s strengths and weakness as a strategic leader as that celebrated general officer made the transition from being a theater commander in World War II to the Supreme Commander of the postwar occupation of Japan and, finally, to being a theater commander in the first year of the Korean War. James highlights the problems that MacArthur had in coming to grips with the political fact that the Korean War was a different type of war than World War II.]

**D. Primary Documents:** The following primary documents not only serve the purpose of providing material for seminar discussion and essays, but also may be useful models or sources of inspiration for students who have to write strategic memoranda or engage in strategic communication later in their careers.

1. Plan Dog memorandum: CNO Admiral Harold Stark to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, 12 November 1940. (S&P Portal)

2. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, “The Atlantic Charter,” issued 14 August 1941. (S&P Portal)

3. Fireside Chat by President Franklin Roosevelt: nationwide and worldwide radio address, 23 February 1942. (S&P Portal)

4. Truman Doctrine: address of President Truman to a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947. (S&P Portal)

5. George Kennan’s pseudonymous article on containment: X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947), pages 566-582; reprinted in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1987).

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=414283&sid=1&Fmt=6&clientId=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD>

6. Paul Nitze's NSC-68 report to the National Security Council: "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14 April 1950, reprinted in *Naval War College Review* (May-June 1975), pages 51-108. (S&P Portal)

**E. Learning Outcomes.** This module applies the theories, themes, and frameworks of the course to two different types of global coalition conflicts and to the early stages of a regional hot war within a global conflict. It addresses nearly all of the learning objectives prescribed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for senior-level officer professional military education and adds desired learning outcomes that go beyond JCS prescriptions. These learning objectives and outcomes include:

- Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate historical applications of national security strategy.
- Apply appropriate strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, SecDef, CJCS, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of US force structure have affected the development of joint military strategy.
- Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels in war.
- Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
- Synthesize the role and the perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans to include WMD/E.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role of geopolitics, geostrategy, society, and culture in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arenas.
- Evaluate processes by which national ends, ways, and means have been reconciled, integrated and applied.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.

- Analyze how interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint plans.
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of national security threats.
- Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- Analyze the nature of new kinds of war.
- Analyze when and where it makes strategic and operational sense to open or contest new theaters in an ongoing war.
- Analyze recurring US problems in making transitions from peace to war, from war to peace, and from one type of war to another.
- Analyze the special problems of making strategy in a democratic political system.
- Analyze how new technology, to include weapons of mass destruction/effect, may contribute to transformations of war.
- Analyze the challenges of assessing adversaries with different political systems and/or from different cultures.
- Analyze how superiority in the information domain supports the achievement of operational and strategic objectives.
- Value the importance of strategic communication in achieving desired effects on different audiences.

## **VII. THE RISE OF CHINA: THE TRANSFORMATION FROM NON-STATE ACTOR TO REGIONAL POWER DURING THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, KOREAN WAR, AND TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES**

**A. General:** In the twenty-first century, the United States faces dangerous, globally networked non-state actors. In the twentieth century, it also faced non-state actors—insurgencies intent upon seizing power in diverse locations throughout the globe and linked through a transnational network—international communism—bent on overturning the international legal and economic order. One such insurgency, that of the Chinese communists led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), seized power in the world's most populous nation after a protracted civil war and soon extended China's regional influence by tipping the balance in neighboring civil wars, first in Korea, then in Vietnam.

Several modules in this course have already revealed how formidable players can emerge, or re-emerge, to prominence in the international environment of strategy with remarkable rapidity. But no such rise was more surprising than that of China in the mid-twentieth century. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that propelled the ascent started as a small and vulnerable non-state actor in the 1920s and suffered some disastrous setbacks in its progression. Yet, over the span of two decades, the insurgency that began with nearly nothing had by the 1950s transformed China into a major communist power in Asia with Mao at the helm. This stunning feat was a culmination of a long and bitter struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT).

The first round of the Chinese civil war was won not by the Communist Party but by Chiang's KMT, which broke an alliance of convenience with the communists on its way to the establishment of a new "National" government in 1928. By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Kuomintang regime had brought about a monumental retreat of severely diminished communist forces and followers to a remote refuge in northwest China. But Mao was able to develop an effective theory of revolutionary war in 1936-1938 and take better advantage than the Kuomintang regime of intervention by external powers—first the Japanese invasion and occupation of large parts of China in 1937-1945 and then the Soviet defeat of Japanese forces in Manchuria in 1945. Manchuria became the crucial theater of military operations in the final stage of the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1949. Soon after Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, he signed a formal treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, and he joined Stalin in supporting the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. When the multinational forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command rolled the North Koreans back and advanced toward the Yalu River, Mao threw his army into the fight. The result in the winter of 1950-1951 was the worst operational defeat in American military history. That was the highest "red tide" of Mao's strategic leadership.

The primary purpose of this module is to learn more about strategy by looking at a period when war began to take forms to which the United States had much trouble adapting. This case study highlights seven major learning areas: first, Mao's theories of protracted revolutionary warfare; second, Mao as a political and military leader; third, the cultural barriers to net assessment; fourth, the difficulties, especially in terms of civil-

military relations, in making a jump from one type of war to another; fifth, the problems of war termination, particularly in situations where fighting and negotiating have to be closely coordinated; sixth, the effects of foreign intervention in civil wars; and seventh, coalition dynamics as illuminated by the emergence and demise of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In exploring these learning areas, it becomes apparent the extent to which the United States did not understand Chinese culture or Chinese communist ideology; did not understand the process or the potential of Mao's type of revolutionary war; was surprised by the overwhelming communist success in the Chinese Civil War; was slow to grasp how tight a multinational communist coalition emerged in East Asia in 1950; was surprised both by the outbreak of the Korean War and by Chinese intervention in it; was blinkered in its assessment of Chinese military capabilities as well as of Chinese political intentions; was surprised in truce negotiations in 1951-1953 by how hard it was to get the Chinese to agree to terminate the war; and, after the Korean War, was puzzled by the PRC's actions in Taiwan Strait crises.

Mao has a strong historical claim to being the leading strategic theorist, and perhaps the most successful practitioner, of war waged by non-state actors. While initially he argued that his theories of revolutionary "people's war" were tailored to the Chinese environment, subsequently they were adapted by insurgents elsewhere in Asia, and ultimately around the world, for their own revolutions. Whereas Sun Tzu (Sunzi) had warned that no state ever benefited from a protracted war, Mao saw that a non-state actor would need protraction to achieve ambitious aims. His theory can be seen in terms of the construction of a "Clausewitzian triangle" over an extended time. Building a people "leg" required cultivating popular support, through a struggle for hearts and minds. Mobilizing the people, especially the peasantry, would enable the communists to create a mass political party, overcome deficiencies in the material dimension of strategy, and develop information superiority at the local level. As supporters were converted into soldiers, the people leg would in turn help build up the military leg, first in the form of a guerrilla force engaged in irregular warfare and then in a conventional army capable of defeating the regular forces of the existing government. For the government leg, Mao drew on the Leninist political model, designed for a party vanguard to be the dominant political authority. The people and government legs were connected by cadres; the government and military legs were connected by commissars. This model proved potent in faction-ridden failing states where the bulk of the population remained in the countryside. In such failing states, the communist message of social equality, land redistribution, and prosecution of class enemies had special appeal, particularly in the period of decolonization following World War II. Mao's theory highlighted instruments of power accessible even to the poorest countries, like China of the 1930s and 1940s.

The United States had great difficulty countering the appeal of the Communist ideology in the developing world and the continental coalition of the growing Soviet bloc. Mao's greatest success was evident in the area of the United States' greatest weakness in developing countries, in the social dimension of strategy, where Mao appeared to win hearts and minds in the countryside, but U.S. strategies seemed often to alienate them. Reluctant to throw its own military forces into a potential Chinese quagmire, the United States found that major efforts to use other instruments of power—

diplomatic, informational, and economic—made no difference in the outcome of the Chinese Civil War. Intervening militarily in Korea on a scale that it had avoided in China, the United States was able to stem the expansion of communism in Northeast Asia in the early 1950s, but at quite a high cost. In the Korean case, fortunately for the United States, neither the indigenous dictator Kim Il-sung nor the foreign intervener Mao Tse-tung was particularly adept at winning the hearts and minds of the Korean people.

Mao's success as a strategic leader required not just theoretical creativity and ideological appeal, but also practical adaptability in the face of changing circumstances. During the Chinese Civil War, he struggled with the following problems: When should the Communists transition from political cooperation with the Nationalists (Kuomintang) to civil war? When should his forces transition from guerrilla operations to conventional warfare? During the Korean War, he faced other critical challenges: How should he adapt an effective civil war strategy against a weak government to a regional war against a superpower? How could he and his forces overcome or outmaneuver the superior firepower and other material advantages of American forces? When should he transition from offensive operations to war termination? After the Korean War, he faced more difficult decisions: When should he transition from apparent ally of the Soviet Union and recipient of Soviet assistance to defender of Chinese interests against Soviet predations? How should he transition from a head of state to the leader of the international communist movement? Costly setbacks caused Mao to make reassessments that, in the end, proved sufficient for victory in a twenty-two year civil war and achievement of his minimum objectives in the Korean War. Mao's reunification of China in combination with his success in Korea cemented his position at home. As with Stalin in World War II, victory in war made Mao a far more popular and powerful domestic leader.

American leaders, too, faced challenges of adaptation that required culturally informed assessments and strategically minded reassessments. Having been allied with Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, the United States had to decide whether to stand by him or to mediate between him and Mao as the civil war in China escalated after 1945. Having lost China by 1949, American leaders had to decide how closely to commit themselves to the support of Syngman Rhee's regime in South Korea in 1950. Accustomed to fighting for unlimited objectives in a global war from 1941 to 1945, American strategists had to adapt themselves to a more limited regional war in Korea. Having grappled with the problem of assessing the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union in the early Cold War, American leaders now had to face the even more difficult task of understanding a new Chinese communist regime that seemed ideologically similar to, but culturally quite different from, the Soviet regime.

The Korean War, on both sides, highlights the dangers of allowing early and easy military success to drive policy objectives beyond prudent limits. Once that happened, there developed, on both sides, deep civil-military tensions. There was a major difference, however, in these tensions on the American side and the Chinese side. The US and UN theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to expand American objectives and, when the PRC intervened in Korea, to open a new theater by attacking the Chinese homeland. American civilian leaders wished to restrain him from

waging a wider war. On the other side, Mao drove his theater commander, Marshal Peng Te-huai (Peng Dehuai), to attain unlimited objectives. Peng sought to restrain his political master. The ultimate outcome of these intense civil-military conflicts speaks volumes about the differences between American constitutional principles and Chinese communist political practices. President Truman cashiered General MacArthur in 1951. Mao had Marshal Peng arrested and tortured to death during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). By then Peng's criticisms of Mao had extended beyond military strategy in Korea to the economic strategies of the Great Leap Forward (1958). There is a curious nuclear backdrop to Truman's restraint and Mao's recklessness. In the early 1950s the United States had a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Soviets had just tested their first nuclear device. China did not develop a nuclear capability until 1964. Yet in the Korean War it was the Truman Administration that showed the most sensitivity to the possibility of nuclear war.

China and the United States had great difficulty terminating the Korean War. When the United States halted its counter-offensive to open peace talks in July of 1951, the fighting stalemated near the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel but the ground and air war continued to exact enormous casualties and economic costs. War termination did not occur until shortly after Stalin's death in 1953. The two-year stalemate had been grueling for all sides, with none achieving any significant objectives beyond what could have been achieved in 1951.

Foreign intervention greatly influenced events in Asia, but in unanticipated and often perverse ways. The Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States intervened to different degrees in the Chinese Civil War. The combined effect helped produce a unified Communist China eventually hostile to them all. Japan intervened, in 1931 in Manchuria and in 1937 in the rest of China, partly to contain communism, but in the process decimated the Nationalists, the only viable Chinese alternative to communism. The U.S. intervention in China (1945-1948) stopped short of large-scale military involvement and failed to produce the desired outcome. Close U.S. collaboration with the defeated Nationalists left the U.S. little diplomatic leverage over the Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had created the Chinese Communist Party (1921) and helped to prevent its defeat during the Manchurian phase of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1948). But Mao ignored Stalin's instructions to halt at the Yangzi River (Yangtze River), so that Stalin wound up not with a weak and divided China but with a unified power soon capable of redressing long outstanding grievances, such as the Soviet railway concessions and military bases in Manchuria whose return China demanded immediately after the Korean War (1953-1955).

Foreign intervention in Korea also produced unexpected outcomes. Although the United States attained its most basic political objective in Korea, it did so at a cost far higher than originally anticipated. China's intervention in Korea resulted in its forfeiting the opportunity to retake Taiwan, while the Soviet intervention produced a much stronger Western alliance system and increasingly strained relations with China. Finally, China's decision to touch off the Taiwan Strait Crisis after the Korean War had the unexpected outcome of unraveling the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance provides a cautionary tale about the perils of aiding potentially hostile forces. It is doubtful that the Chinese Communist Party could have survived without critical Soviet aid especially in the 1920s and the 1940s. Although Mao used the Sino-Soviet alliance to rise to power, he discarded the alliance once he had consolidated his position at home, and he then attempted to usurp Soviet leadership of the international communist movement. These escalating tensions ultimately created a dangerous security threat on the long Sino-Soviet border, where the demographic asymmetry created equally asymmetrical costs for border defense that the Soviet Union was ill-prepared to shoulder in the long run. Meanwhile, when Mao set off the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, partly in order to mobilize domestic support for his harebrained Great Leap Forward economic program, he ended up killing the Sino-Soviet alliance and losing valuable economic and technical aid. China had thus risen far, but had then reached too far—to a point that left Mao's regime in a potentially perilous position of strategic isolation in the international arena and in a chaotic economic situation in its domestic arena.

Finally, the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 illustrate the challenges of crisis diplomacy during the early years of the Cold War. The two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s also highlight the difficulties of dealing with alliance partners when they act in pursuit of their own interests. The confrontation between Communist China and Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan presented the United States with several major strategic challenges, including deterring China from further military action against Taiwan and avoiding a wider conflict in which nuclear weapons would likely be used. The United States also found Chiang a difficult partner at times after forming the US-ROC alliance following the 1954 crisis. Most notably, even though the Eisenhower administration sought to avoid risking war with China over the ROC-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which are located very close to the mainland's coast, Chiang managed to back Washington into a corner during the 1958 crisis by deploying such large numbers of troops to the two offshore islands that their defense appeared to become vital to the survival of his regime on Taiwan.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions**

1. From 1945 to 1958, which power was the most successful in East Asia at securing its long-term objectives—China, the United States, or the Soviet Union?
2. Despite qualitatively and quantitatively inferior equipment, Communist forces took control of most of northeast Asia from 1945 to 1953. Why?
3. To what extent did actual communist strategy in the Chinese Civil War follow Mao's theoretical model of revolutionary war?
4. What lessons about civil-military relations might one draw from the American and Chinese communist experience in the Korean War?

5. A critical issue of theater strategy concerns not going beyond the culminating point, yet overextension plagued the Kuomintang regime in China, and both the United States and the People's Republic of China in Korea. Why did such overextension happen, and how might it have been avoided?

6. Was it strategically wise for the United States to intervene militarily in Korea but not in China?

7. Two key questions of war termination are how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. How well did the United States and China handle these two questions during the Korean War?

8. Evaluate Mao as a strategic leader from 1945 to 1958. What were his greatest strengths and his greatest deficiencies?

9. Between 1945 and 1958, how important were cultural differences in generating conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China?

10. How important were information operations to the outcomes of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis?

11. In both the American Revolution and the Chinese Civil War, insurgents were able to transition to conventional offensive warfare. What factors enabled this successful transition?

12. Which country was better able to adapt to the regional war in Korea, the People's Republic of China or the United States?

13. If the policy objective of the United States was to prevent or undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance, what was the best course of action for doing so in East Asia from 1945 to 1958?

14. Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages for the communists and for the Kuomintang regime of opening and contesting a new theater against each other in Manchuria during the Chinese Civil War.

15. In what ways does Mao's theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?

16. Which government was better able to achieve its strategic objectives in the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises, Beijing, Taipei, or Washington?

17. What lessons should contemporary U.S. policymakers and planners learn from the political and military challenges Washington faced in responding to the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises?

### C. Readings

1. Griffith, Samuel B. "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung," in Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pages 45-56.

[Griffith emphasizes the elements of Sun Tzu most prominent in Mao's military strategy.]

2. Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. New York: Grove Press, 1968. Pages 272-277. (Selected Readings)

[In 1936, American journalist Edgar Snow interviewed Peng Dehuai, who would later serve as supreme commander of Chinese forces in Korea. Snow found Peng in Yan'an, where the communists had fled in the Long March (1934-1935) after nearly being annihilated in Chiang Kai-shek's fifth encirclement campaign (1933-1934). Peng summarized Maoist military methods in a manner that raises the question of whether he, not just Mao, shaped the Chinese Communists' way of war. Snow's book became a key information operation for the communists since his sympathetic account of their activities popularized their cause in the West.]

3. Mao Tse-tung. "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971. Pages 23-39. (Selected Readings)

[Mao's report indicates his early recognition of the role the peasantry might play in a revolutionary war.]

4. \_\_\_\_\_. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967. Pages 206-263, 345-352. (NWC Reprint)

[In "On Protracted War," Mao outlines a three-stage strategy for a non-state actor to overthrow the incumbent government and seize power. In "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Mao elaborates on his principles of operation.]

5. Dreyer, Edward L. *China at War 1901-1949*. London: Longman, 1995. Pages 312-361. (On Library Reserve Shelf—to be read in Library—not to be removed from Library.)

[Dreyer summarizes the major campaigns of the last phase of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) and discusses the relative importance of conventional and non-conventional operations in the communist victory.]

6. Levine, Steven I. "Mobilizing for War: Rural Revolution in Manchuria as an Instrument for War," in Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, eds., *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. Pages 151-175. (Selected Readings)

[Levine provides the best description anywhere of the cultivation of loyalty in the countryside by insurgents in order to create military forces capable of seizing power in a major country. Pay particular attention to Levine's description of the exchange relationship between the communists and the local population and to his discussion of the local coercive balance. Consider whether the communists achieved loyalty primarily through positive or negative incentives. This and the next reading both focus on the Manchurian theater.]

7. Tanner, Harold M. "Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947," *Journal of Military History* (October 2003), pages 1177-1222.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396886>

[Tanner focuses on military operations in Manchuria, the decisive theater of the Chinese Civil War.]

8. Waldron, Arthur. "China without Tears," in Robert Crowley, ed., *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been*. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1999. Pages 377-392. (Selected Readings)

[Waldron provides a counter-factual analysis of the Manchurian campaign, arguing that Chiang Kai-shek could have won the Chinese Civil War.]

9. Westad, Odd Arne. *Cold War and Revolution: Sino-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Pages 165-181. (Selected Readings)

[Westad summarizes U.S. and Soviet diplomacy in China through the Marshall Mission (1945-1947).]

10. May, Ernest R. *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975. Pages 5-33. (NWC Reprint)

[May highlights interagency issues in the U.S. decision not to intervene militarily in the Chinese Civil War.]

11. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 61-193, 213-232.

[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the Korean War, foreign intervention, war termination, and the impact on the Cold War alliances.]

12. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112. (NWC Reprint)

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

13. Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: Random House, 1991. Pages 165-195.

[Cohen and Gooch analyze why some U.S. forces had more difficulty than others in coping with the Chinese intervention in Korea in late 1950.]

14. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1992), Pages 465-475.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440>

[This extract from Hunt's article highlights the leadership differences between Truman and Mao.]

15. Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 203-225. (Selected Readings)

[*Uncertain Partners* summarizes the Sino-Soviet diplomacy that culminated in Chinese intervention in the Korean War.]

16. Zhang, Shu Guang. "The Limits of Technology: Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, 1950-1953." (Selected Readings)

[Zhang highlights the economic and technological dimensions of strategy, the instruments of national power, and civil-military relations in his analysis of Chinese military strategy in the Korean War.]

17. Chen, Jian. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Pages 163-204. (Selected Readings)

[Chen analyzes the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.]

18. "Memorandum for the Record, Washington, August 14, 1958," in United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. China Volume XIX (1958-1960)*, Pages 52-55.

<http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195860v19.p0084&isize=M>

[President Eisenhower and his senior civilian and military advisers discuss the challenges of avoiding a general war with China and dealing with Chiang Kai-shek during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Rise of China module applies the theories, themes, and frameworks of this course. Specifically, this case shows how an initially weak insurgent movement, animated by radical ideology, can rapidly take over and transform a failing state into a major regional, if not, global power. It also demonstrates how revolutionary ideology at home can drive a highly revisionist foreign policy of a major power. Furthermore, this case illustrates the dilemmas of intervening in regional and internal conflicts by outside powers. Finally, this module examines the role of nuclear weapons in a limited war fought within a broader global struggle. In covering these learning areas, the students will:

- Understand the theory, principles, and key strategic concepts of insurgency, terrorism, and counter-insurgency.
- Comprehend the role of ideology in shaping foreign policy.
- Evaluate the historical application of U.S. regional strategy in Asia.
- Evaluate how multinational campaigns support strategic objectives at the global, regional, and local levels of war.
- Apply analytical frameworks incorporating the roles of geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and ideology to the formulation of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the interagency and multinational arena.
- Assess the role of nuclear weapons in limited regional conflicts.
- Analyze the capacity and the limits of the interagency process in achieving strategic objectives.

## **VIII. LESSONS LEARNED? INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND GREAT POWER INTERVENTION IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS: THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CULTURAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, 1945-1975**

**A. General:** From 1945 to 1975 Southeast Asia stood out as one of the most violent regions of the world. Although some of its warfare featured states fighting states, most took place within political systems. Every country in the region except Singapore (established in 1965) was convulsed by internal wars, most more than once. There were violent uprisings against Western colonial systems (Vietnam and Indonesia); there were Communist insurgencies (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia); there was organized violence arising from ethnic and religious divisions (Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos); there were coups and counter-coups (Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, and Cambodia); there was massive repression of an attempted coup or incipient insurgency (in Indonesia in 1965, where several hundred thousand Communists and ethnic Chinese died); there were chemical attacks by a Communist regime against an ethnic minority (Laos); and there was genocidal slaughter by a Communist regime of its own people (in Cambodia, where more than one-fifth of the population died).

It is important for strategic leaders to have the historical, cultural, and geostrategic knowledge necessary to understand, and the awareness to anticipate, why and when a region may become convulsed by violence. In the case of Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975, a number of factors converged to generate massive and violent instability. Well before the twentieth century, Southeast Asia had been a meeting ground for conquerors, traders, missionaries, and migrants from other regions and other civilizations. As a result, by the twentieth century, the area south of China and east of India had become a remarkably complex mosaic of different civilizational influences, ethnic and tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. Before World War II, the whole region except Thailand was under Western colonial rule, though nationalist and Communist movements were beginning to manifest themselves with sporadic episodes of violence. The Japanese invasion and occupation of almost all of Southeast Asia in 1941-1942 had the effect of throwing up for grabs the political future of the region. It not only shattered Western colonial regimes and the aura of Western military invincibility, but also, as Japan headed for defeat in 1945, opened up political opportunities for indigenous successor movements. After World War II, when the British, French, and Dutch (though not the United States in the Philippines) tried to reassert their colonial authority, they encountered political resistance everywhere and violent insurgencies in some places. From 1946 to 1957, independent states emerged all over Southeast Asia.

Decolonization did not bring an end to the violence, for nearly every new regime had to face ideological or ethnic insurgencies—or a combination of both. Some of the Communist insurgencies, notably in Indochina, became enmeshed in the global Cold War. Thus what Americans refer to as the Vietnam War became a “war within a war within a war.” There was a Communist insurgency in South Vietnam that triggered a

regional war between the United States and North Vietnam over the fate of South Vietnam, which became embedded in the Cold War as the United States sought to contain the expansion of Communism even as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China gave massive material support to North Vietnam.

This module focuses on cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines. To provide a comparative backdrop to our successes and failures in Vietnam, we shall consider how the cultural, geo-strategic, and other features of that environment differed from those in Malaya and the Philippines. We shall compare the nature of the insurgents, the strengths and weaknesses of their strategies, and the availability of external support in the different cases. We shall also look for patterns of success and failure in the counterinsurgencies waged by the British against the Malayan Communist Party and its Malayan Races Liberation Army, by the Filipino government (with American advisers and aid) against the Huks in the Philippines, by the French against the Viet Minh in Indochina, and by the United States and its South Vietnamese allies against the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong and North Vietnam.

What stands out in such a comparative perspective is that only in Indochina did Communist insurgencies (or indeed violent mass insurgencies of any kind) actually succeed in Southeast Asia after the immediate post-World War II era. Thinking through why that was so should help students assess the prospects for success or failure of external powers in insurgencies in other regions and future periods. American strategic leaders in the Vietnam War had, but did not make effective use of, opportunities to learn from past experience. American strategic leaders after the Vietnam War were content to take away from that unhappy experience only the most simplistic lessons. The opportunity remains open to us in the twenty-first century to develop and ponder more profound lessons from the rich strategic stories laid out in this module.

One set of lessons has to do with what strategies do and not have a reasonable probability of working in insurgency and counterinsurgency. For this lesson, the offerings of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Joint Military Operations Department complement each other well, since exposure to multiple cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency gives students ample opportunity to see patterns of success and failure from the past that may have predictive value in the twenty-first century. In addition, the cases in this module, along with the previous case of the Maoist insurgency in China, allow us to see the ways in which insurgents might put together an effective strategy from different types of military operations, political struggle, organizational forms, information operations, communications media, and diplomatic tactics. These examples suggest that deviations from, or variations on, the Maoist model may be either promising or perilous for insurgents outside China. These examples also show how insurgents can exploit foreign intervention and benefit from external support.

Equally, the cases in this module reveal where the counterinsurgent side may go wrong. Counterinsurgents, like insurgents, must combine kinetic and non-kinetic means adroitly and coherently. A typical mistake is for an indigenous government or an intervening power to make a hasty resort to excessive military force or get into the habit

of using indiscriminate violence. They must avoid being provoked or induced into military overreaction or overextension. They may be well-advised to attack the enemy's strategy rather than the enemy's forces.

The Strategy and Policy course shows how politics permeates all types of wars, but modules like this one that feature insurgency and counterinsurgency show extraordinary political complexity. Strategists must consider every counterinsurgent course of action in light of its likely political effects on different audiences—local, national, and international. Intervening powers must be careful not to undercut whatever legitimacy their indigenous political partners have. And they must consider whether and how, by diplomatic or military means, they can deny access by the insurgency to external support. All that amounts to a demanding set of tasks and considerations.

A second lesson, which earlier Strategy and Policy case studies of insurgency have affirmed and which this module reaffirms, is that at the political core of a war of insurgency and counterinsurgency lies a struggle for the allegiance of the people caught between the two sides. Much of this political struggle takes place at the local level. The two sides usually follow a different political trajectory in relation to each other. Insurgents typically start at the local level, in villages in the countryside, and work their way up to the national center of power. The government resides at the national center and has to reach down to the local level to counter the insurgents. The outcomes of a myriad of local struggles for political allegiance turn on many factors including the coercive balance, relative political organization, competing economic programs, and information operations at the local level. An intervening external power can be effective only in so far as the indigenous government that it is supporting can be effective in local struggles. Without a lot of friendly locals, counterinsurgent strategy is doomed to frustration.

A third lesson that stands out in the cases of this module is the crucial importance of strategic leadership. That lesson should prompt students to look for the attributes that characterize good leadership of counterinsurgency strategy. Because most military leaders and political leaders are not well-prepared to deal with insurgencies when they first encounter them, the ability to learn quickly, adapt flexibly, assess and reassess enemies and environments incisively, combine different players and instruments cohesively, and communicate with different audiences persuasively are all at a premium. In the Philippines case Ramon Magsaysay (with his sidekick from the US Air Force, Edward Lansdale) and in the Malayan case General Sir Gerald Templer (with the help of a plan conceived by General Sir Harold Briggs) represent impressive examples of effective strategic leadership. By contrast, good examples of strategic leadership are conspicuous by their absence on the counterinsurgent side of the Vietnam War. In the American case, no one in key leadership positions either in Washington or in the theater seemed capable of providing a unifying vision of how to win the war, a compelling explanation of why victory was important in Vietnam, or a powerful acceleration of the sluggish process of adaptation.

Even the best strategies and the best strategic leaders will not necessarily succeed in all circumstances. A fourth lesson of great importance in this module has to do with the crucial role of the environment in shaping the ultimate outcome of any insurgency. What works well in one environment may not work well in another environment. The mechanical or mindless translation of lessons from one war to another may be counterproductive. Strategists must pay close attention to the factors and circumstances that characterize any given environment and that differentiate it from other environments with which they may be more familiar. Relevant factors to assess may be cultural, religious, social, economic, topographical, geo-strategic, and—not least—political. Key circumstances may reflect the weight of history, the way in which past events or developments have given legitimacy to insurgent groups or have damaged the credibility of counterinsurgent leaders or even have created a failed state. Thinking carefully about all this before one intervenes militarily may save one's nation from stumbling or plunging into a disaster.

A fifth lesson highlights the geo-strategic distinctiveness of Vietnam in the larger international environment. Malaya and the Philippines had nothing equivalent to North Vietnam next to them, and neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China had the easy physical access that would have enabled them to provide material support to the Malayan or Filipino insurgents as they did to the Vietnamese Communists. The fact that the United States, by contesting Vietnam as a new Cold War theater, ended up in “a war within a war within a war” complicated its strategic tasks enormously. American strategists had to worry about an interlocking set of difficult problems—the insurgency in South Vietnam, plus extensive North Vietnamese involvement, plus massive Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam. American courses of action that might help solve one problem might make another problem worse. Ideally, the actions taken in one war should have favorable effects in the other wars. Pondering how to achieve such well-aligned “spillover effects” is especially important now for American students and practitioners of strategy, because the United States has again become involved in wars within a larger war (as the introduction to the Long War module explains).

A sixth lesson, also of major relevance to the war against terror, brings us face to face with joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) variables in search of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) coordination. In an environment as difficult as Vietnam, the odds of intervening successfully can improve only if and when all players and all instruments are brought to bear in a unified way. The British succeeded in Malaya both because it was a less difficult environment and because under Templer's leadership they orchestrated players and instruments quite well. The Americans in Vietnam had instruments that were potentially better, but American strategic leaders did not orchestrate the players well. Civil-military relations in Washington were discordant. The chain of command extending from Washington to Saigon had plenty of snags. In the theater each military service tended to go its own way. Civilian agencies, too, were wont to execute their own bureaucratic repertoires. There was haphazard coordination and collaboration between the American military and the South Vietnamese military. American diplomats had only intermittent success in influencing the Saigon government and cajoling its leaders to broaden their political base

across the religious, cultural, social, and ideological fissures of South Vietnam. Information campaigns of the United States lost all credibility at home and abroad, while Communist propaganda increasingly found receptive audiences. When South Vietnam had its greatest need of American economic aid, in 1973-1975, Congress drastically reduced the flow. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had remarkable diplomatic success in improving American relations with the Soviet Union and cultivating new relations with Communist China, but could not induce either of them to abandon their support of North Vietnam. NATO allies, meanwhile, simply sat on their hands and watched the United States fail. Some of these JIM and DIME problems diminished over time in Vietnam, especially in 1969-1971, but the Vietnam War provides an object lesson in the potential consequences of not fixing them in a timely manner.

From the Southeast Asian maelstrom in 1945-1975, students and practitioners of strategy can take away not only some lessons, but also, perhaps, some hope. For the United States, bitter defeat in Vietnam was followed by surprising success both in the region and later, with the demise of the Soviet Union, in much of the world. Such hope arises from looking at the region as it emerged from the 1970s. While other regions convulsed, much of Southeast Asia outside of the war-torn mainland became more politically stable and economically dynamic in the 1980s. Moreover, eventually, even Vietnam itself would become a dynamic economy with a growing middle class.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Vietnam and make it a major new military theater in the larger Cold War?
2. Why did the United States fail in Vietnam whereas it achieved its basic political objective in Korea in the previous decade?
3. Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due mostly to the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the strategic mistakes of the United States?
4. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine conventional, guerrilla, terrorist, and information operations?
5. Would better integration of and coordination among the instruments of national power have allowed the United States to win in Vietnam? Why or why not?
6. How important were civil-military relations in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?
7. General Westmoreland believed that, given the political restraints placed on his ground operations, there were no good alternatives to the strategy of attrition that he pursued from 1965 to 1968. Was he right?

8. Could the United States have used air power more effectively in the Vietnam War? Could air power have brought victory? If so, how? If not, why not?
9. Do the cases in this module suggest an important role for sea power in counterinsurgency strategy? If so, how and under what circumstances? If not, why not?
10. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?
11. How could Washington or Saigon have achieved greater popular support in South Vietnam? Could such more successful strategies have achieved sufficient popular support so as to win the war?
12. Which theorist—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao—provides the best insight into explaining Communist victory and U.S. defeat?
13. What lessons might U.S. strategic leaders learn from this module of the course about which environmental factors to analyze, and how to assess their importance, before intervening as an outside power in an insurgency?
14. What does the Southeast Asian experience suggest are the most important mistakes that governing regimes and coalitions may make in countering an insurgency, and how can insurgents most effectively capitalize upon them?
15. On the basis of the wars of insurgency covered in this module of the course, what attributes of strategic leadership would you judge to be most important on the counterinsurgent side?
16. How important was assistance from outside powers—China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—in determining the outcome of the conflicts examined in this module of the course?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Lomperis, Timothy J. *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Pages xi – xiii, 30-74, 85-130, 173-195, 198-221.

[This reading provides general accounts of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It features helpful cultural and historical background on those countries and a theory of political legitimacy that seeks to explain why some governments facing an insurgency are able to gain widespread popular support and others are not.]

2. Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pages 42-222.

[This book provides an evenhanded overview of the period from 1965, when the Johnson Administration intervened militarily in Vietnam on a large scale, to 1975, when the Vietnamese Communists conquered South Vietnam. Lewy covers both high-level decision-making in Washington and the execution of theater strategy in South Vietnam.]

3. Herring, George C. "In Cold Blood: LBJ's Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam." *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History*. Lecture No. 33. Colorado Springs: U. S. Air Force Academy, 1990. Pages 1-24. (Selected Readings)

[Herring, a leading American historian of the Vietnam War, examines problems in the "Clausewitzian triangle" of the United States in 1965-1968, first by showing how poorly the civil-military relationship between President Johnson and his military advisers functioned and then by showing how inadequate Johnson's efforts to engage in strategic communication with the American people were.]

4. Komer, R. W. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1972. Pages 1-53, 60-126. (Selected Readings)

[In this think-tank report written before the Vietnam War ended, Komer, who in 1966-1968 had served first as a special assistant to President Johnson and then as Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, drew on his experience to analyze major impediments to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. He is particularly insightful on problems with the government of South Vietnam (GVN) and on problems of institutional adaptation in the US interagency and US-GVN multinational efforts at pacification.]

5. Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pages 174-210.

[Robert Pape, formerly a faculty member in the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base and now a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, provides a provocative analysis of the strategic value of American uses of the air instrument in the Vietnam War.]

6. Goscha, Christopher E. "The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945-1975): A Geo-Historical Reflection," *War & Society* (November 2005), pages 70-92. (Selected Readings)

[The maritime dimension of the Vietnam War has received relatively little attention from historians, but deserves attention from students of strategy at the Naval War College. Goscha, a Southeast Asian regional expert able to read untranslated Vietnamese Communist sources, shows interaction and adaptation at work in North Vietnam's effort

to supply Communist forces in South Vietnam by sea and the United States' efforts to interdict seaborne supplies.]

7. Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pages xi-xvi, 24-30, 191-208. (Selected Readings)

[Nagl, a US Army officer with a Ph.D. from Oxford University, explores how and why the US Army in Vietnam was more sluggish than the British Army in Malaya in adapting to counterinsurgency missions, especially with regard to the need to integrate different forms of power into a coherent strategy. In this exploration, he highlights both the flexible institutional culture of the British Army and the adroit strategic leadership exercised in Malaya by General Sir Gerald Templer, who gave the phrase “winning hearts and minds” the currency that it has had ever since. In a preface written after a tour of duty in Iraq as a battalion operations officer, Nagl reflects on just how hard it is for a foreign force to gain and maintain the support of the indigenous people.]

8. Fall, Bernard B. *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis*. Second Revised Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Pages 338-352. (Selected Readings)

[Fall, a French journalist with a profound knowledge of Indochina, wrote these pages during the Vietnam War, in which he lost his life. He highlights the ways in which the environment in Vietnam differed from the environment in Malaya, emphasizes the importance of political factors in determining the outcome of insurgencies, and notes how short-sighted the United States was to ignore the French experience with counterinsurgency.]

9. Pike, Douglas. *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pages 85-108, 119-132, 240-252. (Selected Readings)

[Pike, who was as knowledgeable as any American about Vietnamese Communism in the 1960s, examines in these excerpts different elements of early Viet Cong insurgency strategy in South Vietnam. From the perspective of the twenty-first century, Pike's discussion of the Viet Cong's use of information operations and terrorist tactics for political purposes is of special interest. His extensive quotations from Communist documents give readers a good sense of Viet Cong strategic culture and of the extent to which it may have deviated from the Maoist model.]

10. Elliott, David W. P. “Hanoi's Strategy in the Second Indochina War,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Pages 66-92. (Selected Readings)

[Elliott, an area-studies specialist who has intensively studied the Vietnam War, presents here a revisionist interpretation of Communist strategy based on Vietnamese-language sources. While acknowledging that the Viet Minh followed the Maoist model in the 1946-1954 war against France, he argues that American strategic leaders in the 1960s, and American analysts subsequently, were wrong to assume that the Vietnamese Communists continued to adhere to the Maoist model in the war against the United States. Instead, Elliott seeks to demonstrate (without referring to Sun Tzu), North Vietnam attacked American strategies from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Students should develop their own assessment of Communist strategy by considering how this reading relates to Required Readings 9 and 11.]

11. Brigham, Robert K. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pages 94-125. (Selected Readings)

[This excerpt from a study by an American historian looks at the final two phases (1970-1975) of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership (both in the National Liberation Front and in the North Vietnamese regime). The first chapter assigned shows how the Communists used the peace negotiations as a forum from which to launch information operations to undercut the Thieu government in Saigon and the Nixon administration in Washington. The second assigned chapter illuminates debates and decision-making in the Vietnamese Communist leadership about what strategy to follow in South Vietnam after the peace agreement of 1973.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** The Southeast Asia case study applies strategic concepts relevant to insurgency, counterinsurgency, interagency coordination, and great power diplomacy. Students will:

- Apply key strategic concepts, logic and analytical frameworks to the formulation, evaluation, and reassessment of strategy in a limited war.
- Evaluate applications of the strategy of containment to a complex environment with significant points of comparison with contemporary challenges.
- Analyze the integration of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives in Vietnam, with a focus on military force as a supported and supporting instrument.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining national military resources amidst the challenges of a costly limited war in a distant theater.
- Evaluate U.S. military strategy in its dominant conventional form and its applicability and inapplicability to insurgent warfare.
- Evaluate the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, SECDEF, CJCS, JCS, combatant commanders, and Service Chiefs with an emphasis on how they impacted operational and strategic outcomes.

- Evaluate successes and failures in joint warfare and emerging, sometimes competing concepts regarding strategic air power, counterinsurgency, pacification, and the provision of local security.
- Evaluate the role of combatant commanders in developing and acting upon alternative strategies.
- Analyze the roles of geopolitics, society and culture in shaping the outcome of the Vietnam conflict.
- Analyze the status and role of jointness with respect to the strategies pursued by the combatant commander.
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of the Services in achieving strategic objectives in a war characterized by a mix of conventional and unconventional opponents.
- Analyze the challenges and impact of information operations at the operational and strategic levels of war as well as on the home front.
- Analyze and synthesize the leadership skills necessary for sustaining an innovative organization in a counterinsurgency.

## **IX. LIMITED WAR, COERCIVE CONTAINMENT, AND REGIME CHANGE: THE GULF WARS, 1990-2009**

**A. General:** During the years 1990-2008, the United States and a shifting coalition of allies waged a protracted conflict in the Persian Gulf. Taken as a whole, the conflict with Iraq in this period covers a number of the types of war and stability operations examined in the Strategy and Policy syllabus. This module begins with a regional coalition war (1990-91), which resulted in containment (1991-2003), the breakdown of which led to another regional coalition war (2003), the aftermath of which has been an occupation and nation-building exercise marked by an escalating local insurgency.

Grappling with recent and ongoing operations is an exceedingly difficult task, but also one which is vitally important and which represents a “capstone exercise” for students mastering the Strategy and Policy approach. In order to highlight potential points of comparison, foster a broader view, and ensure an intellectually rigorous approach, the readings below are split into four roughly chronological groups and contain a mix of analysis and primary source material. Moreover, the issues in one portion of the case often carry over to another, placing a central emphasis on the role of interaction and the need to assess the phases covered by this module both individually and as a whole.

Starting with the first group of readings, Iraq in 1990-1991, like Germany in 1917, Japan in 1941, North Korea and its communist patrons in 1950, and North Vietnam in 1964, misjudged how the United States would react to aggression. On the other side of the conflict, the American political leadership deftly handled most of the political problems of a limited war. American military planners had to hastily improvise operational plans for waging joint/combined air and ground operations against the Iraqis. The interplay between civilian and military leaders was critical in the reassessment of the initial plans. The reworked plans proved stunningly successful in practice, routing Iraq’s army and quickly liberating Kuwait, but questions remain whether the performance left room for improvement in execution or if the Coalition should have pursued more ambitious objectives.

In considering the key war-termination issues of how far to go militarily and what to demand politically in 1991, one should again give special attention to the interaction between American civilian and military leaders as well as between the United States and multinational coalition members. One should also consider whether or not the calculations of American strategic leaders—including President George H.W. Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft—gave too much weight to the short-term costs of going farther militarily and demanding more politically at the end of the war, and too little weight to possible longer-term costs of a cautious yet abrupt war-termination strategy.

Turning to the second group of readings, Saddam Hussein proved to be an adaptive and determined opponent after the 1990-1991 war. His continued political survival and halting compliance with the cease-fire agreement rendered the ultimate political result of the first Gulf War more ambiguous than many expected. Since U.S.

and Coalition objectives in DESERT STORM were explicitly limited, the United States countered with a post-war policy of “containment” featuring a combination of sanctions, international inspections, and limited but increasingly frequent use of air power (Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH). The containment of Iraq gradually eroded, however, and international efforts to verify, monitor, and destroy Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction programs broke down, leading to President Clinton’s decision to launch Operation DESERT FOX.

Turning to the third set of readings, the continuing policy of containment required a sustained American military presence in the region but lacked adequate means of verifying Saddam’s compliance with WMD protocols. As a result, an alternative to containment—overthrow of the regime—became more appealing politically, and U.S. objectives became unlimited by the late 1990s. After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, U.S. policy makers committed themselves to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein through the use of conventional military force—a decision that led to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in March 2003.

Planning for military operations in 2002-2003 reflected significant changes in both U.S. military capability and in civil-military relations over the previous decade. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld entered office committed to an ambitious program of military transformation to make U.S. forces lighter and more flexible. Civilian leadership pushed military planners to operate with the smallest forces possible, based on the experience of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan as well as on accurate intelligence about Iraq’s conventional military capabilities. Critics of the administration’s strategic approach toward Iraq maintain that not enough was done to plan and prepare for Phase IV operations. Given the many tasks required to stabilize Iraq, the question remains whether enough troops were provided for the critical period after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Bush administration, which had made the need to eliminate Iraqi WMD the central political issue in its justification for war, also paid a heavy political price both domestically and internationally after inspectors failed to find evidence of active weapons of mass destruction programs.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, launched in March 2003, decisively defeated Iraq’s conventional military forces and overthrew the Ba’athist regime. However, the restoration of political order and the creation of a new democratic regime were complicated by an emerging Iraqi insurgency, which is the focus for the final set of readings. In contrast to DESERT STORM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM reflected fundamental changes in the U.S. perception of the international environment. The second Bush administration pursued a very different coalition-building approach than its predecessors. It emphasized a “coalition of the willing,” which downplayed consensus for military action at the United Nations, yet still relied on international and coalition support for post-war stability and reconstruction efforts.

In practice, however, the prospects for reconstructing a democratic Iraq were adversely affected by a lack of security and order, and by decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and the Ba’ath party apparatus shortly after the conventional conflict ended. They

were also dramatically undercut by the summer 2003 attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would shortly adopt the mantle of emir of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The combined result was the collapse of Iraqi political and social order, forcing Coalition troops to assume the role of an occupation force and setting the stage for a complex and vicious insurgency. An incipient civil war compounded the collapse. In the fall of 2006, the Pentagon and the Iraq Study Group conducted independent assessments of and recommendations for the U.S. strategy in Iraq. President Bush, following the advice of influential hardliners, decided to increase the number of troops in Iraq in order to provide more security for the new Government of Iraq. Additionally, the new strategy applied doctrine and practices described in a newly published counterinsurgency Field Manual written under the guidance of General David Petraeus, who would command the Coalition through the surge of 2007. A key component of the new strategy was the integration of formerly belligerent Sunni tribes into the local security force in the Anbar Province, and later, in other parts of Iraq. The final pair of readings provides initial assessments and insights to the surge and the strategy of including local Sunni tribes into security arrangements.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Was containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq after 1991 a viable policy? Why or why not?
2. Would Iraqi possession of nuclear weapons during any period between the years 1991-2003 have fundamentally changed U.S. strategy in the region? If so, how and why?
3. Considering the U.S. experience in Iraq along with other relevant modules of this course, analyze the political and military conditions necessary to achieve a quick, decisive victory.
4. Some might argue that in both wars with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the United States won the battle but lost the peace. Do you agree? Why or why not?
5. Looking at the span of U.S. operations in Iraq in this module, analyze the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions.
6. OIF was based on "lessons learned" from the previous decade of conflict with Iraq. On balance, how successful were the planning efforts at implementing those lessons, and how might future efforts be improved?
7. Sun Tzu says that knowing oneself and the enemy is the key to success. How well did the United States know Saddam Hussein's Iraq as an enemy, and how did that level of knowledge affect coalition success or failure?

8. Sun Tzu says that knowing oneself and the enemy is the key to success. How well did the United States “know itself” and its potential partners, and how did that level of knowledge affect coalition success or failure?

9. Did the civil-military dialogue within the U.S. help or hamper efforts to arrive at and sustain an effective policy-strategy match when dealing with Iraq?

10. Did the U.S. effectively realize the promise of “jointness” across the span of military operations covered by this module? Why or why not?

11. How would you evaluate NSD-54, President Clinton’s “Desert Fox” speech, or President Bush’s “OIF” speech as an articulation of a policy-strategy match?

12. Judging from the available evidence, do you think the provision of larger ground forces during OIF would have prevented the Iraqi insurgency that later emerged? Why or why not?

13. Under what circumstances do joint operations most effectively substitute for overwhelming numbers?

14. Kenneth Pollack distinguishes between a “pragmatic approach” and a “reconstruction approach” to rebuilding Iraq after the end of conventional operations. Which approach did the United States follow? Which approach should the United States have followed?

15. How would you evaluate U.S. efforts to grapple with the multi-faceted challenges that came with the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime?

16. What do you think were the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. counter-insurgency effort in Iraq in the summer and fall of 2003?

17. Is the period covered by this module best seen as one cohesive but evolving national security challenge or as several separate conflicts? Why?

18. What critical reassessments were made in strategy and policy during 2006 that then were implemented during the “surge of 2007”?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Baram, Amatzia. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad,” in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. *Iraq’s Road to War*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993. Pages 5-28. (Selected Readings)

[This reading examines Saddam Hussein’s rationale for attacking Kuwait, the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT SHIELD, and Saddam’s early

options for dealing with DESERT STORM. It is particularly valuable for its examination of his domestic motives and its counter-factual analysis of Saddam's other options.]

2. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S.MC (ret). *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 123-158, 413-61.

[This reading about Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 provides an opportunity to assess civil-military relations and the national command structure, interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech RMA pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater- Nichols Act, and war termination.]

3. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 450-492.

[President George Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections of this book dealing with the execution of Operation DESERT STORM are especially good for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition management, the influence of domestic political considerations on strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the importance of society, culture, and religion in formulating strategy and policy, and the president's role as commander-in-chief.]

4. *NSD-54* (January 15, 1991). (Selected Readings)

[This declassified document lays out the primary and secondary objectives of the United States in Operation DESERT STORM.]

5. Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002. Pages 46-108, 243-280, 387-396.

**(On Library Reserve Shelf to be read in Library—not to be removed from Library)**

[Kenneth Pollack, an official in the first Bush and Clinton administrations, lays out a careful case for overthrowing Saddam Hussein in a book published after 9/11 but before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Pollack's case for invasion is based on the failure of the containment policy of the 1990s and on Iraq's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. This reading discusses internal risings in Iraq before and after DESERT STORM, the establishment of containment—including the “no-fly zones”—and the international inspections regime from 1991 to 1998, and the gradual erosion of the inspections regime in the late 1990s.]

6. Clinton, President William Jefferson, “Address to the Nation,” 16 December 1998. (Selected readings)

[This speech was delivered by President Clinton on the opening night of the DESERT FOX bombing campaign, and should be analyzed both as an act of strategic communication and as an attempt to articulate a policy-strategy match to the American public.]

7. Bush, President George W. “Freedom and the Future,” Speech at the American Enterprise Institute’s annual dinner, February 26, 2003. (Selected Readings)

[This speech, given shortly before the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, provides the President’s vision of U.S. war aims in 2003.]

8. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Pages 24-163.

[Gordon and Trainor’s second book on U.S. military efforts in Iraq echoes the rich array of topics covered in *The General’s War*, providing a good platform for comparing such keys issues as civil-military relations, war planning, inter-service cooperation and rivalry, and the evolution of U.S. warfighting capabilities across two different conflicts. The section above covers the evolution of the planning and decision-making on both the U.S. and Iraqi sides up to the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.]

9. Woods, Kevin A., with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006. Pages 123-150. (Selected Readings)

[This reading picks up the narrative of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM above by analyzing the execution of the war from the Iraqi government’s perspective. Based on interviews with leading survivors of the Ba’athist regime, this is an invaluable look into the last days of Saddam’s rule and the total collapse of Iraqi political and military organization. It is also particularly useful for understanding how interaction played a central role in the campaign’s outcome.]

10. Macris, Jeffrey R. “Between the Storms: How Desert Storm Shaped the U.S. Navy of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *White House Studies* (Spring 2004). (Selected Readings)

[The author examines lessons learned from DESERT STORM and their impact on U.S. Navy planning and operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.]

11. Ricks, Thomas. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Books, 2007. Pages 133-168, 179-200, 214-269.

[This selection covers the evolution of events from the fall of Baghdad to the end of 2003, with a focus on explaining the beginnings of insurgency in Iraq. Ricks' account provides an excellent platform for discussing a wide variety of issues relating to "Phase IV" and "Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction" (SSTR) operations.]

12. Alwin-Foster, Nigel. "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* (November-December 2005), pages 2-15.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=982470981&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1233085178&clientId=18762&aid=1>

[This controversial article is a sympathetic critique of the U.S. military's approach to counterinsurgency by a British General who served with coalition forces in Iraq throughout 2004. It became a central item for discussion in theater and in Washington, and it represents the sort of material students should be able to produce as well as critically consume upon completing the Strategy and Policy course.]

13. Knights, Michael and Ed Williams. *The Calm Before the Storm: The British Experience in Southern Iraq*. Policy Focus No. 66. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2007. (Selected Readings)

[This monograph highlights the strategic problems the British faced in securing southern Iraq, and is especially good at analyzing the factions within the Shi'a political community and the importance of Basra. Taken together with items 12, 13 and 15, this piece widens the foundation for debating the best approach to counterinsurgency and complements the predominantly U.S. and Baghdad-centric accounts above.]

14. Long, Austin. "The Anbar Awakening," *Survival Global Politics and Strategy* (April-May 2008) Vol. 50, no. 2. Pages 67-91. (Selected Readings).

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer.aspx?target=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Einformaworld%2Ecom%2Fsmpp%2Fftinterface%3Fcontent%3Da791671368%26format%3Dpdf%26magic%3Debscohostejs%7C%7CAA3D3EFB68C36A3B40C78D54581474B7%26ft%3D%2Epdf>

[Long, an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, describes how the United States and its allies in Iraq have embraced a tribal strategy to provide security and fight al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. This approach is not new. Saddam Hussein also sought to use tribal alliances to provide internal security. His experience, and that of the present-day Coalition, demonstrates the prospects and perils of using tribes to provide security. Tension exists between the United States' two main strategic goals of defeating al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and building a democratic, unified Iraq. Long argues that there is also the danger that Iraqi tribes will defect from the Coalition in future.]

15. Diamond, Larry. "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," *Current History* (January 2006). Pages 34-39.

<http://ejsccontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer.aspx?target=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ecurrenthistory%2Ecom%2Fpdf%5Forg%5Ffiles%2F105%5F687%5F34%2Epdf>

[Diamond, an outspoken advocate of the policy of democratization in Iraq and a former official in the Coalition Provisional Authority, explains the policy's short-term failure and lays out lessons learned for future efforts.]

16. Odierno, Raymond T. "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later," *Heritage Lectures* (March 13, 2008) No. 1068. (Selected Readings)

[In this March 5, 2008 speech, General Ray Odierno, commander of Multinational Forces- Iraq, provides his assessment of the surge of 2007 during his command of Multi-National Corps – Iraq. It assesses the immediate and short term effects of the 30,000 troop surge initiated by President Bush in the Spring of 2007 and executed through the early summer of 2008.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study applies the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with an evolving set of national security interests in Iraq; to include the planning, execution, and termination of both a limited regional war and an unlimited one. As the first post-Goldwater-Nichols case, this module provides a rich array of learning outcomes. It also meshes with the next three modules to create a powerful, multi-dimensional understanding of the contemporary security environment. This module is particularly useful for providing students the opportunity to:

- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives in a variety of shifting settings.
- Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, SecDef, CJCS, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs, with a particular emphasis on the importance of a good civil-military relationship.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure and joint doctrine affect the development of joint military strategy as well as the DOD systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated and applied.
- Analyze how interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.

- Analyze how information operations apply at the operational and strategic levels of war in a variety of contemporary settings.

## **X. STOPPING THE UNTHINKABLE: THE STRATEGY AND POLICY OF PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WMD**

**A. General:** In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington argued that the United States now faces a new kind of nuclear arms race: “In the post-Cold War world the central arms competition is of a different sort. The West’s antagonists are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the West is attempting to prevent them from doing so. It is not a case of buildup versus buildup [as occurred during the Cold War] but rather of buildup versus hold-down. . . . The outcome of a race between buildup and hold-down is . . . predictable. The hold-down efforts of the West may slow the weapons buildup of other societies, but they will not stop it.” (p. 190) Huntington’s pessimistic assessment provides a starting point for this examination of the strategy and policy question of whether the United States, in cooperation with other members of the international community, succeeds in preventing the dangerous spread of weapons of mass destruction. By examining several case studies of emerging nuclear powers, this module grapples with some of the most vexing and potentially catastrophic security challenges facing the United States and its allies during the twenty-first century.

The Second World War witnessed an intense arms competition among the major powers to acquire both nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Before the war had ended, both weapons demonstrated their awesome power to inflict casualties. Together they promised to revolutionize warfare and hence the meaning of strategy. Countries without them faced the prospect of suffering catastrophic attacks. The acquisition of these weapons became a strategic imperative for any country seeking a commanding role in world affairs or desiring to stand up to the United States. Stalin was determined to break the American monopoly on nuclear weapons. In turn, his robust ballistic missile programs posed a longstanding security threat to the United States and its allies. The nuclear and missile competition between the two superpowers formed a salient feature of the Cold War. Not just the superpowers, however, had strategic incentives to invest heavily in nuclear capabilities. Other powers also believed that their security depended on the possession of and the credible capability to use nuclear weapons. British and French leaders concluded that independent nuclear forces were necessary because the Soviet Union’s ability to strike the American homeland cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The history of the Second World War and the Cold War provide a cautionary tale concerning the strong strategic incentives to acquire nuclear weapons for both enemies and coalition partners of the United States.

China under Mao’s leadership became the second communist power to pursue a nuclear capability. As examined in module VII, China fought the United States in a major regional war over Korea and the division of China along the Taiwan Strait has remained a flash point in Sino-American relations ever since. During the 1950s, the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons in its confrontations with communist China. Mao wanted nuclear weapons should another war break out with the United States. With assistance initially given by the Soviets, he embarked on a nuclear weapons program that frightened United States’ planners. Many feared that a highly ideological state, such as China, would not show the same restraint as other members of the nuclear

club. As China moved closer to acquiring nuclear weapons during the early 1960s, American decision makers and planners undertook an agonizing interagency debate to determine an appropriate response. The fear of a wider war with China formed the strategic backdrop for the American involvement in Vietnam, examined in module VIII. In these assessments of alternative courses of action, strategic leaders considered preventive strikes and ballistic-missile defenses. Both options possessed serious strategic disadvantages, which decision makers and planners frankly addressed in their assessments. Defenses against ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons held out the prospect of a technological solution.

Armed with nuclear weapons, Mao challenged not only the United States but also the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders soon viewed the Chinese nuclear program as a grave threat to their security and their standing as the world's dominant communist power. They even sought regime change in Beijing, in the hopes of replacing Mao with a more compliant leader. Thus, nuclear weapons became a critical component in the breakdown of both the Sino-Soviet alliance and the international communist movement. Soviet leaders considered preventive war to weaken China and eliminate its nuclear weapons. When they sought the support of the United States for this strategy, American leaders were not receptive. An examination of China's emergence as a nuclear great power illustrates the unintended consequences and second- and third-order effects inherent in the proliferation of WMD.

China's atomic breakout in 1964 and successful test of a thermonuclear weapon in 1967 spurred proliferation by its neighbors. India began its pursuit of a nuclear energy program just before independence and carefully kept open the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. After China's test, India's interest in a nuclear deterrent increased, leading eventually to a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974. As a result, India's neighbor Pakistan also became interested in nuclear weapons, exploiting its alliance with China and a sophisticated covert nuclear acquisition network to acquire its own nuclear capabilities. In May 1998, both India and Pakistan tested multiple nuclear devices, demonstrating emphatically that they had crossed the nuclear threshold.

Interlocking regional conflicts created an environment in which emerging nuclear powers found reasons to share their new capabilities. China provided critical support to Pakistan's nuclear program, and probably to North Korea's as well. Pakistan shared its new knowledge with Iran, North Korea, and Libya. North Korea most recently shared its nuclear knowledge with Syria. India, alone, did not proliferate. Most emerging nuclear powers promoted further proliferation—a serious concern for policy makers in the twenty-first century.

The recent North Korean nuclear test highlights the immense danger from the enduring instability in Northeast Asia stretching back to the horrendously costly Korean War. The response of the United States to North Korea's nuclear challenge affords the opportunity for an in-depth examination of the interagency process. North Korea's nuclear ambitions have severely tested the United States government down to the present day. Theater commanders and their staffs have played a critical role in dealing with this

challenge. In most accounts, General Gary Luck, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, helped dissuade the Clinton administration from striking North Korea's nuclear facilities during the unfolding crisis. If such an attack had resulted in a communist military offensive against South Korea, the losses of life and property on the Korean peninsula, as well as the associated impact on the global economy, would have been enormous. Even without a proven nuclear-weapons capability, then, North Korea's formidable conventional threat has deterred outside powers from taking military action to impede its nuclear ambitions. Its nuclear program has tested Washington's alliances with Japan and South Korea, and demonstrated the limits of Chinese and Russian cooperation. Given the dysfunctional economy and the cycles of famine, state failure in North Korea remains an ever present danger. Whether the Kim dynasty can fall without a major war involving the use of nuclear weapons poses a daunting question not only for the United States but also for China, South Korea, and Japan. In the meantime, an increasingly desperate North Korean regime may hope to bolster its position by selling or transferring nuclear weapons or material to other adversaries of the United States.

The proliferation of nuclear WMD is no longer confined to the actions and threats posed by state actors. As shown in module IX, Iraq created a potentially formidable WMD capability during the 1980s. Saddam Hussein's regime acquired WMD through commercial markets, from private suppliers willing to ignore or undercut existing laws and treaties in return for lucrative Iraqi contracts. The level and scope of the Iraqi program, which included multinational cooperation on ballistic missiles and a hidden nuclear capability—far more sophisticated than any intelligence service had discerned—raised serious concerns about gaps in the control system for international technology transfer.

The massive and covert supply network for nuclear technology established by Pakistan's Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan highlighted these gaps. Khan, widely (if inaccurately) known as "the father of Pakistan's bomb," stole uranium enrichment technology from Western Europe and applied it to Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program during the late 1970s. He established illegal commercial linkages with European suppliers, who provided some of the necessary materials for Pakistan's uranium enrichment complex. Connections with China provided additional technology and assistance. By the late 1980s, Pakistan was widely suspected of having a covert nuclear weapons capability—one which was finally revealed in nuclear tests in May 1998.

During the late 1980s, Khan began a new phase in his nuclear operations. Rather than importing nuclear technology, he exported it to interested buyers around the globe. How such transfers could take place without the cooperation of the Pakistani government and military leadership is a matter of considerable dispute. Khan provided uranium enrichment to China, Pakistan's most important arms supplier, and to Iran in the late 1980s, when Pakistan's military leadership was intent on developing a Pakistan-Iran alliance. Khan offered nuclear assistance to Saddam Hussein in October 1990. In the 1990s, Khan provided enrichment technology to North Korea, which supplied ballistic missiles to Pakistan. He provided Libya with a pre-tested Chinese nuclear weapon design, as well as technologies capable of producing the uranium for at least ten nuclear

weapons. Syria recently admitted that it had been approached by the Khan network in 2001.

The impact of the Khan network on current international security problems cannot be overestimated. His uranium enrichment technology allowed North Korea to bypass the constraints of the Agreed Framework, leading to the current nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia. His support for Iran's uranium enrichment program has created an emerging nuclear crisis in the Middle East. It remains doubtful the network has been completely uncovered despite Libyan cooperation with international authorities that resulted in the abandonment of the Libyan nuclear program and the arrest of a number of Khan's contacts in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Although Khan made a public confession in early 2004, he recanted upon his release from house arrest in February 2009, fueling doubt about the completeness of his earlier statements.

Contacts between Khan's organization and al Qaeda are a matter of the utmost concern. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have heightened the specter of nuclear terrorism. Non-state actors seek nuclear weapons to menace the United States and its coalition partners. How and why terrorists might employ nuclear weapons raise fundamental strategy and policy questions concerning the relationship among cost, risk, and the value of the object. Prevention of the ultimate form of a terrorist attack requires isolating extremist terrorist networks from state sponsors or agents who might supply them with nuclear weapons or materials. Prevention of nuclear terrorism is, arguably, the most important task for American decision makers and planners engaged in the Long War, the subject of the next module in the Strategy and Policy Course.

The prospect of dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran poses another dangerous challenge both for United States policy makers and for the politically volatile Middle East. It remains to be seen whether the United States can form a coalition capable of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program. Strategic concepts inherited from the Cold War—such as mutual deterrence and containment—might prove inappropriate and indeed dangerous for managing a state whose leaders are motivated by a messianic world view. The readings presented in this module provide a starting point for analyzing Iran's international behavior and the threat posed by Iranian nuclear ambitions to the peace and security of the Middle East and Europe.

This module provides an opportunity to understand the obstacles to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, it explores the difficulties inherent in coordinating international diplomatic action, imposing multinational economic sanctions, and forming coalitions to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by regimes hostile to the United States. Students examine the strategies of preemptive attack and preventive war to foreclose an adversary's nuclear options. These cases put into stark relief how past decision makers and strategic planners have evaluated these and other courses of action for stemming the proliferation of WMD. Intelligence, deception, and strategic communication also play a major role in this module, as states employ Fabian strategies to delay and deter outside interference, in order to gain time to develop and produce weapons.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. “The experience of the Cold War has little relevance for understanding the threat posed by nuclear WMD in the post-Cold War world.” Do you agree?
2. “Conventional military power plays only a secondary role in countering the proliferation of nuclear WMD. Other instruments of national power matter far more in devising a successful strategy.” Do you agree?
3. What are the principal problems in intelligence and assessment that hamper states seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear WMD?
4. What obstacles stand in the way of forming international coalitions to prevent nuclear proliferation?
5. What obstacles stand in the way of taking effective military action to prevent nuclear proliferation?
6. Samuel Huntington has argued: “The West’s antagonists are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the West is attempting to prevent them from doing so. . . . The hold-down efforts of the West may slow the weapons buildup of other societies, but they will not stop it.” Do the case studies examined in this module support Huntington’s pessimistic assessment?
7. Evaluate the strategic assessments of American civilian and military leaders in the 1960s and 1990s about options to deal with Chinese and North Korean nuclear-weapons programs.
8. What were the principal geostrategic consequences of the diffusion of 1940s “legacy” systems of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles?
9. Graham Allison, in *Nuclear Terrorism*, presents a seven-point strategic roadmap for preventing the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Evaluate this strategy.
10. Do you agree with Graham Allison’s assessment that nuclear terrorism is preventable?
11. What major strategic problems face military planners in fighting a country armed with nuclear weapons?
12. What strategic risks and challenges face the United States in attempting to contain a nuclear-armed adversary by means short of war?
13. Does Libya’s decision to renounce its WMD program present an anomalous case that provides few lessons for American policy makers and strategists, or does it provide a useful model for the future?

14. What lessons would you draw from the case studies examined in this course for crafting a strategy to address Iran's WMD challenge?

15. In light of the case studies examined in this course, what are the rewards, risks, costs, and feasibility of pursuing a WMD program against the opposition of the United States?

16. The ability to frustrate the enemy's strategy is a key element in Sun Tzu's strategic thought. How have states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons sought to frustrate the United States and its coalition partners from executing a timely, effective strategy to prevent their weapons buildup?

17. Why does American dominance of the air, maritime, and space commons not translate into the ability to stop the spread of nuclear WMD?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Pages 186-192.

[The late Samuel Huntington, a noted professor at Harvard University, examined the cultural, political, economic, and strategic undercurrents driving the diffusion of military power—and, in particular, WMD—within the international system. He underscores the danger to the United States and its coalition partners posed by the connections between states in the Middle East and East Asia in promoting the spread of WMD.]

2. Bracken, Paul. "The Second Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1 (January-February 2000), pages 146-156.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=2623501&site=ehost-live>

[Paul Bracken of Yale University provides a short account of the changing international geostrategic environment caused by the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.]

3. Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2539273.pdf>

[Sagan postulates three reasons why states might pursue nuclear weapons, focusing not only on security pressures but also on institutional demands (see course theme *The Institutional Dimension of Strategy*) and on normative or symbolic pressures to demonstrate great power status through nuclear weapons acquisition. These models can be used to analyze each of the emerging nuclear powers studied in this case.]

4. Goldstein, Lyle J. "Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 118, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 53-80.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035822>

[The rise of China as a nuclear power posed a major challenge to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This historical case study is examined by Naval War College Professor Lyle Goldstein.]

5. Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson. "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/1), pages 54-99.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2626706.pdf>

[The Chinese nuclear program greatly worried successive American administrations during the 1960s. This essay details the planning undertaken by the Kennedy administration for diplomatic, economic, and military action against China.]

6. Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, paperback edition, 2005. Pages vii-x, 78-246, 355-370, 396-408.

[This detailed account by policy insiders provides essential background on the history of the crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. In particular, this account is valuable for understanding American interagency and military planning, as well as civil-military relations. The appendices (pages 409-428) contain a chronology of events and the joint statements and agreements reached in negotiations.]

7. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *CIA Intelligence Report: Exploring the Implications of Alternative North Korean Endgames*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Asian and Latin American Analysis, 1998. (Selected Readings)

[This declassified document is drawn from the second of two CIA-led exercises exploring North Korean scenarios in 1997. It provides an excellent foundation for assessing the policy and strategy assumptions about North Korea's future that have colored American perspectives on how to handle the crises covered in the Albright reading listed above. Of particular note, the reading explores two critical conclusions: (A) the consensus view that North Korea's survival as an independent state was the preferred policy outcome for the near term; and, (B) that most of the experts involved doubted the regime would last beyond 2002.]

8. Allison, Graham. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York: Owl Books, 2005. Pages 12-15, 19-42, 61-86, 140-206.

[Well-known Harvard scholar and former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans Graham Allison provides a lucid overview of the danger posed by nuclear

terrorism. His strategic roadmap for preventing the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists provides a starting point for analysis.]

9. Kapur, S. Paul. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 71-94.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer/FullTextServer.asp?format=fulltext&ciid=F76693B4907C65F845CD6FFA4A1D27D24B3522F704F8A64CC0CC4B7D15B6B4ABEEBBCCA6A0E79DA9&ftindex=1&cid=B407F81CB0BD9D06A89D79EDEC9E8F38E961E828CC3729E2C8E32D7422EEB7A6&ext=.pdf>

[Kapur examines the debate over whether nuclear weapons increase or decrease regional stability after they are acquired by emerging rivals. He notes that in the case of South Asia, the region continues to experience conflict and crisis, and that possession of nuclear weapons has done little to settle the still unresolved political tensions between India and Pakistan.]

10. Albright, David, and Corey Hinderstein. "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks." *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pages 111-128.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer/FullTextServer.asp?format=fulltext&ciid=CF026B53497D68696445295DB0FB64FE49BFA561D3A504CBF459C1C48D956E581D065C4FA89272B3&ftindex=1&cid=C412D35DBCD2DA58069D1F9A334BF0ABE0F791407F0BBCFCC74FE76FF5F0E7D4&ext=.pdf>

[David Albright and Corey Hinderstein analyze how and why the world's best intelligence agencies and nuclear non-proliferation institutions all failed to expose and prevent the A.Q. Khan network from buying and selling key nuclear weapons capabilities for more than two decades.]

11. Jentleson, Bruce W., and Christopher A. Whytock. "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06), pages 47-86. (Selected Readings)

[This article provides an historical overview of Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programs. The Libyan case offers an instructive example for evaluating the effectiveness of strategies that seek to halt the proliferation of WMD.]

12. Talmadge, Caitlin. "Deterring a Nuclear 9/11," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007), pages 23-34.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer/FullTextServer.asp?format=fulltext&ciid=ABA488F7C5BCD7342FF186BA2F95FBEA39E1C01BF292EB55C5B1F79EC7903AA3552EEDFA3A736C27&ftindex=1&cid=BF5585E477F4042396EDF86E190CD8660C83BD00F2FDF44ABB2BD93BB12B84DD&ext=.pdf>

[This article discusses the problems of deterrence in the twenty-first century, particularly in the context of nuclear armed non-state actors working with or without formal state support.]

13. Russell, Richard L. "Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., *Getting Ready for A Nuclear-Ready Iran*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. Pages 23-49. (Selected Readings)

[Richard Russell, a professor at the National Defense University's Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, provides an excellent analysis of the security dilemma that will occur in the Middle East should Iran develop its nuclear capabilities. In addition, Russell includes a good summary of the Navy's role in ballistic missile defense in that region.]

14. Betts, Richard K. "The Osirak Fallacy," *The National Interest* (Spring 2006), pages 22-25.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=24&did=1018816231&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1234441405&clientId=18762&aid=1>

[Betts argues against the use of preventive strikes to meet the challenge of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Instead, Betts advocates that the United States "replicate the Cold War strategy of containment and deterrence until such time that the regime in Tehran mellows or is replaced from within."]

15. Pollack, Kenneth M. "Iran: Three Alternatives," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* (June 2006), pages 73-83. (Selected Readings)

[This insightful analysis examines the effects of actions by the United States and the international community on the internal situation within Iran. Pollack speculates that "over the course of the next two to five years, the Iranian regime could easily face a series of economic, political, and diplomatic crises for which the regime is ill-prepared."]

16. National Intelligence Council. *National Intelligence Estimate—Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities*. November 2007. (Selected Readings)

[This controversial document reexamines intelligence on Iran's capability and intent to acquire nuclear weapons.]

17. Raas, Whitney and Austin Long. "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007), pages 7-33. (Selected Readings)

[This provocative article examines the operational obstacles Israel would face in a hypothetical preventive or pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear complex. It also

raises serious questions about the risks and consequences of such an attack by the United States, particularly at the strategic and policy levels.]

18. Carter, Ashton B., Michael M. May, and William J. Perry. "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pages 19-32. (Selected Readings)

[Written by three former high-ranking officials in the Department of Defense and the US nuclear establishment, this article examines the consequences of a nuclear attack on the United States by a terrorist group or small nuclear power.]

19. Kissinger, Henry A. "Our Nuclear Nightmare," *Newsweek*, February 16, 2009. (Selected Readings)

[Henry Kissinger presents a framework for the policy and strategy to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. He writes: "The danger posed by nuclear weapons is unprecedented. . . . We thus return to our original challenge. Our age has stolen fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?"]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study applies the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have responded, and may respond in the future, to the specter of nuclear proliferation to dangerous ideological opponents. This module is unusual, in that it focuses on a major problem in the international environment, rather than on a particular bilateral or multilateral conflict. This study emphasizes the policy dimension of the strategy and policy course, and the role of the military as one of several tools of national influence for managing threats and, at times, crises. It will help students to appreciate the value of joint, combined, and interagency efforts, for both the theater commander and for broader national policy. It considers the role of deterrence in the modern era, the impact of the threat of nuclear attack on US policy options, and the impact of catastrophic attacks on the US homeland. This module is particularly useful for providing students the opportunity to analyze, evaluate, and synthesize:

- The role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans to combat WMD/E in a wide range of cases.
- The integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, particularly objectives that require coalition and diplomatic elements.
- The utilization of the military resources of the United States, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain critical national security objectives.
- The capabilities and limitations of the US force structure in achieving strategic objectives and contributing to national policy.
- The role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies and strategies in the international environment.

- How the interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.
- The capabilities and limitations of the interagency processes.
- The integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities.
- How information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.

## **XI. THE LONG WAR: THE UNITED STATES AGAINST AL QAEDA**

**A. General:** The architecture of this Strategy and Policy Course gives students a framework to take a long view of success in war and peace. No module covers less than a decade. Some cover more than half a century. All present either a long war or a sequence of wars. This educational design serves to prepare students for the current war in which the United States and its allies find themselves—what the US Government has increasingly come to call the Long War. The multi-dimensional complexity of the Long War, as well as the spectrum of other threats that intersect with or run parallel to this conflict, mean that this module is best seen as part of the Strategy and Policy Course’s “capstone,” building on the previous two modules, and blending with the next one, to help students craft a sophisticated and multi-faceted appreciation of the current strategic environment.

Approaching this case through one of two conceptual frameworks, a Strategy and Policy “boxes” approach or a more broadly thematic one, can help reduce the complexity and highlight particular aspects of the conflict. Using a “boxes” approach, it becomes clear that in some ways the entire course has been preparing students for grappling with the Long War. Strategy and Policy has taken students through wars of various sizes, shapes, types, and combinations. Three basic types of war stand out in our syllabus: wars fought for high stakes, between coalitions and in multiple theaters; regional wars fought within a single theater, typically for a shorter time than big wars, sometimes for limited political objectives; and, insurgencies fought within a political system, against a failing, emerging, or well-established state, by a non-state movement that seeks to form a new political system. Every historical module of this course incorporates at least two of these basic types of war; some modules include all three types. They may appear in sequence, sometimes with an abrupt transition, sometimes with a longer interval separating them. Or different types may go on simultaneously, with one type overlapping with, or developing within or on top of, another.

The Long War is an especially complex mixture of wars. Seen in broad perspective, it falls within the “big war” box. It is likely to be quite long, it certainly involves high political stakes, it already extends over multiple theaters, and it has coalitions on both sides. Within this big war, the United States has already fought two regional wars, the first in Afghanistan and the second in Iraq. In both cases, when conventional operations brought about regime collapse, there was a transition into the “insurgency” box. Thus, the three “boxes” of war featured in this course have reappeared in the Long War.

This course also reveals, however, that new cases of each basic type of war differ in significant respects from previous cases in a given “box.” There is a fundamental character to war and to its basic types that is virtually unchanging over time, but there are other characteristics that do change radically. A syllabus that takes students from the ancient Greeks to the twenty-first century allows them to see how and why some characteristics of war change from era to era.

Two important sources of change are new forms of political organization and new forms of technology. Both figure prominently in this module of the course. The Long War differs from any previous big war that we have studied in that the principal adversary of the United States and its allies is not other states, whose military capabilities are best suited to conventional operations, but rather a transnational network of non-state actors who engage in terrorist, guerrilla, and information operations. This new form of political organization would not be viable without changes in information technology, especially the Internet, that allow far-flung cells and clusters of an increasingly loose and decentralized organization such as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) to communicate around the globe. And without the diffusion beyond state control of the great destructive capacity enabled by technological developments, small groups of terrorists could not pose the grave threat that they now do to the United States and its allies.

The “wars within the war” in this module—the regional wars and insurgencies fought in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Long War—also deviate in noteworthy respects from other cases of such wars in this course. Whereas the previous regional wars that we have studied featured, for the most part, limited political objectives, the American political objectives in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) involved the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Technology and forms of political organization were important here, too. Well-trained American forces were able to exploit advances in precision-strike and information technologies to inflict a remarkably quick defeat on adversaries operating in a more or less conventional mode. The impact on the Taliban and Iraqi armies of the dysfunctional political organization of the regimes of Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein made them “cooperative adversaries” for the United States. OIF and OEF represent the most recent of numerous cases in this course of quick victories against isolated and incompetent adversaries in regional wars.

Yet, as the course has also shown, quick operational success does not necessarily provide a decisive or durable political result. In both Afghanistan and Iraq in the early twenty-first century, as in Spain in the early nineteenth century, a regional war “morphed” into an insurgency. Especially in Iraq (but recently in Afghanistan, too), there was variation from earlier cases in the insurgency “box” that complicated counterinsurgency efforts. As non-state actors without significant conventional capabilities, jihadists and other insurgents embraced the Al Qaeda model of relying on terrorism, especially suicide bombings, to generate incidents of mass slaughter on a scale beyond that of previous insurgent-terrorist groups. In addition, they showed more sophistication and agility than previous groups in exploiting new technological means of communication.

Patterns arising from a “Boxes” approach to the study of the modules in this Strategy and Policy Course reveal two points to bear in mind as we deal with the complexity of the Long War. First, each different type of war has different keys to strategic success. It seems that American strategic leaders have learned well how to win

regional wars but not so well how to defeat insurgencies. Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether they understand how to translate the general lessons of previous U.S. success in big wars to the specific circumstances of the Long War. Second, when there are wars within wars, strategies for fighting the regional wars and insurgencies must be oriented toward achieving strategic effects that contribute to success in the overarching “big war.”

For example, in OEF, critics charge that a preoccupation with taking down the Taliban regime got in the way of opportunities to take out the Al Qaeda leadership. In the case of Iraq, critical appraisals have argued that American strategy has had the net effect, both within and beyond the theater, of creating more violent jihadists than American operations have killed, captured, or dissuaded. They would further charge that though Iraq has become a major theater in the Long War, it has also distracted the United States from a more direct focus on its main enemy, AQAM. As the fragmentary and ever-shifting record shows, both of these assertions are also open to debate. However this debate is resolved for each individual student, the material in this module should drive students well beyond the breezy assertions and shallow analysis which has marked much of the public debate on the war.

Yet another way to approach the complexity of this case would be to adopt a thematic approach, using four key themes:

The *first and foremost issue*, as Clausewitz stressed long ago, is to understand the nature of the war. This issue has been a matter of intense controversy ever since 9/11. Drawing on arguments made by the eminent academics Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis in the 1990s, some see the Long War as a culturally or religiously driven “clash of civilizations.” (That, indeed, is how Al Qaeda has been predisposed to portray the war.) Others, harking back to ideological struggles in the twentieth century, see the Long War as World War IV (with the Cold War having been World War III). Still others (including many observers in the Middle East as well as in the West) think that the Long War is best understood as a transnational insurgency within the Muslim world or as a series of mostly unrelated insurgencies in different countries where Muslims live. Finally, there are those (especially in Europe) who question whether the conflict against AQAM is indeed a war. They see it primarily as a law-enforcement “hunt” against a transnational terrorist network that has more in common with a criminal enterprise than a strategic entity. In mulling over this debate, which has critical implications for what the policy and strategy of the United States and its allies should be, students ought to bear in mind the commentary earlier in this introduction about how complex the Long War is. At the same time, students should recall from previous modules in this course how a war can change its nature as it unfolds.

In addition, this module also seeks to bring chronological depth to an understanding of the war upon which we are embarked, reaching back at least to 1989 and the growing debate among jihadist groups about what to do after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the Gerges and Kepel readings trace, jihadist movements dealt with this question in a variety of ways, with Al Qaeda, followed increasingly by others, settling on a “far enemy” strategy in the early 1990s. As these

readings and the 9/11 Commission report detail, this fundamental strategic choice led to an early “war” in the sense of an escalatory pattern of lop-sided interactions that culminated in the 2001 attacks.

A *second issue*, closely related to the first, arises from Sun Tzu’s injunction to know one’s enemy and picks up the chronological sweep of the case from the 2001 break point above. As this module’s readings also indicate, the cultural terrain of this conflict is far more complex than a simple focus on Al Qaeda as the primary adversary might imply. First, after the 9/11 attacks, the pace and depth of strategic interaction has become intense. Al Qaeda has changed in important ways since it lost its initial base of operations in Afghanistan. AQAM also include “start-up” cells of terrorists who are inspired by Al Qaeda but may not be directly connected to it, as well as distinct regional permutations of the organization in Iraq and Afghanistan. While this makes for a quite complex patchwork, it is also possible now to dig more directly at key issues such as AQAM’s “theory of victory” by using the enemy’s own words, compiled in a reader especially designed for this module “In the Eyes of Your Enemy.” Moreover, Kepel’s deeper look at the three key strains in radical Islamist thought should help build a composite picture of potential adversaries and fault lines that goes beyond the simple Sunni-oriented sectarianism of figures like Zarqawi.

In reviewing the United States’ strategy as it unfolded, a *third issue* merits reflection, when and where to open up new theaters. As we have seen this term, in most of our modules from the Peloponnesian War to the conflicts of today, a decision to open or contest a new theater may change the whole course of a larger war and must take account of a complex mix of political and military considerations. After 9/11, Afghanistan was the obvious theater for offensive American military action because it was there that Usama Bin Laden had reestablished his main base in 1996 and had developed a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban regime. What the next theater (if any) should be for an American military offensive was not so obvious. President Bush, in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an Axis of Evil, because they all wanted nuclear weapons and were wont to sponsor or consort with terrorism. Subsequently, the Bush Administration developed a case for going to war to prevent any possible eventuality in which terrorists might get weapons of mass destruction from tyrannical or theocratic regimes. The epithet “Axis of Evil” may primarily have been a rhetorical flourish for a domestic audience, but it does remind us that launching OIF in 2003 was not the only option that the United States had for using military force to open a new theater after OEF. Indeed, if the most consequential risk of the Long War for the United States has been that terrorists could gain access to weapons of mass destruction to use in the American homeland, it is worth consideration, as the Kitfield piece will argue, that on the basis of intelligence available at the turn of 2002-2003, either Iran or North Korea was arguably more likely than Iraq to transfer WMD to terrorists with a global reach.

To be sure, that consideration is not the only one to ponder with regard to opening new theaters in the Long War. In light of patterns that we can derive from our earlier modules in which new theaters loomed large and new policy guidance from

President Obama's administration, students should review where the United States could be operationally effective at reasonable cost and manageable risk, as well as where it could expect the most positive strategic "spillover" effects. Drawing on our recent module on nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation, students should also reconsider whether, and how, ways short of the use of force might be effective in deflecting, containing, or undermining Iranian and North Korean pursuit of a nuclear capability. Bearing in mind our previous module on Iraq, students should also conduct a counterfactual analysis of how interaction with Saddam Hussein might have played out in the context of the Long War, if the United States had not launched OIF in 2003. Would inaction with regards to Saddam Hussein's Iraq produced a less favorable environment in the Gulf if containment were eroded and a new Iran-Iraq rivalry escalated, with each side driven to acquire WMD? Others might argue that such fears would be exaggerated and that a reversion to defensive posture as a whole might have been far wiser than choosing new theaters of any sort. In this sense, students should ponder the issue of "opportunity cost" and whether the resources used for offensive military actions to open up a new theater might be more strategically effective if used in defensive measures or other offensive measures.

Finally, while numerous other themes might also warrant consideration, the information domain of the Long War deserves special attention as the *fourth* issue. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, information operations, strategic communication, and other forms of information-gathering, opinion-shaping, and perception-management loom large in the Long War—as large if not larger than in any previous war that we have studied. Terrorists and insurgents have a limited repertoire of kinetic capabilities, mainly suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices. There is a huge gap to fill between the violent means that they currently use and the grandiose ends that they envision. Jihadists are trying to fill that gap with information operations and strategic communication. They need to amplify their violent actions with words and images. They need to recruit new supporters to their cause with those words and images, and they need to incite recruits to engage in terrorism. The Internet, satellite television, hand-held video cameras, and other new communications media have given them ways to spread their ideological message to far-flung audiences more readily than Maoist revolutionaries of previous generations that we have studied in this course.

From a military perspective, it is noteworthy that AQAM has used cyberspace for planning, intelligence collection, virtual training, and strategic debate, especially since it no longer can exercise the type of command and control possible when it had secure physical space in Afghanistan. But from a grand-strategic perspective, it is even more important that AQAM has used new means of communication to try to impel a wide range of Muslim audiences to transcend their multiple national, ethnic, and tribal sources of identity and embrace a single, extreme, religious identity as a global *umma* (community) in mortal confrontation with infidels. AQAM also addresses Western audiences with words as well as propaganda of the deed. Its package of terrorism and strategic communication seeks to achieve psychological, economic, and political effects that, it presumes, will bring an end to the Western presence in the Muslim world. The deep attention paid to Al Qaeda's world-view, messages, and efforts in this module

should also provide a solid backplane against which to compare and evaluate the United States' own efforts.

## **B. Essay and Discussion Questions:**

1. Various analysts have defined the essential nature of the Long War quite differently: as a “clash of civilizations”; as a transnational insurgency within the Muslim world; as World War IV (with the Cold War having been World War III); or, as a law-enforcement “hunt” against a terrorist network that has more in common with a criminal enterprise than a strategic entity. How would you define the nature of the war as it has unfolded so far and what are the strategic implications of choosing this definition over another?

2. Evaluate the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review's emphasis on the “indirect approach” and the themes of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism in light of the operations covered in this module.

3. How would you evaluate former President Bush's National Endowment for Democracy speech as a potential policy-strategy match for the Long War?

4. Henry Crumpton, who led the CIA effort in OEF from September 2001 until June 2002, has emphasized the importance for American operations of understanding the “cultural terrain” in Afghanistan. What features of that cultural terrain were most important to achieving the degree of success that OEF has had and what have proven the most difficult?

5. In your opinion is it more helpful or harmful for U.S. strategic communication to emphasize the transcendent value of democratic forms of government as a core element in its approach to the Long War?

6. Has the United States struck the proper strategic balance in the Long War between offensive actions and defensive measures?

7. Has the United States or Al Qaeda done a better job of mastering interaction and adaptation in the Long War?

8. The strategic theorist Colin Gray has written: “One of the costs of the ideological dimension to culture is that it can lead you astray in the perception and definition of threat.” To what extent does this comment apply in the Long War?

9. In the context of the Long War against jihadists, evaluate the decision to open a new theater by conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom as opposed to other strategic options in 2003.

10. What strategic effects do you think U.S. operations in Iraq since March 2003 have had on AQAM in the Long War?

11. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy's strategy. How does that insight apply to the Long War?

12. Many have argued that the key to victory over AQAM in the Long War lies in the mobilization of Muslim opponents of jihadist terrorism. What U.S. policies and strategies are most likely to encourage such mobilization?

13. How has Al Qaeda's strategy changed since the 9/11 Attacks? Evaluate the logic or illogic of its approach.

### **C. Readings:**

1. Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pages 23-42, 217-236. (Selected Readings)

[This work, by a prominent scholar of Islamist movements, lays a foundation for understanding the larger texture and potential permutations of the "Long War" by examining three key ideological figures: Qutb, Mawdudi, and Khomeini. The second section covers the activities and viewpoints of various militant groups from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to the fall of the Taliban in 2001.]

2. Gerges, Fawaz. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pages 1-14. (Selected Readings)

[This work, by another long-term scholar of extremist movements, explains the fundamental shift in strategy to the "far enemy" made by Al Qaeda, leading to direct attacks upon the United States. It is particularly useful for understanding the minority status that AQAM and like-minded militants hold within the wider Islamic world.]

3. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 108-214, 330-352. (Selected Readings)

<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>

[With a readability that is unusual for official reports, this well-known document provides informative background on the emergence of Al Qaeda as a threat to the United States; the escalation and interaction leading up to 9/11; US attempts to come up with an agreed interagency policy-strategy match before 9/11; and the early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the 9/11 attacks.]

4. Crumpton, Henry A. "Intelligence and War: Afghanistan, 2001-2002," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. Pages 162-179. (Selected Readings)

[Crumpton, who led the CIA's effort in Operation Enduring Freedom from September 2001 until June 2002 and later became Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, describes the planning and execution of operations in Afghanistan in which he was involved. He highlights the importance of understanding the Afghan cultural terrain and building a "complex partnership of power" that brought together different agencies of the U.S. government and different indigenous factions in Afghanistan.]

5. Lambeth, Benjamin. *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005. Pages xiii-xxx.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\\_MG166-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG166-1.pdf)

[Lambeth, a retired Air Force officer and the author of many works on air power, here provides an overview of Operation Enduring Freedom from an air-power perspective. A key task was time-sensitive targeting of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. Lambeth points to political restraints and CENTCOM micromanagement that complicated such targeting. Students should consider whether U.S. strategic leaders struck the proper balance between operational opportunities and political considerations.]

6. Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 309-331. (Selected Readings)

[In 2002, while winding down the campaign in Afghanistan and planning ahead for the next campaign in Iraq, the Bush Administration developed and enunciated the most important and controversial elements of its policy and strategy for what it then called the Global War on Terrorism. Mann provides a lucid account of the decision-making of key American strategic leaders at that crucial juncture.]

7. Kitfield, James. "America's Nemesis," *National Journal*, July 22, 2006.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1091627081&sid=1&Fmt=6&clientId=18762&RQT=309&VName=PQD>

[In protracted multi-theater conflicts, when and where to open a new theater is a major strategic issue. President Bush's State of the Union address in January 2002 identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an Axis of Evil—rogue regimes who pursued a nuclear capability and might enable Al Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Kitfield, drawing on interviews with government officials, suggests that Iran, not Iraq, should have been the main focus of American strategy after the toppling of the Taliban regime.]

8. Bush, President George W. Speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[This speech represents one of President Bush's most important efforts to communicate his strategic vision of the Long War. In essence, it can be read as an attempt to articulate a policy-strategy match for the GWOT, along the same lines that NSD-54 did for the Gulf War.]

9. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium.*

[These translated primary-source documents, compiled by Professor Scott Douglas with help from Professor Heidi Lane and other colleagues, allow students to engage in "cultural intelligence" by assessing first hand AQAM's ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States, as well as their political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates. The Zawahiri-Zarqawi letters and the post OIF speeches mark the point at which this case picks up from, and meshes with, the Iraq wars module. Additional material has been included in the reader which is both intended to serve as a continued resource for students and as a demonstration of how primary source documents are being applied to derive Strategy and Policy implications.]

10. Harmony Project, "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida 1989-2006," West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. (Selected Readings)

[This document should be considered an addition to Section II of the compendium readings above. This insightful analysis uses primary source and captured documents to update and expand understandings of the internal workings of Al Qaeda's senior leadership and its strategic decision-making. Earlier sections complement the coverage in the 9/11 Commission Report while the latter portions bring valuable evidence to bear on the debates surrounding the evolution of AQAM and the Long War.]

11. Hegghammer, Thomas. "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War," *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2006), pages 11-32.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=43&did=985448041&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1220969899&clientId=18762&aid=1>)

[Hegghammer, associated with the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, tracks Arabic-language primary sources, with special attention to the pronouncements of radical jihadists on Internet sites. In this article, after providing useful background on "global jihadism" and on the importance that its proponents attach to the Iraqi theater, he offers a clear and sophisticated analysis of various important effects that the war in Iraq has had on Al Qaeda and Associated Movements.]

12. Kilcullen, David J. "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (August 2005), pages 597-617.

<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=115&sid=03e3611e-50a0-498c-a5cf-ed2094c3055c%40sessionmgr108>

[This article, by the Chief Strategist in the office of the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, argues that the Global War on Terrorism should be conceived of as a global insurgency. The author suggests a strategy of "disaggregation" to break the bonds between terrorist networks.]

13. Douglas, Frank Scott. "Waging the Inchoate War: Defining, Fighting, and Second-Guessing the 'Long War.'" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 30, no. 3 (June 2007), pages 391-420.

<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=109&sid=cdc59807-33e7-4a0a-b07bb8e1054c095b%40sessionmgr107>

[This article, by a faculty member of the Strategy and Policy Department, attempts to answer three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress or lack thereof to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? It uses the hunt for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as a highlighted operation to make a series of larger argument about strategic interaction in the Long War and the role of Iraq within it, to include amending Kilcullen's recommended approach in item 15.]

14. Giustozzi, Antonio. *Koran, Kalashnikov, Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Pages 11-29, 97-139, 161-217.

[The selections above offer a concise overview of the complexity of Afghanistan as a theater before examining the span of events from the fall of the Taliban through 2007. It is particularly useful for its assessment of events from both the insurgent/terrorist's perspective as well as that of US and coalition forces.]

15. Johnson, Thomas H. and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign Until Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security* (Spring 2008) pp. 41-77.

<http://ejournals.ebsco.com/direct.asp?ArticleID=490681935426883C7321>

[The first portion of this article provides an ethnographic break-down of tribal society along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, and some of the key "cultural terrain" features in it. The second half of the article provides an overview of events along the Pakistani side of the border from 2001 through late 2007, complementing the coverage in Giustozzi above.]

16. Usama Bin Laden, "Come to Jihad: A Speech to the People of Pakistan," translated transcript of a video message released on 20 SEP 2007. (Selected Readings)

[http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/2007\\_09\\_20\\_UBL.pdf](http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/2007_09_20_UBL.pdf)

[This speech, which should be considered an addition to those in the Al Qaeda compendium above, covers a substantial change in AQ's strategic rhetoric. In it, Bin Laden formally calls for war against the Pakistani state in a fashion which may mark another turning point in the Long War's evolution.]

17. Hoffman, Bruce. "The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists," Testimony presented to the House Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND\\_CT262-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf)

[Terrorists have long used images and words as well as deeds to communicate messages to various audiences. But jihadists have recently exploited the revolution in information technology to craft and control their messages to an unprecedented degree of sophistication and to make possible tactical training, operational planning, and strategic debate in a decentralized organizational framework. Hoffman, a longtime RAND Corporation expert on terrorism, analyzes the different ways in which AQAM leaders and operatives have used the Internet to advance their cause. He also notes U.S. shortcomings in contesting the "virtual battleground of cyberspace."]

18. Corn, Tony. "World War IV as Fourth Generation Warfare," *Policy Review* (January 2005).

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/4868381.html>

[Corn, a State Department official, offers provocative observations about many different aspects of the Long War. He seeks to rectify what he sees as the lack of an interagency consensus in Washington about the nature of the war and the appropriate strategies for waging it—especially in the domain of strategic communication and information operations.]

**D. Official Documents:** This module provides an opportunity to assess and evaluate a number of important documents published by the U.S. Government and Department of Defense. In particular students should refresh their memory of the following:

Department of Defense. "Operationalizing the Strategy," in *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C., 2006. Pages 19-39.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. February 2006.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf>

*National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.* Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2006.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>

**E. Learning Outcomes:** This case study applies the theories, themes, and frameworks examined throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners are coping with the complex challenge presented by transnational terrorism. By beginning before the 9/11 attacks and moving to the present day, this module is particularly adept at highlighting DoD and interagency change in order to address the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups. This module also builds upon the Iraq and WMD/E modules to create a powerful, multi-dimensional understanding of the contemporary security environment. Of additional note, this module equips students to:

- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives in a variety of complex settings.
- Evaluate the national military strategy, especially with respect the changing nature of warfare.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other Services—to include Special Operations Forces (SOF)) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations
- Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Analyze how information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.

## **XII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

**A. General:** In 1902, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan grappled with a new century, and the place of sea power within it, by fusing historical insights with extrapolations of contemporary trends. His study, entitled “Retrospect and Prospect,” contained some strikingly modern conclusions—for example, about the need for international “maritime consortiums”—which suggest that in strategy virtually everything old is new again. This case study follows Mahan’s example by inviting you to think about the future of strategy and policy in light of the enduring problems revealed in previous case studies and the rapidly changing character of the contemporary world.

We begin with a flashback to our first case study involving maritime strategy, the Peloponnesian War, asking you to compare the analyses of Archidamus and Pericles to the joint *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* unveiled at the Naval War College in 2007 by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. What can navies do? What problems do land powers face when confronting sea powers, and vice versa? In what ways have the problems of maritime strategy changed in the last 2,500 years? In what ways do they remain essentially the same? Does the new Maritime Strategy come to terms adequately with the recurring problems identified by Archidamus and Pericles? Does it provide sufficiently for the unique problems of the current century?

One way to answer these questions is to identify the general trends of maritime strategy in the last hundred years or so. Frank Uhlig takes a neo-Thucydidean position, arguing that it is the constants of naval warfare that are decisive in maritime strategy; Geoffrey Till looks at both naval technology and the role of navies in diplomacy; Barry Posen examines the role of navies in “command of the commons,” especially as the commons expands from the sea to the air, space, and now, cyberspace, with important implications for joint and combined strategies in the rest of the century; Paul Kennedy places the current naval arms race in Asia in the context of previous naval arms races; and Robert Kaplan wonders whether the new Maritime Strategy is merely a way to gracefully handle the strategic decline of the United States, which ended World War II with over 6,000 ships in its fleet but is now struggling to sustain a fleet of just over 300 ships.

Is Kaplan right? We cannot answer that question without looking at the potential red team. Nor can we do so without looking at alternatives to conflict. If conflict were to occur, how might our adversaries choose to fight the United States? What would victory and defeat mean, both for the United States and for its adversaries? How might we prevent such conflict, if possible, but also wage it effectively, if necessary?

Without predicting conflict with a particular country, or suggesting such conflict is inevitable, the case examines Chinese maritime strategy in relation to the maritime strategy of the United States. The 2008 version of the annual DoD report on China’s military offers a wide-ranging assessment that includes multiple courses of action China

might take regarding Taiwan, as well as a wealth of raw information about China's developing capabilities, intentions, and strategies. Lu De offers a Chinese perspective on the new U.S. Maritime Strategy. While Erickson and Goldstein highlight China's ambition to emulate the rise of previous great powers, Lord's review of the efforts of land powers to transform themselves into sea powers reveals the inherent difficulties of such an ambitious objective. Ross, however, makes the case that the traditional asymmetry between land and sea powers will endure; meaning neither the United States nor China could gain a decisive edge in a conflict. Cooperation would become a better strategy, peace a more likely outcome. He thus warns us of the danger that self-fulfilling prophecies could turn a possible partner into a strategic rival—a deep concern of the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century will witness significant changes among the maritime powers. While Europeans have consistently downsized their sea services since the end of the Cold War, powers in Asia, the Pacific, and the Arabian Gulf have all begun to pay greater attention to maritime strategy. Terrorism and competition for resources, furthermore, seem likely to make Africa an increasing focus of maritime attention. What roles might India and Iran, among many others, play in the new maritime world? Holmes and Yoshihara offer a vision of Indian maritime strategy with an uncanny resemblance to U.S. maritime strategy in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Talmadge calls on us to reflect on the ways by which a possible conflict with Iran might unfold symmetrically at sea, but also asymmetrically, for example through terrorism.

The readings close on a cautionary note. Strachan warns that mastery of all of the above may simply become irrelevant if practitioners lose sight of the vital linkage between operational creativity and broader strategy and policy—the very purpose of this course. Framing wise policies and supporting strategies promises to be even more difficult in the future, in light of the transformed, intensively transnational challenges now emerging. The National Intelligence Council's November 2008 report on *Global Trends 2025* calls attention to nontraditional security threats such as pandemics, like the plague that devastated Athens in the Peloponnesian War and the influenza pandemic at the end of the First World War. The council urges decision makers to take a proactive approach to future challenges, preserving positive trends while—to the extent possible—correcting negative ones. The final reading, the U.S. Joint Forces Command's latest effort to foresee the *Joint Operating Environment*, examines likely challenges ranging from energy security to demographics to climate change. While all predictions are imperfect, this *tour d'horizon* makes essential reading for NWC graduates poised to rejoin the operational forces.

## **B. Discussion Questions:**

1. What are the principal elements of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*?

2. Draw upon the strategic framework offered by Mahan to evaluate *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*.
3. Will technological change alter the logic or grammar of war in the coming decades, or only repackage enduring truths?
4. Looking ahead for the next ten to twenty years, how would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States without fighting? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?
5. How would the Chinese theorists Sun Tzu and Mao advise China to go about defeating U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency five years from now? Who do you expect to have the upper hand in such a contingency?
6. Are Chinese naval forces and strategy more Mahanian or Corbettian in nature? What are the implications of this analysis for the effectiveness of the 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy?
7. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the concept of sea control retain its relevance?
8. What is the proper mix between war and non-war missions for the U.S. sea services? What are the opportunity costs between optimizing the kinds of noncombat missions Geoffrey Till examines, such as naval diplomacy and presence, and wartime missions such as sea control and denial?
9. How does command of the maritime commons contribute to U.S. homeland security and defense, and how expansive should the definition of sea power be?
10. Is Strachan's warning vital and visionary, or does he risk overstating the problem?
11. Should the United States worry more about asymmetric threats, either from non-state actors or from states supporting them, or about conventional challenges from peer or near-peer competitors? What are the implications for thinking about maritime strategy?
12. What mix of conventional and unconventional strategies is best suited to defeat the United States, especially at sea? What would be the best U.S. response to prevent an adversary from employing such strategies, or to defeat them if they were employed?
13. Use the enduring course themes and strategic theorists provided in the Strategy and Policy Course as a framework for evaluating *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.

14. How might a Thucydides, a Bismarck, or a Kennan evaluate the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*? Which strategic leader would be closest to the truth about the *Cooperative Strategy*?

15. How well does the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* address the perennial problems of maritime strategy identified by Archidamus and Pericles? What is new in the strategy not seen by these strategic leaders from the past?

### C. Readings:

1. Strassler, R. B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. (New York: Free Press, 1996), Bk. I, para. 80-85; Bk. I, para. 140-144.

[This flashback to the speeches of Archidamus and Pericles in our first case study involving maritime strategy reminds us of the classic problem of a struggle between a land power and a sea power while revealing many of the core capabilities and limitations of navies in times of war.]

2. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*. (Selected Readings)

[This important statement on maritime strategy was released at the International Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College in October 2007. Some specific areas of critical importance addressed in this strategy are maritime partnerships, homeland defense, the war on terror, irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns.]

3. Uhlig, Frank. "The Constants of Naval Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 50, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pages 92-105.

<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=22&sid=1&srchmode=3&vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&clientid=18762&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=11769858&scaling=FULL&ts=1221060610&vtype=PQD&aid=1&rqt=309&TS=1221060658&clientId=18762>

[This article by Frank Uhlig, the Editor Emeritus of the *Naval War College Review*, argues that despite changes in naval technology, naval missions have remained constant at the operational level from the late eighteenth century to the present day.]

4. Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Chapters 9-10.

[The chapters from this book by one of the world's leading naval strategists explore the role of technology in naval warfare, as well as the role of navies in diplomacy and enforcing standards of international conduct.]

5. Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of

U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pages 5-46.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer/FullTextServer.asp?format=fulltext&ciid=65EFA80674BD576853F2C3EFA7E7951FBFFBCA363E66DC56F02FE71C92528B672EC76BCF8F659E1C&ftindex=1&cid=D810F93588DF71CBD955DDAE03D261401D6B4D3164B905546BB40EB7ED6B18C5&ext=.pdf>

[In this article Barry Posen, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argues that superiority at sea, in the air, and in space forms the military foundation of American dominance. He discusses the nature of that superiority as well as challenges to it. (Those who have taken the National Security and Decision Making Course will only need to review this article before seminar because they have already read it during the previous term.)]

6. Kennedy, Paul. “The Rise and Fall of Navies.” *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, 2007.

<http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=5158064>

[The internationally renowned naval historian places the current naval arms races occurring in Asia within their contemporary and historical contexts].

7. Kaplan, Robert D. “America’s Elegant Decline.” *Atlantic Monthly* (November, 2007).

<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200711/america-decline>

[Kaplan, the author of *Balkan Ghosts* and *Imperial Grunts*, applies several of the theorists, themes, and cases used in this course to assess the ends and means disparities that will confront the United States Navy in future conflicts.]

8. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008. (Selected Readings)

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/2008-prc-military-power.htm>

[The annual DoD report provides the grist for the ongoing policy debate about the potential challenge posed by China and what the United States may or may not be able to do about it.]

9. Lu De. “The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces.” Translation by Andrew Erickson, Naval War College. (Selected Readings)

[This review of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy was written by a leading Chinese admiral and received broad attention in Chinese military circles. This translation, by a researcher

at the Naval War College, offers rare insight into how others are receiving the strategy and what critiques it may encounter.]

10. Lord, Carnes. "China and Maritime Transformations." *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformations in Strategic Perspective*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009. (Selected Readings)

[Lord, the editor of the *Naval War College Review*, reviews how past land powers have sought to become sea powers, highlighting the dilemmas China will confront as it surveys its continental and maritime peripheries.]

11. Erickson, Andrew S. and Lyle Goldstein. "China Studies and the Rise of Great Powers." *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformations in Strategic Perspective*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009. (Selected Readings)

[Erickson and Goldstein, of the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, detail how Chinese analysts are sifting through history for lessons on how to manage their nation's rise to great power.]

12. Ross, Robert S. "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pages 81-118.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539295>

[This article suggests that the traditional asymmetry between sea powers and land powers will endure, thus making cooperation a better strategy and peace a more likely outcome of Sino-U.S. relations in the coming century.]

13. Holmes, James R. and Toshi Yoshihara. "India's 'Monroe Doctrine' and Asia's Maritime Future," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 32, no. 6 (November 2008), pages 997-1011. (Selected Readings)

[This essay suggests a powerful analogy between the American Monroe Doctrine, by which the United States began to rise to great naval power status, and Indian maritime strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.]

14. Talmadge, Caitlin. "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008), pages 82-117.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer/FullTextServer.asp?format=fulltext&ciid=C3D0A172470D2E70E8B52D1CDC9DD0B9360B71DAE29ADDCEC62C003729B7DA3D652D92AE8BECA312&ftindex=1&cid=7F16599CF61C5E9FDE0F00617B1AF86966E551254E1EE45F2B196CB52F84F20B&ext=.pdf>

[This reading offers an in-depth analysis of several Iranian courses of action with regard to closing or restricting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. In so doing, Talmadge

provides an excellent foundation for debating the strategic significance of Iranian capabilities.]

15. Strachan, Hew. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), pages 33-54.

<http://ejcontent.ebsco.com/ContentServer.aspx?target=http%3A%2F%2Ftaylorandfrancis%2Emetapress%2Ecom%2Findex%2FM1135431841G3P65%2Epdf>

[This article, by a noted professor of war studies at Oxford University, offers a critique of American and British policy and strategy, arguing that the term “strategy” is often misused in contemporary national security discussions.]

16. National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, November 2008. (Selected Readings)

[This report from the National Intelligence Council projects global trends out to 2025 in an effort to determine how these trends—and potential discontinuities—could influence world events and U.S. responses.]

17. U.S. Joint Forces Command. *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, November 2008. (Selected Readings)

[This study represents the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s latest effort to forecast the challenges U.S. forces will confront at the operational level in the coming years, along with the implications of such challenges.]

**D. Learning Outcomes:** This case study on Maritime Strategy and Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century applies the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the future application of maritime power across the full range of conventional and unconventional operations and along the spectrum from peace to war to peace. Students will:

- Analyze *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* by using enduring course themes and strategic theorists.
- Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy, to include the current U.S. national security strategy and military strategy.
- Apply appropriate national security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.

- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national policy.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Evaluate the national military strategy, especially with respect to the changing nature of warfare.
- Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
- Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare for, and conduct operations.
- Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined, and interagency efforts and teamwork.
- Analyze how information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.
- Assess the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. armed forces—and particularly of naval forces—in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations against the spectrum of adversaries the United States may face in the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.